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This dissertation seeks to present a constructive theology from the perspective of 
Third Culture Kids (TCKs). TCKs are persons who, due to their parents’ occupation, 
have spent a significant time of their developmental years outside of their parents’ 
home culture. While taking part in their parents’ home culture (first culture) and host 
culture (second culture), their sense of belonging tends to be with others of a similar 
background (third culture). TCKs, shaped by high mobility and cross-cultural 
experience, often have a sense of living betwixt and between different worlds and 
carry with them questions of identity and belonging. This research proposes a 
theological answer to TCKs’ questions of identity and belonging. 
First, the potential role of faith in the development of TCKs identity is examined. 
Faith provides TCKs with an internal locus of integrity and facilitates the 
consolidation of a fragmented identity on a higher level. Second, key concepts for 
understanding the experience of TCKs are identified to serve as themes with which 
to construct a meaningful theology for TCKs. Transculturality, liminality, non-place, 
liquid modernity, and constructive marginality and mediation are identified as 
relevant concepts capable of capturing the experience of feeling both at home 
everywhere and nowhere. Third, having identified key themes for a TCK theology, 
three areas of theology are addressed to propose a vision of Christianity capable of 
resonating with TCKs. The doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of the person of 
Christ, and the doctrine of salvation and human identity in God are contextualized 
utilizing Nozomu Miyahira’s theology of ‘betweenness’, Emil Brunner’s doctrine of 
the identity-bestowing ‘Gott-zum-Menschen-hin’, and ‘mediation’ in the theology of 
Thomas F. Torrance. Each doctrine is reformulated in terms of liminality, non-place, 
liquidity, and mediation in order to present a coherent theology TCKs can recognize 
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What is this dissertation about? 
This dissertation seeks to present a constructive theology from the perspective of 
Third Culture Kids (TCKs)1. TCKs are persons who, due to their parents’ 
occupation, spent a significant time growing up outside of their parents’ home 
culture. While taking part in their parents’ home culture (first culture) and host 
culture (second culture), their sense of belonging tends to be with others of a similar 
background (third culture). TCKs, shaped by high mobility and cross-cultural 
experience, often have a sense of living betwixt and between different worlds. The 
idea for this dissertation grew out of a personal dissatisfaction with the lack of a 
serious theology for and by TCKs. While the 20th century has seen the emergence of 
context specific theologies, there does not exist a proper contextualized ‘TCK 
theology’. Not only has theology failed to specifically address the concerns of TCKs 
but theology also has neglected incorporating TCKs’ insights into its discourse. 
This dissertation stands on two presuppositions: First, I believe theology has a 
meaningful contribution to make to TCKs and, second, I believe TCKs have a valid 
contribution to make to theology. Rather than merely ‘repackaging’ traditional 
theology to make it more acceptable to TCKs (thereby treating TCKs as the object of 
theology), this work seeks to identify key areas of importance to TCKs and construct 
a theology shaped by these very concerns (thereby making TCKs the subjects of 
theology). 
I believe the long Christian tradition has resources to offer to enrich TCKs’ 
global lives. I have chosen three areas in theology, (1) the doctrine of God, (2) 
Christology, and (3) Soteriology, to sketch a broad picture of a constructive theology 
that can meaningfully address TCKs’ questions of belonging and purpose. Similarly, 
                                                          
1 By ‘TCK’ I mean to include ‘Adult TCKs (ATCKs)’. Other names for TCKs are: Global Nomads, 
Third Culture Individuals. More specifically TCKs can be: Missionary Kids, Oil Kids, Military Brats, 
Diplomat Kids etc. See also: Ruth E. Van Reken, "Third Culture Kids," in International Encyclopedia 
of Education (Third Edition), ed. Penelope Peterson, Eva Baker, and Barry McGaw (Oxford: Elsevier, 
2010). Ann Baker Cottrell, "Explaining Differences: TCKs and Other CCKs, American and Japanese 
TCKs," in Writing out of Limbo: International Childhoods, Global Nomads and Third Culture Kids, 
ed. Gene H. Bell-Villada, et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2011). Ruth 
Hill Useem and Ann Baker Cottrell, "Adult Third Culture Kids," in Strangers at Home: Essays on the 
Effects of Living Overseas and Coming "Home" to a Strange Land, ed. Carolyn D. Smith (Bayside, 
NY: Aletheia, 1996). 
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I believe that the rich experiences of TCKs can be a resource for the church of this 
century and her theologians. I have chosen four TCK-themes as spectacles to bring 
into focus theological ideas that have been downplayed or overlooked by other 
theologians from different perspectives: (1) ‘liminality’, i.e. finding oneself betwixt 
and between two states,2 (2) ‘non-place’, i.e. the literal and metaphorical liminal 
space without identity, history and community,3  (3) ‘liquidity’ in identity 
construction, and (4) mediation as a constructive (as opposed to encapsulating) way 
to live out TCKs’ ‘in-betweenness’. Using these concepts as the central themes with 
which to construct a perspective specific theology, TCKs can contribute by adding to 
the richness of our corporate theological imagination. A theology for and by TCKs 
thus addresses TCKs’ issues and gives TCKs a voice in the current theological 
discourse. 
 
Who am I? 
In the interest of full disclosure, I need to state at the very beginning of this work that 
besides an academic curiosity I also have a personal interest in the matter of TCKs 
and theology. I am myself a TCK and have found theology a rich resource from 
which to draw on as well as a creative discourse within which I can express myself. 
A brief introduction of my background will serve to clarify where I come from and 
give a general sense of who TCKs are. 
I was born in 1982 in Yokohama, Japan, to German missionaries working with 
a North American mission society during their first term in the field. Our family 
repatriated to Germany every five years for a one-year furlough resulting in frequent 
and regular relocations between Japan and Germany. My two sisters and I grew up in 
the eccentric environment shaped by American missionaries, fellow German-
speaking expatriates, and our local Japanese neighbourhood. The German expatriate 
school we attended consisted of an ever changing mosaic of German, Swiss, 
Austrian, and Japanese pupils, some staying their whole childhood, others leaving as 
soon as their parent’s sponsoring agency, such as corporations, foreign ministries, 
                                                          
2 ‘Liminality’, from the Latin word for ‘threshold’, describes the ambiguous state of an individual in 
the middle of a transition. See: Victor Turner, "Liminality and Community," in Culture and Society, 
ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Stephen Seidman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
3 ‘Non-place’ was first developed by the Anthropologist Marc Augé (1935- ). See: Marc Augé, Non-




educational institutions, or mission societies, issued a reassignment or ordered a 
furlough. It was in this surreal environment that I was raised as an expatriate German 
kid in an ethnically and culturally overwhelmingly homogeneous Asian country. It 
involved the constant switching of frames of reference often resulting in hilarious 
instances of ‘chanpon’-talk.4 
I learned the language, adopted the mannerism, and gobbled up the pop culture 
of our ‘hosts’. My proudest memory is successfully holding down a job at my local 
‘izakaya’5 in my high school and university years. Yet, I grew up as the white 
German kid among Japanese peers. Friends and strangers I interacted with were 
always welcoming and many would commend me on my Japanese skills. While this 
surely was done with the best of intentions it did highlight that I was seen as an 
outsider, a ‘gaijin’6. This feeling was amplified every time my family had to stand in 
line at the immigration office in Yokohama to renew or change our visas. I needed a 
permission to reside in the country I was born in, lived in, and later would work in. 
Our ‘regular’ expatriate life was interrupted every 5 years when after a long 
haul flight we found ourselves in our supposed fatherland where everyone spoke our 
mother tongue. If in Japan I was the ‘German one’ among my friends, now I was the 
‘Japanese one’ who came every 5 years and disappeared again after a year. When in 
Japan I felt at home but was a legal alien, in Germany I felt an alien but was 
categorized a citizen. Repatriations were not easy for me as the disruption led to a 
host of questions of belonging and identity. Being bicultural and multi-lingual, I was 
a ‘both/and’-person but also a ‘neither/nor’-person. I spoke both German and 
Japanese, had a fairly adequate understanding of both countries, but I found myself 
neither a German nor a Japanese person. I did not belong anywhere. 
After completing my Abitur7 at the German expatriate school in Yokohama, I 
chose to remain in Japan to study theology at Tokyo Christian University. I was too 
much of a perpetual foreigner to be able to imagine a ‘normal’ life in my parents’ 
home country. This set me on a path of continuing mobility and cross-culturality. 
After working for two years in Japan as translator, interpreter, and language 
instructor, I crossed the Pacific to pursue graduate studies in religion at Claremont 
                                                          
4 Mixing different languages within one sentence. 
5 Traditional Japanese drinking establishment. 
6 Short for ‘gaikokujin’ (外国人) meaning ‘foreigner’. 
7 German A-level exams. 
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Graduate University in the States, returned to Tokyo to teach a further two years, and 
moved to London to undertake doctoral studies at King’s College London. 
It was the study of theology in the context of Asia8 and of other contextualized 
theologies9 in Japan and the States that led me to the question of what exactly the 
context of my theology was. Was I a culturally dislocated person and thus 
theologically homeless? Theology had to be indigenous and local if it was to make 
sense. Was the simultaneous ‘both/and’ and ‘neither/nor’ position I held as a TCK a 
valid location for theological reflection? Furthermore, I asked myself what role 
theology played in my life. Could theology function as a ‘place’ to which I belong—
a space with identity, history, and fellowship? If for me and other TCKs cross-
culturality and mobility were more salient features in our self-understanding than 
ethnicity, gender, nationality, or class, what role could Christian faith play in 
affirming my and other TCKs’ experience? 
 
What questions do I want to answer in this dissertation? 
The idea for this dissertation arose out of the many questions that confronted me in 
doing theology locally. While this dissertation cannot answer all questions regarding 
theology in the context of TCKs, I have selected to look closer at the following three 
questions: 
(a) What potential role does faith play in the lives of TCKs? 
(b) What is the context or ‘place’ of TCKs which accurately captures their 
experience, struggles, and potential? 
(c) What shape would a theology for and by TCKs take which both speaks to 
and from this particular context or ‘place’? 
These three questions roughly correspond to the three parts of this dissertation. 
 
 
                                                          
8 See for example: Kosuke Koyama, Waterbuffalo Theology (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1974). 
Kazo Kitamori, Kami No Itami No Shingaku 神の痛みの神学 (Theology of the Pain of God) (Tokyo: 
Shinkyo Shuppansha 新教出版社, 1946). Nozomu Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of 
God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity (Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster, 2000); Masao Takenaka, 
God Is Rice : Asian Culture and Christian Faith (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1986). 
9 See for example: Elizabeth A. Johnson, Quest for the Living God : Mapping Frontiers in the 
Theology of God (New York: Continuum, 2007). Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity : Global 
Perspectives (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007). 
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What attempts have been made at a theology for and by TCKs? 
Much has been written about the experience of TCKs, their struggles to identify, and 
their unique worldview. Originally published in 2001 and revised and updated in 
2007, David C. Pollock and Ruth Van Reken’s book Third Culture Kids10 stands out 
as the most widely read popular book on the topic. Notable more recent scholarly 
works include Gene H. Bell-Villada et al.’s Writing out of Limbo 11 and Saija 
Benjamin and Fred Dervin’s Migration, Diversity, and Education.12 While these 
works give us a good understanding of TCKs, they do not specifically address the 
issue of theology in the context of TCKs. 
So far two attempts worth mentioning have sought to explore the connection 
between TCKs and theology. The first are the three International Conferences on 
Missionary Kids (ICMKs) in 1984, 1987, and 1989.13 The three ICMKs looked at 
the issues of TCKs primarily through the lens of missionary kids (MKs) and thus 
naturally included a discussion of personal faith and theology in the context of cross-
culturality and mobility. Overall, two complementary views emerged out of the 
discussions: Firstly, the ICMKs affirmed that Christianity is relevant to the 
experience of MKs. Christ is described as a quasi-MK who can identify with MKs; 
Secondly, the ICMKs confirmed that MKs can play a unique role in a globalising 
church that spans across cultures, nations, and languages. MKs have the transcultural 
perspective needed for a church whose gospel must be able to transcend times and 
places. Thus, the ICMKs kicked off an important discussion of how Christianity 
relates to the experience of TCKs and how TCKs can contribute to the church. The 
emotional well-being of TCKs within the church became a key point of discussion. 
However, their theological attempts were rudimentary at best, more pastorally and 
                                                          
10 David C. Pollock and Ruth E. Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised 
Edition (London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2009). 
11 Gene H. Bell-Villada et al., eds., Writing out of Limbo: International Childhoods, Global Nomads 
and Third Culture Kids (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2011). 
12 Saija Benjamin and Fred Dervin, eds., Migration, Diversity, and Education : Beyond Third Culture 
Kids (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
13 Compendiums of the three ICMKs are: Beth A. Tetzel and Pam Mortenson, eds., Compendium of 
the International Conference on Missionary Kids: New Directions in Missions: Implications for MKs, 
Manila, Philippines, November, 1984 (West Battleboro, VT: ICMK, 1986). Pam Echerd and Alice 
Arathoon, eds., Understanding and Nurturing the Missionary Family: Compendium of the 
International Conference on Missionary Kids: Quito, Ecuador, January 4-8, 1987 (Pasadena, CA: 
William Carey Library, 1989). Planning for MK Nurture: Compendium of the International 
Conference on Missionary Kids: Quito, Ecuador, January 4-8, 1987 (Pasadena, CA: William Carey 
Library, 1989). Joyce M. Bowers, ed. Raising Resilient MKs: Resources for Caregivers, Parents, and 
Teachers (Colorado Springs, CO: Association of Christian Schools International, 1998). 
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practically than systematically oriented, and focused one-sidedly on the experience 
of Christ without making connections to other aspects of theology. 
The second attempt at an integration of TCKs and theology came much more 
recently in the form of David Gibbon’s 2007 popular book The Monkey and the 
Fish.14 Gibbons, himself biracial and a TCK, argues that ‘third culture’ captures the 
essence of the gospel. Gibbons uses ‘third culture’ quite liberally as referring to the 
mindset willing to reach out across boundaries and leave one’s comfort zone even at 
the cost of risking pain. The book argues, mostly through catchy slogans and 
anecdotes, that Christians are all called to act in this ‘third culture way’. Gibbon’s 
book is certainly thought-provoking in that he looks at the gospel through the lens of 
TCKs. In this sense, his book is one of a kind. Gibbon’s ideas leave the Christian 
TCK feeling affirmed in their experience and valued as an insider who has already 
understood a vital principle of the gospel that many non-TCKs have failed to see. 
Gibbons echoes our presupposition that TCKs have something unique to contribute 
to Christianity. However, The Monkey and the Fish is meant to motivate and inspire 
leaders to act generously towards others rather than reflect theologically on the 
experience of TCKs. Thus, it fails to present anything beyond a practical guide to 
leadership and lacks in theological depth. 
These two most prominent examples of grappling with the emergence of TCKs 
from a Christian point of view highlight the fact that there is both interest and 
potential in a constructive theology for and by TCKs, especially as MKs are a major 
subgroup of TCKs. Both examples, however, lack a substantial engagement with 
theology that is systematic, broad, and coherent. To my knowledge, no work exists 
that has succeeded in filling this gap in scholarship. 
 
What is my methodology? 
In my pursuit of making sense of Christianity for TCKs, I have adopted a method 
similar to Paul Tillich’s ‘method of correlation’.15 Tillich employed as his method 
the correlation of our human situation with the Christian message. Our human 
situation raises important questions about who we are. Theology presents the 
                                                          
14 Dave Gibbons, The Monkey and the Fish : Liquid Leadership for a Third-Culture Church (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2009). 
15 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 59-66. For 
a brief summary and analysis of Tillich’s ‘method of correlation’, see: Bernard M. Loomer, "Tillich's 
Theology of Correlation," The Journal of Religion 36, no. 3 (1956). 
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Christian message as an answer that fits these existential questions through a 
correlating, common element.16 It is thus the theologian’s task to analyse the current 
predicament humans find themselves in and construct a theology which speaks to 
that very situation. 
Given the method, this dissertation is naturally divided into two halves: The 
first half (part one and two) is dedicated to the analysis of the situation of TCKs and 
the identification of core themes we can use to relate theology to TCKs. The two 
foremost questions that TCKs ask are the question of identity and place: Who am I? 
Where do I belong? Core themes to help connect TCK’s situation and theology are 
liminality, non-place, liquidity, and mediation. 
The latter half (part three) is dedicated to the exploration of a theological 
answer to the questions implied in the situation of TCKs using the core TCK themes 
as the correlating elements. Correlation will take the dual form of both continuity and 
contrast. On the one hand, I want to present a constructive theology that utilizes the 
very themes that describe TCKs’ outlook to present this theology in a relevant 
manner. Here a natural continuity between the situation and the message is needed. 
TCKs must be able to recognize themselves in their theology. On the other hand, 
TCKs’ predicament must be met with a contrasting theological resolution. The 
questions of the context must be met with a resonating theological answer. The 
crippling ‘encapsulating marginality’ many TCKs experience as a result of their 
unique upbringing must be met with a purposeful ‘constructive marginality’ in the 
Trinity and in Christ. 
 
What is the structure of this dissertation? 
I have divided this dissertation into three parts. In part one, I will begin with the 
analysis of the current situation TCKs find themselves in. This entails defining 
‘TCK’, reflecting on common TCK experiences, analysing how TCKs develop their 
identity, exploring the role personal faith plays in that identity development, and 
finally reviewing the attempts of contextualizing theology for TCKs. 
In the second part, I will build on our findings and identify core concepts to 
correlate theology with the experience of TCKs. This entails looking closely at (a) 
transculturality, (b) liminality, (c) non-place, (d) liquid modernity, (e) encapsulating 
                                                          
16 Existentialism in Tillich’s case. 
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and constructive marginality (mediation).  Central to all of them is the idea that 
TCKs are ‘in-between people’ who, positioned between differing parties, are both 
‘both/and’ and also ‘neither/nor’. These concepts will serve as the basic building 
blocks when subsequently constructing a theology for and by TCKs. 
In part three, we will delve into our primary objective which is to construct a 
resonating theology TCKs are able to recognize themselves in and identify with. In 
this most substantial part I chose three theologians as my dialogue partners: the 
Japanese theologian Nozomu Miyahira (1966 –), the Swiss theologian Emil Brunner 
(1889 – 1966), and the Scottish theologian Thomas F. Torrance (1913 – 2007). With 
the help of these three, I will construct a TCK specific theology covering three areas: 
the doctrine of God in three eternally liminal persons (Trinity), the person and work 
of Christ as liminal mediator (Christology), and the new-found identity of believers 
as mediators through the liminality of the Christ’s life and death (soteriology). The 
theology of Torrance will be the most substantial source in the development of these 
three theological areas. 
 
Why Miyahira, Brunner, and Torrance? 
The choice of these three theologians from such different backgrounds is not 
arbitrary. First, all three reflect my own personal diversity: a Japanese theologian, a 
German-speaking theologian, and a missionary kid. More importantly, however, 
each thinker supports the construction of a TCK-theology: a theologian engaged in 
contextualization, a theologian addressing the question of who humans are in the 
face of nationalism, and a theologian who has woven ‘mediation’ into the very fabric 
of his theology. 
Miyahira will serve to set us on the path towards a contextualized theology. In 
his work Towards a Theology of Concord: a Japanese Perspective on the Trinity17 
Miyahira, first, makes a strong case for the contextualization of theology, second, 
demonstrates this by making use of the Japanese concept of ‘betweenness’ (aida/kan, 
間), a concept similar to that of liminality, and, finally, gives us a theological 
structure we can adopt. He is an ally in his methodology and in his use of 
‘betweenness’ as a resource for theology. Miyahira will give us an example I can 
imitate when using liminality, non-place, and mediation as our key concepts. His 
                                                          
17 Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity. 
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theology is structured around three areas, (a) Trinity, (b) Christology, and (c) 
believers’ identity, all treated with ‘betweenness’ as their core theme. This also gives 
us an idea of the scope such a contextualized theology should have to demonstrate 
sufficient coherence and breadth. 
Brunner will help us address the issue of Christian identity in contrast to a 
national identity. His 1938 work Wahrheit als Begegnung18 is written against the 
backdrop of the Third Reich and deals with the questions of what humans are and 
who defines humans. Brunner’s vision of a Christian identity bestowed on the 
believer by God through the participation in the death of Christ differs from how 
Nazi Germany sought to consolidate its national identity. This extreme case of the 
conflict between a national and ethnocentric identity and a transnational and 
transcultural identity in Christ will help us demonstrate how Christian faith plays a 
crucial role in liberating the TCK from the encapsulating marginality of conflicting 
demands by different cultures and countries. Brunner’s portrait of God as the 
dynamic ‘God- towards-humanity’ who re-establishes humanity as ‘humanity-from-
God’ will also supplement Miyahira’s more static God of ‘betweenness’ and 
prepares us for a more explicit doctrine of the Trinity with liminality at its centre. 
Finally, Torrance will serve to flesh out our theological construct and give it its 
depth. Three reasons justify our use of Torrance: First, he is himself a missionary kid 
and qualifies as a quasi-TCK. His theology undeniably reflects a missionary 
sensibility and lends itself naturally to our agenda. Second, in Torrance we have a 
theological heavyweight as a sparring partner. His extraordinary theological breadth 
and depth will supply the vital theological resources to set this project on a solid 
foundation.19 Third, his theology heavily features ‘mediation’ between the persons of 
the Trinity in the economy as well as between the two natures of Christ in the 
incarnation.  Since mediation is one of the core concepts we will use to relate 
theology to TCKs’ experience, Torrance’s theology is the perfect choice as a 
springboard for a more explicit TCK theology. 
 
                                                          
18 Emil Brunner, Wahrheit als Begegnung (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1938). English: Truth as 
Encounter : A New Ed., Much Enlarged, of "the Divine-Human Encounter" (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1964). 
19 I make extensive use of the following works: Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: 
One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996); The Mediation of Christ (Colorado 
Springs, CO: Helmers & Howard, 1992); Incarnation : The Person and Life of Christ, ed. Robert T. 
Walker (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2008). 
16 
 
Why Trinity, Christ, and Christian Identity? 
Given the granted space, I have had to limit myself to exploring only three areas of 
theology to make my case for a theology for and by TCKs. These are the doctrine of 
the Trinity, the doctrine of the person and work of Christ, and the doctrine of 
Christian identity. I have found that these three doctrines lend themselves most 
naturally to a theology with ‘betweenness’ at its heart. Just as TCKs are the bilingual 
and bicultural mediators betwixt and between ‘home’ and ‘host’, so in theology 
Christ is the ‘bilingual’ and ‘bicultural’ mediator in between God and humanity. 
Together the three selected theological areas (God-Christ-humanity) thus mirror the 
theme of being located between two dissimilar places. Each individual area will also 
feature ‘betweenness’ at its core. 
Our constructive theology needs to conclude with a definite answer to the 
questions of ‘who am I and where do I belong?’ and thus the doctrine of our newly 
founded identity as liminal mediators in Christ naturally comes at the end. If we 
position the question of our human identity at one end, then it makes the most sense 
to position God’s identity as the eternally liminal being on the other end as its 
corresponding counterpart. This means that Christ, the mediating person between 
God and humanity, naturally fits in between as a link that binds the two together. In 
constructing our theology, the doctrine of God will thus come first, followed by the 
doctrine of Christ in between and the doctrine of the identity of believers at the end. 
Of course, the treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity requires touching upon 
the revelation of God through the Son and the Spirit in the economy but it seemed 
appropriate to discuss the mediating person and work of Christ separately and in the 
light of who God is in Godself. This will show that what God does in Christ 
corresponds with who God is antecedently, inherently, and eternally. References to 
the person of Christ as a TCK-figure abound and thus it felt only right to set this in 
the context of where Christ comes from (Trinity) in order to then properly address 
what Christ achieves (Christian identity). 
Thus while our theological exploration has the doctrine of Christ at its centre, 
the doctrine of God is its foundation and the doctrine of the Christian identity its 
outcome. In treating the doctrine of God first, the doctrine of Christ second, and the 
doctrine of Christian identity last, a theology for and by TCKs portrays a natural 
movement that goes out from God and flows into creation through Christ to reach its 
fulfilment in humanity’s return to God. These three elements, God, Christ, and 
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Christian identity, are the least amount of pillars necessary upon which to construct a 
coherent picture of a theology for and by TCKs. Additionally, they also leave 
sufficient space to further develop this theology in other areas in the future. 
 
What is the hoped for outcome of a theology for and by TCKs? 
Ruth Van Reken and David C. Pollock describe TCKs as often suffering from a deep 
sense of rootlessness and restlessness.20 ‘Where are you from?’ can be a dreaded 
question for someone who seems to be from all over the place and at the same time 
from nowhere. TCKs often long for a ‘home’ in their fragmented life. Mobility 
during the developmental years also often leads to a migratory instinct that reminds 
TCKs that every place they find themselves in is only temporary. When one’s 
memories are scattered all over the globe the only hope to feel ‘at one’ seems to be 
by continuously moving. This restlessness can prevent TCKs from forming lasting 
commitments and discovering their purpose in life. It is my hope that this 
dissertation can help rootless and restless TCKs discover belonging even in their 
rootlessness and a commitment to a purpose even in their restlessness in the 
Christian message. I hope TCKs can feel affirmed in their experience through a 
tailor-made theology for TCKs. 
At the same time, it is my hope that non-TCKs can benefit from the addition of 
TCKs’ perspective to the study of theology. If the world continues on its path of 
globalization, TCKs are the perfect population to study in order to understand the 
future challenges a multi-national, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic church will face. If, 
as Pollock and Van Reken suggest, “TCKs [are] the prototype citizens of future”21 
the study of TCKs gives us a glimpse of what will inevitably also become true for a 
significant portion of the global population. A theology by TCKs is thus a first step 
towards a full-fledged theology for the 21st century able to address the pressing 
issues of identity and belonging in the context of transculturality and mobility. 
  
                                                          
20 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 123-29. 














Who are Third Culture Kids? 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of part one (chapters 2 to 6) is to define who TCKs are, summarize the 
experience of growing up as a TCK under four key themes, and analyse how 
spirituality in general and Christianity in particular assist TCKs in their identity 
development. Part one concludes with the review of two attempts to make sense of 
TCKs in the context of Christianity. This chapter analyses the definition of ‘TCK’. 
 
Definition of Third Culture Kids 
This chapter will review the standard definition of ‘TCK’ and present a profile. 
David Pollock's description of who a third culture kid (TCK) is has become accepted 
as the standard definition.22 He defines TCKs as follows: 
A Third Culture Kid (TCK) is a person who has spent a significant part of his or 
her developmental years outside their parents' culture. The TCK frequently builds 
relationships to all of the cultures, while not having full ownership in any. 
Although elements from each culture may be assimilated into the TCK's life 
experience, the sense of belonging is in relationship to others of similar 
background.23 
Additionally, the term “global nomad”, originally coined by Norma McCaig24, has 
come to mean the same as third culture kid. Barbara F. Schaetti has offered a 
definition of global nomad: 
Global nomads are persons of any age or nationality who have lived a significant part 
of their developmental years in one or more countries outside their passport country 
because of a parent's occupation. Children raised as global nomads can be the 
offspring of diplomatic, international business, government agency, international 
agency, missionary, or military personnel, or indeed of people living internationally 
mobile lives for any professional reason. Typically, global nomads share a unique 
cultural heritage.25 
I treat TCK and global nomad synonymously. The two definitions offer several 
marks of what it means to be a TCK. 
                                                          
22 See for example: Van Reken, "Third Culture Kids." 
23 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 13. 
24 Barbara F. Schaetti, "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a Developmental Model" 
(Unpublished PhD dissertation, The Graduate College of The Union Institute, 2000), 68. 
25 Barbara F Schaetti and Sheila J. Ramsey, "The Global Nomad Experience: Living in Liminality," 
Mobility, September 1999. 
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Any Age: The experience of growing up as an internationally mobile person 
exerts its influence even when a TCK becomes an adult and/or settles down and 
might never move again. Schaetti writes “once a global nomad (or TCK), always a 
global nomad.”26 Instead of becoming ‘former TCKs’, they grow up to become adult 
third culture kids (ATCKs). This dissertation includes ATCKs under the term TCK. 
Studies usually distinguish between three periods in TCKs’ lives: while still abroad 
during developmental years, immediately after repatriation (usually during college), 
and long after repatriation. 
Nationality: The majority of research focuses on TCKs with US American 
parents. Major studies have also been done among Japanese TCKs (so-called Kaigai 
/ kikoku-shijos).27 Some studies have included TCKs of different nationalities28 and 
also compared TCKs of different nationalities.29 Different national subgroups might 
face different challenges abroad and upon repatriation and exhibit slightly different 
characteristics,30 however, the consensus is that TCKs are a transnational 
phenomenon.31 
Significant part of their developmental years: Pollock and Van Reken argue 
that the number of years spent abroad alone does not determine the impact that the 
third culture experience has on the person's development and, therefore, it is 
impossible to suggest a lower limit of years that a person must have spent abroad to 
qualify as a TCK.32 Other variables, such as the person's age during the years abroad, 
personality, or degree of participation in the host culture, determine the extent to 
which that person grows up as a TCK. However, a correlation exists between the 
number of years spent abroad and the degree of worldmindedness in the TCK.33 
                                                          
26 Schaetti, "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a Developmental Model," 69. 
27 Momo Kano Podolsky, "Cross-Cultural Upbringing: A Comparison of the "Third Culture Kids" 
Framework and "Kaigai/Kikoku-Shijo" Studies," Contemporary Society (Kyoto Women's University 
Bulletin) 6 (2007). 
28 Helen Fail, Jeff Thompson, and George Walker, "Belonging, Identity and Third Culture Kids Life 
Histories of Former International School Students," Journal of Reserach in International Education 3, 
no. 3 (2004). 
29 Michael Gerner et al., "Characteristics of Internationally Mobile Adolescents," Journal of School 
Psychology 30, no. 2 (1992). 
30 See for example: Anu Warinowsi, "Finnish Expatriate Families and Their Children: A 
Complementary Viewpoint," in Writing out of Limbo: International Childhoods, Global Nomads and 
Third Culture Kids, ed. Gene H. Bell-Villada, et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars 
Pub., 2011). 
31 Schaetti, "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a Developmental Model," 69-70. 
32 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 21. 
33 Thomas P. Gleason, "The Overseas-Experienced American Adolescent and Patterns of 
Worldmindedness," Adolescence 8, no. 32 (1973).  
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Developmental years: Although the number of years that a person must have 
spent abroad is ambiguous, the time when the person experiences international 
mobility is precisely defined. Pollock and Van Reken write that, “[i]t must occur 
during the developmental years – from birth to eighteen years of age.”34 This is time 
when the person develops their sense of self. Laura Cockburn argues that two age 
groups are especially influenced by cross cultural encounters and mobility.35 First, 
children under five are at the stage of building their security and developmental 
skills. Second, young people in their adolescence years undergo a transition in their 
lives where their sense of identity takes on greater significance. Exposure to mobility 
and intercultural experience during these two times intensify the impact on the TCK. 
One or more countries: Schaetti uses ‘country’ and Pollock employs ‘culture’ 
to describe the temporary environment that differs significantly from the parent's 
country/culture. Foreign country and foreign culture might coincide but do not have 
to. So-called ‘domestic TCKs’ can go through a similar third culture experience 
moving from one subculture to another without ever crossing international borders.36 
Although studies do not usually make a distinction between the number of countries 
a person has lived in, research suggests that the more countries or cultures a person 
has lived in the more worldminded the TCK becomes37 and the closer the expatriate 
family grows.38 Even those who stay in a single host country are constantly exposed 
to mobility and change as members of the expatriate community regularly transfer in 
and out of the TCK's life. Furthermore, the degree of difference between the host 
culture and the parent's culture seems to impact TCKs' experience during 
expatriation and repatriation.39 The meaning of ‘third culture’ is stretched as there 
might be more than one first country/culture in case of multinational/multicultural 
families and more than one second country/culture in the case of multiple overseas 
                                                          
34 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 21. 
35 Laura Cockburn, "Children and Young People Living in Changing Worlds," School Psychology 
International 23, no. 4 (2002): 480. 
36 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 32. 
37 Gleason, "The Overseas-Experienced American Adolescent and Patterns of Worldmindedness." 
38 Ruth Hill Useem and Richard D. Downie, "Third-Culture Kids," Today's Education 65, no. 3 
(1976). Reprints of his article can also be found as chapters in the following two books: Karen 
Curnow McCluskey, ed. Notes from a Traveling Childhood: Readings for Internationally Mobile 
Parents and Children (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Youth Foundation, 1994), 65-71. Bell-
Villada et al., Writing out of Limbo: International Childhoods, Global Nomads and Third Culture 
Kids, 18-24. 
39 Schaetti, "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a Developmental Model," 72. 
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assignments. ‘Third’ here takes on the meaning of ‘in-between’ rather than its 
numerical value. 
Passport country/culture: Rarely is a TCK's ‘home’ identical with the passport 
country and culture. The passport country/culture often designates an inherited 
culture that TCKs might only experience indirectly through what they learn from 
their parents, short vacations or furloughs, representations in the media, and/or 
passport country schools in host countries. TCKs' expectations of what the passport 
country is like are likely to be unrealistic.40 Furthermore, TCKs might have more 
than one nationality, further complicating the identification with a specific passport 
country. In any case, Carolyn Smith suggests that some TCKs develop a “Rubber-
Band Nationality” that is stretched beyond the confines of a single nation.41 Smith 
writes that, on the one hand, TCKs might “feel like a citizen from all over”42 and, on 
the other hand, might simultaneously “[not] feel that they 'belong' anywhere.”43 
Whereas for non-TCK peers ‘belonging’, ‘home’, and ‘nationality’ usually coincide, 
this is rarely the case for TCKs. Furthermore, the TCK's parents' sense of belonging 
to the passport country and the TCK's sense of passport country affiliation often 
differ significantly. Thus even among family members ‘nationality’ is experienced 
differently. 
Parents’ occupation: Instead of national origin, the TCKs' parents' occupation 
and the sponsoring organization serve to classify TCKs into subgroups. Ruth Hill 
Useem and Richard Downie write that “one of the first questions a TCK asks a new 
arrival is 'What does your father do?’ Or 'Who is your father with?' The answer helps 
to place young people socially.”44 Typically sponsoring agencies include mission 
societies, the military, the state departments (embassies), international and 
multinational corporations (e.g. oil companies), academic institutions (e.g. 
international schools, universities), and international organizations (e.g. WHO, 
Unicef). Useem and Downie comment that TCKs' parents are “usually highly 
educated or highly skilled people who are forging the networks that intertwine and 
                                                          
40 Ibid., 73. 
41 Carolyn D. Smith, "World Citizens and "Rubber-Band Nationality"," in Strangers at Home: Essays 
on the Effects of Living Overseas and Coming "Home" to a Strange Land, ed. Carolyn D. Smith 
(Bayside, New York: Aletheia Publications, 1996). 
42 Ibid., 190. 
43 Ibid., 197. 
44 Ruth Hill Useem and Richard D. Downie, "Third-Culture Kids," in Writing out of Limbo: 
International Childhoods, Global Nomads and Third Culture Kids, ed. Gene H. Bell-Villada, et al. 
(Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2011), 19. 
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interrelate the peoples of the world.”45 According to Thomas Gleason, the family’s 
sponsoring agency directly influences the degree to which a TCK comes into contact 
with the host people and culture.46 The closer ties the TCK builds to the host country 
to the more worldminded the TCK becomes. Among the first five sponsors 
mentioned above, on average, missionary kids spend the longest time abroad, learn 
more second and third languages, and feel more at home in the host country 
compared to dependants of other sponsor agency workers.47 One common aspect that 
TCKs who grow up within the organizational structures of their parents' sponsors 
have is what Ruth Hill Useem calls “representational roles.”48 TCKs are seen as 
“little ambassadors” and their actions are taken to reflect the sponsoring 
organization.49 TCKs are often taught that their families are representatives of 
“something bigger” such as the government, God, headquarters, etc. and the whole 
family is expected to conform to the organizations' values and standards.50 This often 
means that TCKs have to put their parent's sponsoring organization's demands first, 
and their own wishes second. For example, relocations are often ordered by the 
agencies and leave the TCK with the impression that their lives are governed by a 
higher authority and that resistance is futile. 
Build relationship to all of the cultures while not having full ownership in 
any: Due to the international mobility, a TCK's friends and memories are scattered 
all over the world. Similarly, a TCK’s cultural heritage and linguistic skills draw on 
a multitude of sources. In this sense, a TCK is ‘at home everywhere.’ At the same 
time, however, Pollock and Van Reken suggest that this also gives rise to the notion 
that TCKs are ‘at home nowhere’ as it is impossible to bring the plethora of 
influences that constitutes the TCK into the “here and now.”51 Home continues to 
elude the TCK and is deferred to the “there and then.” While growing up under the 
influence of particular cultures, full ownership in the culture, even if desired by the 
TCK, is often denied by the host population due to legal restrictions, ethnicity, 
language barriers, and/or educational differences among other factors. This issue of 
being “at home everywhere and nowhere” or, in other words, “a part of and apart 
                                                          
45 Ibid. 
46 Gleason, "The Overseas-Experienced American Adolescent and Patterns of Worldmindedness." 
47 Ibid. 
48 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 15. 
49 Cottrell, "Explaining Differences: Tcks and Other Ccks, American and Japanese Tcks," 60-61. 
50 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 18. 
51 Ibid., 23. 
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from” host and passport cultures typically causes a deep sense of rootlessness and 
restlessness in the TCK's life.52 
Elements from each culture may be assimilated: Cultural practices from the 
passport as well as host country/ies are incorporated into the cultural heritage of 
TCKs. Each place that the TCK spends time at during the formative years leaves its 
distinctive mark on the TCK’s sense of self, thereby creating what might appear as a 
diversity of people with not only different nationalities, languages, classes, 
ethnicities, but also differing cultural norms and values. However, Pollock and Van 
Reken argue that “the third culture is more than the sum total of the parts of home 
and host culture. If it were only that, each TCK would remain alone in his or her 
experience.”53 In other words, the third culture is not a “hybrid culture” and TCKs 
are not primarily categorized as bi/multi-cultural. Affirming Pollock and Van 
Reken's point, Ann Baker Cottrell argues that “TCKs incorporate a feeling of 
connection with all the countries and peoples they have experienced as a TCK, but 
ownership of none.”54 Thus while being influenced by various cultures, TCKs do not 
fully identify with any of the individual strands of influences in their lives and any 
one of these cultural sources cannot fully account for the TCK experience. Thus the 
above statement must be understood in the context of the following statement. 
Share a unique cultural heritage / the sense of belonging is in relationship to 
others of similar background: Pollock and Van Reken argue that “although each 
[TCK] has differing points of identification with his or her host culture (…) it is 
obvious that their commonalities of feelings and experiences far outweigh their 
differences”55 and Cottrell adds that “in spite of these significant differences, TCKs 
from all different passport countries find an immediate bond with one another.”56 
The unique heritage that TCKs share and belong to is the ‘third culture’. Van Reken 
observed that when TCKs meet there is an “instant, almost magical connection” 
Pollock called “a reunion of strangers.”57 Bill Peterson and Laila Plamondon 
remarked the following in the conclusion of their study of TCKs: 
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55 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 26. 
56 Cottrell, "TCKs and Other Cross Cultural-Kids," 57. 
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Despite diversity in TCK membership, interviewees talked about “the TCK experience” 
in an unusually unified way. No matter how different the overt content of their stories, 
TCKs seemed to share a latent script. (…) This underlying script revolves around the 
shared experience of having grown up abroad. The exact country did not matter; the 
interviewees all expressed the feeling that they were part of a special in-group who were 
different from American peers living domestically.58 
The fragmentation experienced of neither fully belonging to the host nor 
passport country works as a source of solidarity with others of similar 
experience and is more salient in the TCK's self-concept than their ties to either 
host or passport country. Thus, the similarities to other TCKs carry more 
meaning than the similarities to host or passport country peers. 
In conclusion, from the definition of TCKs there emerges the concept of 
a group of people that creates a sense of belonging which deviates from 
conventional identification following national, racial, or ethnic demarcations. 
Although rather exclusive due to the TCK’s highly unusual circumstances 
during the developmental years, it is simultaneously a radically inclusive group 
that disregards national, racial, or ethnic backgrounds in favour of a shared 
experience that highlights common humanity.59 In an increasingly globalizing 
world their significance cannot be underestimated. Rather than marginal roles, 
TCKs play central roles in the important contact zones where differences clash 
and are negotiated.60 Rather than fragmented identities, TCKs display 
integrated identities. Rather than isolated figures, TCKs act as links between 
various groups of people.  
From reviewing the definition of TCKs, there emerges the concept of 
‘the third’ or ‘the in-between’ which is both ‘neither/nor’ and simultaneously 
‘both/and’. It cannot be reduced to the sum of its individual influences.  
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Themes in Third Culture Kid Literature 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will further explore the characteristics of TCKs following the four 
common themes proposed by Barbara Schaetti: change, relationships, worldview, 
and cultural orientation.61 These four themes will supplement the static definition of 




Change is one of the few constants that accompany TCKs throughout their 
internationally mobile upbringings. From early on, TCKs learn not only to survive 
change, but to thrive amidst change. Even when not moving themselves, members of 
the expatriate community constantly come and go as they are transferred by their 
sponsoring organizations. Norma McCaig writes that: 
in an era when global vision is an imperative, when skills in intercultural 
communication, linguistic ability, mediation, diplomacy, and the management of 
diversity are critical, global nomads are better equipped in these areas by the age of 
eighteen than are many adults. Why? Because they have spent years developing these 
skills as strategies for social survival in times of transition.62 
TCKs learn to become flexible and adaptable when faced with multiple occasions of 
change.63 The majority of TCKs state that they can “relate to anyone regardless of 
differences such as race, ethnicity, religion, or nationality.”64 McCaig speaks of 
TCKs acting like “cultural chameleons”65 capable of carefully observing their 
situations and conforming to the demands of each. This makes them “keen observers 
                                                          
61 Schaetti and Ramsey, "The Global Nomad Experience: Living in Liminality." Schaetti and 
Ramsey’s article is published online. I will use paragraph numbers instead of page numbers. For a 
detailed analysis see: Schaetti, "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a Developmental Model," 77-
83. 
62 Norma M. McCaig, "Understanding Global Nomads," in Strangers at Home: Essays on the Effects 
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of human behaviour, developing the invaluable ability to suspend judgment while 
examining both sides of an issue or situation.”66 The experience of constant change 
thus gives TCKs an advantage when facing difference. 
With constant change also comes lifelong restlessness. Schaetti observes 
that “[i]t is not uncommon that [TCKs] develop a measure of confidence in the 
process of change, and perhaps even become so accustomed to change that life 
without it seems somehow incomplete.”67 This sense of restlessness, rooted in 
the regular pattern of mobility, is behind the urge to keep on moving even in 
adulthood that a majority of TCKs experience. Even when settling in one place, 
adult TCKs often generate periodic and regular change by switching jobs or 
merely rearranging household furniture.68 
Finally, constant geographical change poses a difficulty for TCKs when 
faced with the question of ‘where are you from?’ and ‘who are you?’. Schaetti 
suggests ‘home’ is typically not a singular geographical place but a plurality of 
relationships.69 Furthermore, the question of belonging cannot be answered in 
terms of a single place or even multiple places but must be answered in terms 
of alternative non-contingent categories. This also means it takes TCKs longer 
than their non-TCK peers to figure out who they are and while TCKs can be 
better at adapting they are slow to commit.70 Thus, change, while helping 
TCKs develop invaluable skills to cope with difference, leaves them with a 
deep sense of “rootlessness and restlessness”71 that usually lasts a lifetime. 
 
2. Relationships 
Pollock and Van Reken argue that due to the constant flux of people entering 
and leaving TCKs' lives, they “build a rich international network [of people]” 
which spans the world.72 This is an example of the fragmentation of TCKs’ 
sense of who they are. It is often not easy to keep up with all relationships and 
might result in disappointments and feelings of loss. However, TCKs also learn 
                                                          
66 Ibid., 100-01. 
67 Schaetti and Ramsey, "The Global Nomad Experience: Living in Liminality," par. 4. 
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to enter into deep and valued relationships relatively quicker than their non-
TCK peers. Pollock and Van Reken give three reasons TCKs skip superficial 
levels of conversation to relate to others at a deeper level.73 
First, TCKs jump into relationships fairly quickly because they have had 
to start so many. Pollock and Van Reken write that TCKs “have learned to 
observe the dynamics of a situation, ask questions that can help open a door, 
hopefully be sensitive to cultural cues of what is or is not appropriate (…), and 
respond appropriately.”74 Whereas non-TCKs might at first shy away from 
topics which require to give one's opinion or express one's deeper feelings, 
TCKs see it as an opportunity to connect with the counterpart more efficiently. 
Second, TCKs’ international experience naturally influences their choice 
of topic in favour of international politics, crises, differing religious or cultural 
views, etc. TCKs feel more comfortable having a discussion about these topics 
than conversations about pop culture that their passport country peers might 
find more entertaining. 
Third, TCKs hasten to develop relationships because of previous 
experiences of having to say goodbye too soon too often. “Why waste time in 
small talk?”75 Pollock and Van Reken ask, when there might not be another 
opportunity to get to know the person better. Thus, the TCK lifestyle can result 
in “forced extroversion.”76 At the same time, TCKs learn not to get too 
emotionally involved and dependent on the relationship as they instinctively 
feel that they have to protect themselves from the pain of losing that 
relationship. This is reflected in the fact that Pollock and Van Reken devote 
two major sections of their book on “unresolved grief” caused by cycles of 
losses of relationships, status, lifestyle, possessions, role models, system 
identities, etc., resulting in denial, anger, depression, withdrawal, rebellion, 
vicarious grief, or delayed grief.77 
Furthermore, TCKs' relationships to other TCKs are often based on the 
common experience of difference. TCKs bond with others of similar 
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experience due to the fact that they neither fit into the host nor passport country 
environment. Schaetti concludes that “these relationships [to other TCKs] give 
global nomads their sense of belonging.”78 Relationships are thus the basis of 
fragmentation that distinguishes TCKs from their non-TCK peers as well as the 
basis of their sense of belonging to TCKs. 
 
3. Wordview 
One of the most distinctive marks of TCKs is their expanded worldview. 
Thomas Gleason argues that TCKs exhibit patterns of ‘worldmindedness’, 
defined as “an expression or manifestation of openmindedness toward differing 
concepts of national identity and cross-cultural values.”79 New patterns of 
behaviour emerge from this worldview. Pollock and Van Reken call it a “three 
dimensional view of the world” and argue that it gives TCKs the sense that 
there is more than one way to look at the same issue.80 They explain that, 
because [TCKs] have lived in so many places, smelled so many smells, heard so many 
strange sounds, and been in so many strange situations, throughout their lives when 
they read a story in the newspaper or watch it on TV, the flat odorless images there 
transform into an internal 3-D panoramic picture show.81 
TCKs thus often have a more realistic perspective of the diversity and complexity of 
life due to their global experience. The TCK's perspective extends beyond national 
borders and is capable of holding several opposing points of view at the same time. 
Therefore, Schaetti argues that TCKs are aware that “truth is relative”82 with which 
she means that cultural values are seen as relative by the TCK. TCKs’ ethnorelative 
position (as opposed to ethnocentric) shows appreciation of different norms and 
values in differing contexts and the awareness that all positions are culturally 
influenced.83 
According to Schaetti, underlying the ability to suspend judgment and accept 
situational values and norms is the view that different people all share a 
                                                          
78 Schaetti, "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a Developmental Model," 80. 
79 Gleason, "The Overseas-Experienced American Adolescent and Patterns of Worldmindedness," 
487. 
80 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 88. 
81 Ibid., 93. 
82 Schaetti, "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a Developmental Model," 80. 
83 For more on ethnorelativism, see: Milton J Bennet, "Towards Ethnocentrism: A Developmental 
Model of Intercultural Sensitivity," in Education for the Intercultural Experience, ed. R. Michael 
Paige (Main, USA: Intercultural Press, 1993). 
30 
 
“fundamental humanness.”84 Pollock and Van Reken make the same point when they 
argue that TCKs see through the national, racial, ethnic, or economic differences to 
connect with people through their common humanity. According to the two authors, 
“[w]hen TCKS (…) see this most fundamental fact of the human likeness they share 
with others, they don't need to fear losing their sense of identity, no matter where 
they are.”85 Thus, TCKs tend not to feel threatened when confronted with difference 
but instead connect with others on a deeper human level. 
Furthermore, TCKs typically maintain an international dimension throughout 
their lives in their choice of university major, occupation, friends, and other areas 
such as volunteering.86 This has a concrete consequence, as Ruth Hill Useem has 
observed, in that “[U.S. American TCKs] relate Americans to the rest of the world 
and interpret the outside world to the immediate world in which they live. 
Significant proportions of them actually do this for a living.”87 TCKs' international 
involvement might spring from personal interest but often results in mediating 
between countries, cultures, or languages. This is illustrated by Useem and Cottrell 
in another finding that describes TCKs as helpers and problem solvers. Their study 
shows that “in situations where there is a conflict or misunderstanding [TCKs] are 
the ones who step in to mediate.”88 The experience of having been linguistically or 
culturally helpless in a foreign environment while growing up internationally 
motivates TCKs to act as mediators for others in similar situations. 
Schaetti argues that TCKs’ global worldview is shaped by certain 
“birthrights,”89 specific intercultural skills that TCKs naturally develop. These 
include, among others, a comfort with ambiguity, refined observational skills, 
multilingualism, and the capacity to work effectively with different people in 
different situations. 
This expanded worldview, however, can pose several challenges. Among them 
is the accusation of confused loyalties and lack of convictions. Pollock and Van 
Reken write that “[TCKs are left with] a sense of confusion about such complex 
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things as politics, patriotism, and values.”90 The intercultural flexibility and 
adaptability that TCKs display make non-TCKs question what the TCK’s own 
position is. The following comments by Sophia Morton, herself a TCK, illustrate this 
“Cultural Chameleon/Onion” dilemma well: 
My basic shape camouflages itself in the colours of whatever surroundings I find 
myself in. I am adept at playing the appropriate roles. But do I have a colour of my 
own apart from those I appropriate? If I cease to play any role, would I be transparent? 
To mix metaphors, if I peeled away the layers of the roles I adopt, would I find nothing 
at the centre? Am I, after all, an onion – nothing but the sum of my layers?91 
The question with which Morton is confronted is one of relativism. Is everything 
relative in the worldview of TCKs or are there certain things that hold true regardless 
of the transient situation? Schaetti argues that relative truth must be supplemented by 
“personal truth,” which, to use Morton's metaphor, constitute the natural colour of 
the chameleon and the centre of the onion.92 Schaetti explains that “[d]eveloping, 
resolving and expressing a multicultural self-concept, then, requires the capacity to 
hold an internal rather than external point of reference for one's identity. The 
capacity to do so is based upon a non-contingent, overarching, and spiritual locus of 
integrity.”93 In other words, developing a stable global worldview that incorporates 
conflicting demands hinges on the ability to find a core identity that transcends these 
particular peripheral demands without competing with these as yet another demand 
among many demands. 
 
4. Cultural Orientation 
How TCK understand themselves in terms of cultural identity and belonging is a 
complex issue that evades straight forward answers.94 As the name suggests, TCKs 
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belong to ‘the third culture’, but the question of what exactly this culture without 
geographical border, without a language, without racial or class distinction, without 
ethnicity is, is not easily defined. What is clear is that the two influences that create 
this third culture are, first, high mobility, and, second, exposure to multiple 
cultures.95 
When third culture had not gained wide acceptance as the term to describe the 
cultural orientation of internationally mobile children an alternative term was 
“marginal people.”96  TCKs in their rootlessness and restlessness certainly 
experience being “terminally unique” 97 in their marginality at one point or another.  
Schaetti and Ramsey, however, argues that the space in-between and on the very 
margin, neither completely belonging to the host culture, nor completely belonging 
to the passport culture, yet somehow being related to both host culture and the 
passport culture, is where TCKs are culturally at home.98 They write, “exposed to 
multiple cultural traditions during their developmental years, global nomads have the 
opportunity to achieve identities informed by all, constricted by none, balanced on 
the thresholds of each.”99 TCKs can be described as ‘threshold people’ who have 
deliberately made being ‘the third’, i.e. ‘the in-between’, their location when 
constructing a unique TCK-identity and creating a sense of belonging with other 
TCKs. By claiming ‘the third’ as their own unique space, TCKs are constructive 
rather than encapsulated in their cultural marginality.100 It is this very elusive and 
fragile ‘third’ space in-between others that is the main subject this investigation. 
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Questions that Remain 
Having examined who TCKs are and what common themes cut across the apparent 
differences in this group, there are several questions that emerge. First of all, many 
descriptions of TCKs seem to accept an essentialized definition of culture. 
Determinist and essentialist images of culture and identity seem to underlie the 
model of a first, second, and third culture.  Richard Pearce criticizes this commenting 
that “[c]ulture is clearly not  a normative force which imposes complete uniformity 
of values, in any imaginable community. Identity is clearly not a set of 
characteristics permanently and rigidly inherent in a given person.”101 Can we still 
speak of a ‘third culture’ without relying on these outdated notions of culture? 
Furthermore, while TCK profiles are useful in identifying broad trends, the reality is 
that no essential third culture exists. Is the ‘third culture’ a culture among other 
cultures, such as Japanese culture or German culture, or is it a misnomer that belongs 
into a different category from ‘culture’ altogether? Clearly a better model for 
‘culture’ that takes into account the diversity within cultures as well as the continuity 
between different cultures is needed. This model also needs to be able to make sense 
of ‘third culture’. 
Second, can we speak of a TCK identity given the fragmented and 
discontinuous nature of the third culture experience and the vast differences even 
among TCKs? Pearce calls ‘TCK’ a category “stretched beyond useful limits”102 for 
analytical purposes. Given the diversity found in the subgroups of TCKs and the 
fluid nature of identity itself can TCKs be addressed as one group? Surprisingly, 
McCaig observes that “for many who have grown up globally, having their past 
validated and placed in the clear context of a shared heritage brings with it a 
stunning sense of safe homecoming”103 indicating that it nevertheless is a powerful 
concept among those who identify with it. Any theological treatment of TCKs must 
acknowledge that ‘TCK’ is an artificially constructed category and that identification 
as a TCK is often intentional. The category of TCK is thus not only descriptive but 
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also operative in that it shapes TCKs. Furthermore, a model for the identification 
with TCKs must be able to accommodate the diversity found within TCKs. 
The question of a better model for culture will be addressed in chapter seven. 






Third Culture Kid Identity Development 
 
Introduction 
In the first half of part one, I outlined a TCK profile. The latter half will be devoted to 
exploring the relation between identity development, spirituality, and specifically 
Christianity. In this chapter, I will examine one particular model of a secular TCK 
identity development which will serve to open up the discussion to the potential role 
that spirituality plays. Barbara Schaetti’s model of TCK’s identity development also 
allows for more variety in developmental outcomes among TCKs doing justice to the 
diversity found within TCKs. 
 
Developmental model of Third Culture Kid Identity 
Barbara Schaetti104 describes TCK identity development in a way that does justice to 
the spectrum of outcomes. She acknowledges that “identity development is cyclical 
rather than linear, fluid rather than static, and multi-faceted rather than singular”105 
thus setting herself apart from other approaches that describe a single stereotypical 
outcome for all TCKs. Central to her identity development analysis is the concept of 
identity saliency. An identity (such a race, nationality, gender, third culture, etc.) 
might have low or high salience for TCKs. TCKs might even have multiple high 
salience identities arranged in a hierarchy, switched depending on the situation, or 
managed by a higher-order integrated principle. What makes Schaetti most 
interesting and relevant to this project is her discovery of a link between a higher-
order integrated self-concept and a non-contingent spiritual dimension of belonging. 
 
Four Developmental Transactions of Third Culture Kid Identity 
Schaetti describes TCK identity development along the following four transactions: 
                                                          
104 Barbara F. Schaetti, "Phoenix Rising: A Question of Cultural Identity," in Strangers at Home: 
Essays on the Effects of Living Overseas and Coming "Home" to a Strange Land, ed. Carolyn Smith 
(Bayside, New York: Aletheia Publications, 1996); Schaetti and Ramsey, "The Global Nomad 
Experience: Living in Liminality."; Schaetti, "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a 
Developmental Model."; "Attachment Theory: A View into the Global Nomad Experience," in 
Military Brats and Other Global Nomads : Growing up in Organizational Families, ed. Morten G. 
Ender (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002). 
105 "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a Developmental Model," 37. 
36 
 
repatriation, nationality, difference, and plurality.106 She defines these transactions as 
“an interactive process between the individual global nomad and his or her lived 
experience such that the individual achieves new levels of clarity and integration.”107 
TCKs develop a sense of who they are by resolving the developmental tasks these 
transactions entail. Each transaction has a variety of identity development outcomes 
that the same person might adopt during various stages in their life, thus signifying a 
spectrum of responses to the third culture upbringing as well as different stages of a 
continuing process of identity exploration and recycling. 
 
1. Repatriation 
A defining characteristic of TCKs distinguishing them from immigrants is the 
expected repatriation of the family. Repatriation, from host to home culture or from 
third culture environment to monocultural environment, often functions as a moment 
of truth for TCKs with different resulting attitudes.108 Especially among recently 
repatriated TCKs the uprooting experience can be “painful and create a profound 
sense of isolation.”109 Some feel excluded from social groups, feeling “at home 
nowhere” and some develop a global identity that makes them feel “at home 
everywhere.”110 
Schaetti gives three potential resolutions to the transaction of repatriation: 
homecomer, stranger, and cosmopolite.111 For the homecomer, the repatriation is a 
welcomed move that results in a reaffirmed sense of belonging. In contrast, during 
childhood the majority of TCKs resolve the transaction as strangers: expecting to 
return home but finding that they do not actually belong. However, later in life TCKs 
are more likely to become cosmopolites. Cosmopolites have no expectation of fitting 
in to begin with and find themselves at home in multiple places. This often dramatic 
repatriation sets in motion the TCK’s quest for identity and is intimately tied to the 
other three transactions.112 
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Nationality is a central yet ambiguous theme among TCKs. As “little 
ambassadors”113 TCKs are always reminded of their passport country when in the 
host country. The passport is the most important identification document for the 
expatriate and host nationals categorize expatriates accordingly. However, 
simultaneously, nationality is for many TCKs “relatively uninformative as a cultural 
descriptor”114 as they often experience their passport country only indirectly through 
their parents or artificially through their education.115 This points to a foreclosed and 
untested national identity for the TCK pre-repatriation. 
The concept of nationality and a salient national identity itself is not without 
difficulty. H. Ned Seelye and Jacquelin Howell Wasileski argue that the idea of the 
modern nation state only solidified by the end of the 19th century.116 It is a 
convenient yet simplistic way of identification that gives people “the illusion of 
having roots.”117 Nationhood is a notion that “typically assumes that a nation 
consists of one people, indivisible, with shared values, speaking one common 
language, and occupying one clearly bound and mostly contiguous piece of real 
estate”118 when in fact such unity and uniformity does not exist. National 
consciousness thus relies on assumptions of solidarity. As such, Benedict Anderson 
argues that nations are powerful ‘imagined communities’ which are socially 
constructed.119 
Schaetti also comments that nationality is an artificial construct which, 
however, has real world consequences especially for TCKs and is used “to include 
and exclude, to determine access to power and privilege or even simply to basic 
needs.”120 The powerful and real life consequences of the construct of nationality 
and national consciousness can easily be witnessed at such events as the Olympic 
Games where spectators sense a strong emotional but ultimately imagined solidarity 
with athletes with whom they might have little in common besides citizenship. 
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Further exploring the real world consequences of national consciousness, 
Seelye and Wasileski suggest that “[n]ation-states impose borders on the map and 
matching borders on the mind.”121 Arbitrary naive solidarity thus invites equally 
arbitrary and crude inclusion and exclusion. This stands in direct contrast with TCKs 
who grow up and often develop a sense of nationality with stretched, overlapping or 
fuzzy boundaries. Carolyn Smith has named this loosened sense of national identity 
“Rubber-Band Nationality.”122 Thus, TCKs perceive of nationality identity flexibly 
and develop a variety of responses to the transaction of nationality. Schaetti agrees 
with this non-static view of nationality and favours the idea of national identity 
recycling.123 Becoming aware of the social construction of nationality by 
experiencing first-hand the arbitrariness of exclusion and inclusion based on 
citizenship opens up the possibility of exploring nationality extremely flexibly. 
Schaetti suggests three possible resolutions to the question of nationality: 
insular national identity, international national identity, and transnational national 
identity.124 Insular national identity conforms to the above quoted rigid and 
homogenous notion of nationhood. Although unlikely as an identity outcome, 
Schaetti argues that TCKs can temporarily develop an ethnocentric insular national 
identity when first confronted with the host nation and before entering an identity 
moratorium.125 Repatriation calls this insular national identity in question and 
typically results in the development of either an international or transnational 
national identity.126 An international national identity maintains a primary but non-
exclusive allegiance to one particular country that is open to the incorporation of 
foreign elements. A transnational national identity, on the other hand, regards 
nationality purely as a matter of function and does not claim any allegiance to a 
specific nation. The primary identification for this group lies with the third culture. 
Transnational TCKs find themselves occupying dynamic borderlands.127 It is 
important to note, however, that “a transnational identity does not preclude a sense of 
responsibility for the actions taken by the passport country”128 meaning that 
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transnationals are not necessarily opposed to committing to the improvement of 
communities and/or countries. 
 
3. Difference 
TCKs have to come to terms with difference and marginality. This can include 
appearance, behaviour, language, as well as cultural norms and values and can be 
experienced positively as a privilege or negatively in the form of marginalization. 
While reaching across differences to connect with others such as host nationals is 
part and parcel of being a TCK, difference or marginality is actually the “primary 
source of commonality” among TCKs.129 Underlying TCKs’ sense of marginality is 
the experience of simultaneously being ‘both a part of and apart from’ and yet also 
neither completely a part of nor completely apart from the cultural mainstream.130 
Schaetti observes three possible outcomes to this transaction: Rejection of 
difference, terminal uniqueness, and normalizing difference.131 Repatriated TCKs 
faced with difference might opt to hide that which sets them apart from their 
monocultural peers, either successfully setting aside their international experience 
permanently or living a life as a “hidden immigrant.”132 Others are overwhelmed by 
the experience of difference and become paralyzed by it. Encapsulated by their 
marginality, these TCKs see themselves as terminally unique and alone in their 
experience of difference. Finally, some TCKs actively retain their difference as a 
valuable characteristic of who they are. Rather than feeling isolated, these TCKs 
transact marginality constructively and choose to “maintain a life-long awareness of 
difference.”133 
David Pollock likens this last resolution of the transaction of difference to 
Hans Christian Anderson’s story of the ugly duckling writing that “[a]ll global 
nomads are not alike. They do not fit perfectly into a mold. But all global nomads 
need to know that it is all right to be a ‘swan’ moving among other valuable creatures 
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such as ‘ducks’.”134 Pollock believes that through accepting one’s uniqueness and 
discovering a third culture reference group, the TCK experience becomes normal and 
valid.135 Ruth Hill Useem and Ann Baker Cottrell’s research also indicates that the 
majority of TCKs “feel enriched by their third culture childhood”136 and thus have 
learned to resolve marginality constructively by normalizing difference. 
 
4. Plurality 
Schaetti argues that through their cross-cultural experience TCKs are faced with the 
transaction of plurality. She writes that TCKs are “exposed from their earliest days to 
a constantly changing world in which contradictory realities are simultaneously 
true.”137 This can involve language, cultural values, education, or more concretely 
how two countries perceive one historical event radically differently.138 
Simultaneously, TCKs have to realize that their “way of being necessarily takes on a 
multiplistic hue.”139 Pollock and Van Reken elaborate writing that “TCKs not only 
have to learn new cultural rules, but more fundamentally they must understand who 
they are in relationship to the surrounding culture.”140 Plurality is experienced 
externally as well as internally. 
Pollock has proposed four categories to identify TCKs’ position relative to 
their surrounding: the mirror, the adopted, the hidden immigrant, and the 
foreigner.141 The mirror looks alike and thinks alike in relation to the surrounding. 
The adopted looks different but thinks alike. This is typical of TCKs who remain an 
extended period of time in one host culture where appearance nevertheless sets them 
apart from the host population. The hidden immigrant looks alike but thinks 
differently and is characteristic of TCKs upon repatriation. Finally, the foreigner 
looks different and thinks differently. TCKs usually experience themselves as 
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foreigners in the host country.142 As cultural settings change TCKs jump categories 
and face new questions of who they are. The experience of plurality is thus also a 
contradiction within and extends to issues of personal identity, belonging, loyalty, 
values, and where or what ‘home’ is. 
Schaetti categorizes four resolutions to the transaction of plurality: Dualism, 
multiplicity, relativism, and commitment within relativism.143 Dualism resolves 
plurality with an either/or mindset and is an escape to the security of a singular truth. 
It entails an ethnocentric outlook on life. Multiplicity describes a state of being 
overwhelmed by demands of conflicting plurality to the extent that TCKs become 
paralyzed. This state can be described as a neither/nor mindset. Contextual relativism 
lets TCKs function by regarding all truth and action entirely dependent on the 
context and signifies a both/and mindset. Finally, Schaetti suggests that when TCKs 
continue to transact plurality they reach the stage of commitment within 
relativism.144 She writes that “[g]lobal nomads who transact plurality to 
Commitment Within Relativism still know that truth is contextually relative but at 
the same time have developed a commitment to a personal set of higher-order 
values.”145 Schaetti has found that TCKs at the stage of commitment within 
relativism “have a solid central core belief” 146 which does not depend on the 
situation but lets them integrate their overall relative experience and actions. This 
stage can be described as both neither/nor and both/and since two sets of values are 
maintained. On the one hand, core beliefs which are independent of and transcend 
the immediate cultural situation are neither based on the host culture, nor based on 
the home culture. On the other hand, peripheral values based on the context are seen 
as relative and are based both on the host culture as well as home culture depending 
on what is called for. 
 
Reference Group Orientation 
As these four transactions show, being exposed to a plurality of cultures and value 
systems and establishing different positions when acting within such systems during 
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the developmental years, the TCK “is likely to establish [multiple] foundational 
identities,”147 meaning that the TCK simultaneously holds several high-salience 
identities that often contradict. TCKs would have to switch between identities raising 
issues of authenticity and compartmentalization. For Schaetti, the important question 
is whether TCKs can integrate these various salient identities to form a higher-order 
multicultural self that is more than the sum of its parts. Constructing this overarching 
self would render the issue of negotiating between competing identities and the issue 
of which of the many high salience identities are authentic moot.148 Schaetti suggests 
that exploring TCKs as a reference group helps resolve these issues. 
As TCKs become aware of their fact of experience through events such as 
repatriation and begin to explore the TCK reference group orientation, their 
experience of growing up between cultures is highlighted and validated. Schaetti 
writes that, 
[t]he process of [reference group orientation] exploration directly influences 
individuals’ transaction of the four identity tasks. Validation of their fact of experience 
by virtue of both a reference group and a reference literature supports the individuals 
in transacting future repatriations as Cosmopolites, in transacting nationality to a 
balanced resolution of International or Transnational, in normalizing difference to a 
Constructive experience of marginality, and in articulating a Commitment Within 
Relativism.149 
By intentionally identifying as a TCK, their resolutions are driven to a more 
cosmopolitan, global, constructive, and ethnorelative response. 
 
Higher-Order Integration and Spiritual Dimension of Belonging 
Schaetti suggest two outcomes of this reference group orientation. TCKs “may 
articulate a personal hierarchy of salient identities or may express a more integrated 
higher-order identity.”150 Those with multiple salient identities in a hierarchy are able 
to switch roles adjusting to the immediate situation. The roles remain somewhat 
compartmentalized and questions of authenticity still remain. A higher-order identity, 
on the other hand, resists fragmentation and positions the TCK on a different level at 
the intersection of all salient identities. 
Interestingly, Schaetti observes that TCKs in her study who integrate their 
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various salient identities were “those informed by more, more distinct, and less 
consistent cultural influences; their plurality was grounded in the culture general 
rather than the culture specific.”151 The increased contradiction experienced 
discourages compartmentalization and encourages a more complex resolution 
“irreducible into its parts”152 that raises the self to a higher level and results in more 
complex integration. Schaetti describes this position of identity resolution as “in-
betweenness” and names the function of this higher-order identity “betweening.”153 
TCKs with a higher-order integrated identity transcend their immediate cultural 
contexts and define themselves between and beyond their various salient sub-
identities. 
Echoing Schaetti’s conclusions, Jutta König suggests that TCKs create a 
dialogical self, capable of achieving increasingly higher levels of novelty by 
sustaining dialogical relationships between conflicting cultural positions or voices in 
a field of tension.154 The “multivoicedness” threatening the person with 
disintegration is reintegrated through a “voice on a higher, superordinate level 
[which] can bring together and organize a specific combination of voices at a lower, 
subordinate level.”155 Similar to the commitment within relativism position, König 
thus also suggests that TCKs can develop a higher level, core identity that governs 
peripheral ethnorelative identities instead of a hierarchy of cultural identities. 
What causes the difference between a hierarchy of multiple salient identities 
and a higher-order integrated identity for those with a TCK reference orientation? 
According to Anne Elizabeth Murase, those who have constructively dealt with 
conflicting plurality can be described as follows: 
Undoubtedly their locus of integrity partially rested in a high degree of psychological 
integration. But beyond this these particular persons experienced a profound sense of 
what might be termed spiritual identity akin to the intimacy of creature and Creator 
(…) A spiritual ‘knowing and being known’ that is shared by the great traditions.156 
The higher-order identity that integrates various conflicting aspects of the TCK is 
here closely linked with a spiritual identity. Schaetti also theorizes that 
“[d]eveloping, resolving, and expressing a multicultural self-concept (…) requires 
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the capacity to hold an internal rather than external point of reference for one’s 
identity. The capacity to do so is based upon a non-contingent, overarching, and 
spiritual locus of integrity”157 and concludes that “[a] preliminary correlation seems 
to exist between those whose experience of belonging were most clearly located 
within themselves and those whose negotiations of salience were rendered moot by 
their integrated, higher order expressions of identity.”158 TCKs who hold to 
internally localized spiritual values have a self-contingent experience of belonging 
and they develop the capacity to integrate their experience of marginality and 
plurality into an all-encompassing whole.159 
In her conclusions, Schaetti makes the following suggestion for the people 
involved in raising and educating TCKs: “Help them hold and integrate the 
complexity of their experience by articulating a set of inner, core beliefs and / or 
spiritual practices which can serve them as an over-arching locus of integrity.”160 The 
argument is similar to the resolution of the transaction of plurality through the 
position of commitment within relativism: A commitment to a “personal set of 
higher-order values”161 helps the TCK transact the conflicting cultural norms and 
values and the multiplicity of salient identities that the TCK build around those. 
 
Conclusion 
Schaetti presents a developmental model of TCK identity that suggests overarching 
spiritual values at the core of TCKs help form a higher order integrated self-concept. 
The reason for this is because these spiritual values are not dependent on external 
cultural values which are relative. On a lower level, TCKs are able to function 
amidst conflicting values precisely because on a higher level there are unchanging 
core values independent of the changing situation. These spiritual core values are not 
values among other values but function on a different level thereby letting the TCK 
commit within relativism. Although only making reference to spirituality and not 
organized religion per se, Schaetti’s model opens up the discussion of how religion 
and Christianity in particular can play a role in TCKs’ sense of belonging and 
constructive identity. The religious exploration of TCK identity is thus not only 
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Religion and Identity: The Case of Missionary Kids 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have looked at Barbara Schaetti’s argument that a higher 
order ‘in-between’ identity can be achieved through “a non-contingent, overarching, 
and spiritual locus of integrity.”162 This naturally leads to the question of how 
spirituality and religion might assist the development of TCKs’ identity. As 
Missionary Kids (MKs) constitute a significant subgroup of TCKs, this chapter 
explores the role of religion in the development of identity and then takes a look at 
the case of MKs and their relation to Christianity in order to begin to explore how 
Christianity might help TCKs in developing their identity. 
 
Religion and Identity 
Religion is a double-edged sword: it can facilitate reconciliation and forgiveness163 
but also produce nationalistic, ethnocentric ideologies.164 Kate A. Walters and Faith 
P. Auton-Cuff have researched the identity development among college-age female 
TCKs and list the stability of spirituality as one of the major factors that contributed 
to their identity development.165 This serves as an example of how Christianity 
impacted the TCK’s development in a positive way. They argue that the numerous 
transitions that TCKs experience cause disruption and discontinuities. In contrast, 
spirituality, defined here as a relationship with God in the context of Christianity, 
served to transcend these transitions and lend stability to TCKs.166 Walters and 
Auton-Cuff write that “spirituality was an important component of identity 
development for these women. Their faith in God gave them a ground to stand on, 
and through that they were able to know who they were as Christians. It gave them 
an identity.”167 According to the authors, personal faith gives TCKs independence 
from the various beliefs of others. Thus, Christianity is named as a potentially 
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positive influence on TCK identity development. 
Pamela Ebstyne King elaborates on the positive impact religion can have on 
identity formation in youth.168 Although not specific to TCKs, King shows the 
potential of religion in the Judeo-Christian context to positively impact identity 
development. She understands identity formation as the two developmental tasks of 
locating oneself in something beyond the self and seeking one’s sense of uniqueness 
and independence. According to King, “[a]t its best, religion offers both”169 by 
providing three contexts: ideological, social, and spiritual. 
First, the ideological context of religion provides meaning and perspective 
when resolving identity issues. King argues that “[r]eligion intentionally offers 
beliefs, moral codes, and values from which a young person can build a personal 
belief system. This worldview forms the cornerstone of a young person’s individual 
sense of uniqueness and is an important aspect of his or her identity.”170 Religion is 
thus a source of potential core beliefs that the TCK can hold to. 
Second, the social context of religion provides a community for the 
adolescents that helps sustain trustworthy relationships in which common goals and 
values can be fostered. King writes that “[t]rusting and sharing relationships have 
been shown to promote self-reflection and internalization of values, beliefs, and 
commitments that constitute identity.”171 The social context of religion might be less 
useful for the internationally mobile child who does not grow roots in one specific 
local community. However, on the other hand, in the case of Christianity similar 
communities that share basic beliefs can be found all over the globe and can be a 
form of continuity. 
Finally, religion provides a spiritual dimension that lets the individual 
transcend the immediate context of the self and develop a sense of belonging to God 
as well as being related to God. King argues as follows: 
Inherent within spirituality is the experience of transcending the self. Spirituality 
brings awareness of self in relationship to others. Engaging in the spiritual provides 
connectedness with divine, human or natural other (…). This moving beyond the self 
provides the opportunity for the search for meaning and belong that is central to the 
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task of identity exploration.172 
Thus spirituality offers a transcendent, internal point of reference. 
While King’s findings are not specifically tailored for TCKs, her findings 
nevertheless support Schaetti’s argument that spirituality impacts the identity 
formation to let the individual develop a higher-order overarching identity based on 
core beliefs and values held to be true regardless of the immediate situation. 
However, King is careful to point out that religion can benefit identity development 
but does not do so necessarily. For example, fundamentalist religiosity can 
“devaluate the individuality of their members in order to elevate their ideology”173 or 
elevate the individual to “promote a sense of narcissism, entitlement, and lack of 
connectedness and contribution to society.”174 A religiosity that promotes 
estrangement, nationalism, encapsulated marginality, and a dualistic worldview 
might give TCKs the limited comfort of a false sense of security, but ultimately 
contradicts the TCK’s experience and hinders the actualization of his or her 
potential. The key question is whether a tailor-made form of Christianity can assist 
the TCK to transact the developmental tasks of repatriation as cosmopolite, 
nationality as international or transnational, difference as constructive, and plurality 
as commitment within relativism. What form of Christian spirituality serves TCKs 
identity realization is thus a key question to consider. 
 
Missionary Kids and Religious Identity 
Analysing the special case of MKs will help explore the role of spirituality and 
Christianity in the broader context of TCKs. In a world of discontinuity and plurality, 
faith in one God, creator of all things, can be a great source of continuity and 
integration. The case of MKs thus serves to examine what strand of Christian 
spirituality emerges from a transcultural and internationally mobile upbringing. 
Ruth Van Reken writes that in addition to transculturality and high mobility a 
third factor plays a dominant role in MKs’ lives, namely being raised in a God-
system.175 She writes that “every circumstance of our lives as MKs—good and 
bad—happen within that framework, or under that umbrella, of faith in God and 
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Jesus Christ. This means that while some of our deepest foundational blessings come 
from this overlay, our pain issues are also inextricably interwoven with God.”176 Any 
experience, positive or negative, is intimately intertwined with the MK’s perception 
of God. A positive view of God in the context of the TCK experience might 
encourage TCKs to adopt Christianity as their core personal belief system whereas a 
negative experience might result in the rejection of Christianity. For MKs, both 
affirmation and rejection of faith occur within the context of the TCK experience. 
 
MKs’ Rejection of their Parents’ Faith 
While some MKs state that faith in God helped their identity development, others 
have chosen to reject their parents’ faith altogether. This section examines why MKs 
chose to leave their parents’ faith. 
Nancy Henderson-James found that 53% of missionary kids from her 1993 
study claimed to be religious, 23% claimed to not be religious at all, 18% did not 
answer the question, and 7% gave ambivalent answers.177 Importantly, some 
participants in the study claimed not to be religious, but “spiritual” or still informed 
by the “values, morals, and sense of social justice” of their parents’ Christianity.178 In 
addition, those under the category of ambivalent are also not unconnected with 
Christianity as some have “left, rejoined, and sometimes left the church again.”179 In 
the words of one participant “[m]y current spirituality is less formal, but more 
global.” Thus some form of religion or spirituality played a role in the majority of 
MKs even if not explicitly part of an organized religion. Rejection of Christianity 
can in fact be a rejection of a particular church culture rather than rejection of 
spirituality or personal faith per se. 
Henderson-James summarizes a number of factors that play a role in MKs 
being less religious than their parents. Among them are the following: the exposure 
to alternative cultures and belief systems and subsequent rejection of an exclusivist 
Christian faith, feelings of neglect through separation that lead to anger towards God 
in some and a sense of self-reliance in others, and the loss of stability in the host 
                                                          
176 Ibid. 
177 Nancy Henderson-James, "The Religious Lives of Adult Missionary Kids," in Writing out of 
Limbo: International Childhoods, Global Nomads and Third Culture Kids, ed. Gene H. Bell-Villada, 
et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2011), 232-33. Some of the percentage 
figures are rounded up and therefore add up to 101%. 
178 Ibid., 239-41. 
179 Ibid., 242. 
50 
 
culture during repatriation that led to questioning of faith.180 Overall, however, the 
study confirms that MKs continue to value spirituality and maintain personal core 
beliefs. 
Van Reken has elaborated on the fact that some have become disillusioned 
with organized religion and particular forms that churches take in cultural 
contexts.181 Speaking from experience, Van Reken explains that MKs see 
Christianity contextualized in various cultures. She writes that “shared core values 
will be lived out differently from one culture to another (…) How do you figure out 
what is faith and what is culture?”182 Different worldviews result in different 
interpretations of the same scripture. Van Reken hits home when she writes: 
How did I know which one to choose? These types of encounters ultimately shook 
me to the core of my faith. Again, this is a paradox, for while these problems made 
life confusing and difficult for some years, I finally had to determine whether I 
believed what I believe only because I’d been taught this way, or if, in fact, I believed 
because I truly believe. Whatever the final outcome of this process, it has lifelong 
consequences for the MK.183 
In the context of the transaction of plurality, Van Reken describes a scenario of 
entrapment in multiplicity and finally a resolution through a commitment to personal 
truth that transcends the plurality. If belief in Christianity is seen as part of the 
relativity of culture it fails to serve as an overarching spiritual locus and becomes 
one relative point of view among many others. The experience of plurality and 
relativity can thus become a stumbling block for MKs if Christianity is perceived 
that way. 
Equally shocking to the MK, Van Reken names the confrontation with 
ethnocentric Christianity in the home culture as a cause of struggle.184 While MKs 
are often used to living in multinational, racially, linguistically, and cultural diverse 
missionary organizations, their home churches might lack such diversity and have a 
much less global outlook. One of the reasons for leaving the church is thus that MKs 
cannot find a faith community with a wider, more global worldview. Especially for 
MKs who tend to be cosmopolitan, transnational, ethnorelative, and worldminded, 
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the encounter with ethnocentric and nationalistic churches leaves a negative 
impression of Christianity. 
Robin M. Kietzman et al have elaborated on the emotional issues such as anger 
towards God and the loss of stability that cause spiritual struggles among MKs.185 
The study confirms that besides transculturality and mobility, an all pervasive faith 
system influenced the MK’s response to their parents’ religious tradition. The parent-
MK relationship is a dominant factor in how MKs perceive Christianity and God as 
the MK’s parents’ decisions to live cross-cultural and internationally mobile lives are 
religiously motivated. The authors of the study state that “[t]he parenting 
characteristic that seemed to be most impacting and relevant to the question of the 
participants’ struggle with faith was that of disengagement, a passive neglect of the 
children by their parents.”186 The trauma of being separated from parents due to 
boarding school, the feeling that host nationals received more attention than the 
MKs, the abuse by fellow missionaries or dorm parents, or the instability of mobility, 
and finally being reassured that it was a necessary sacrifice in the name of God led 
some MKs to conclude that “God, the Trinity, and Jesus in particular, [were] the 
chief agent of [their] destruction.”187 The pain caused by their parents’ choice of 
lifestyle and the optimistic thinking by parents’ that “since they were doing God’s 
work, God would take care of their children”188 shaped the MK’s view of God as an 
uncaring sadistic being who is punishing  them. 
In conclusion, we can give some broad answers to why MKs choose to reject 
their parent’s faith even though spirituality plays such a crucial role in the lives and 
identities of MKs. Some MKs are unable to see God but through their parents’ 
context. God remains the God of someone else. The culturally contextualized strand 
of Christianity remains that of the host culture, their parent’s mission society, or their 
often ethnocentric home churches. As long as these MKs cannot make sense of 
Christianity in the context of their own experience, their global outlook as well as 
their experience of loss and pain, MKs cannot adopt faith in God as part of their core 
personal belief that helps develop their higher-order identity, transacts plurality 
through commitment within relativism, and marginality as constructive. 
                                                          
185 Robin M. Kietzman et al., "The Lost MK: A Qualitative Study Exploring the Choice of Some 
Adult Missionary Kids to Leave Their Parents' Faith," Missiology 36, no. 4 (2008). 
186 Ibid., 462. 
187 Ibid., 646. 
188 Ibid., 463. 
52 
 
One especially dominant factor in MKs’ spiritual lives is the pain they 
experience and seek to make sense of but not always succeed. Van Reken summarizes 
the MK’s dilemma: 
[A]dult MKs face two possible outcomes: First, to maintain faith, they must deny any 
pain from their childhoods. But then unresolved grief surfaces in other ways, such as 
anger and depression. Some adult MKs actually do feel like they are God’s victims. 
Second, if in the face of pain and unresolved questions, they abandon their faith, then 
they lose the very one who is willing to listen to their questions and pain, and to heal 
them.189 
If MKs are unable to find a sophisticated enough faith in God that is able to make 
sense of their extraordinary situation, then Christianity remains alien to them and 
MKs are trapped in a false dualism between either denying their painful experience 
or denying their faith in God. That this is a real problem is affirmed by the MK 
CART/CORE study of adult MKs’ well-being which confirms that 29% of 
respondents have received some form of professional counselling, and in addition 
20% feel the need of such counselling.190 However, the study also concludes that 
“most MKs can be expected to do very well spiritually as adults”191 indicating that 
faith and spirituality are ascribed positive roles as TCKs resolve their identity 
development transactions more positively. 
Having surveyed some of the obstacles that MKs experience when it comes to 
developing personal core beliefs based on Christianity, it is now time to turn to 
constructive and unique approaches to making sense of TCKs’ transcultural, 
internationally mobile upbringing within the context of Christianity. 
 
Progress in MK Research 
While for a long time, MKs were virtually unrecognized as a group worthy to be 
studied, this changed significantly in the 1980s. The new interest in MKs sought to 
clarify their legitimate place within Christianity and within the world. 
Joyce Bowers writes that “[d]uring the 1970s, issues of [missionary] family 
dynamics became a new focus in Christian circles. It became acceptable for people 
to talk about their emotional wounds and to seek healing.”192 This led to three 
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ground-breaking conferences in the 1980s held solely for the purpose of better 
understanding MKs. The first International Conference on Missionary Kids (ICMK) 
was held in Manila in 1984.193 Bowers comments that “[n]ever before had there been 
a broad-based public discussion of growing up in a multicultural environment. 
Awareness of missionary childhood experience as it shapes the way MKs function as 
adults was placed ‘on the map’ by ICMK Manila.”194 The overwhelming success of 
ICMK Manila led to a second ICMK conference in Quito in 1987195 and a third 
conference in Nairobi in 1989.196 Thus the 1980s saw an explosion of research 
interest in MKs.197 
One significant development was the formation of the MK-CART/CORE198 
inter-mission research group in 1987 that conducted a study on the well-being of 
adult MKs199 and sought to clarify the extend of emotional, physical, and sexual 
abuse and trauma among MKs as well as the long term effects of international 
childhoods on North American MKs. John Powell, one of the leaders behind the 
study, concludes that “research indicates that the majority of MKs have made faith in 
Christ their own, and are nurturing and personally integrating it. Most seem to 
recognize this as a life-long process and a significant number (36%) express it in 
Christian vocations. Some have rejected it, and still others struggle with aspects of 
it.”200 Thus while remaining mainly optimistic about the faith of MKs the fact that 
some MKs reject their parents’ faith was also a point of focus. 
Of interest to us is the question of how MKs found constructive ways of 
expressing their faith without denying their unique experience thereby allowing them 
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to live out their spirituality healthily. Based on the three ICMKs, this particular 
question has been dealt with in two ways: first, in terms of the relevance of 
Christianity to the struggles of MKs and, second, in terms of a unique purpose MKs 
have within Christianity. 
 
The Relevancy of Christian Faith and the Experience of being Known by God 
Alfredo Smith presents a constructive way of looking at the experience of MKs from 
a Christian perspective. His view is representative of other ICMK contributors’ 
remarks. He suggests that loss of identity as well as construction of identity should 
be understood in the context of the incarnation of the second person of the Trinity.201 
Smith sees the incarnation through the eyes of the MK who is similarly (mis-) 
placed, robbed of identity, and endures suffering. For Smith, Isaiah’s suffering 
servant is “the greatest MK that ever set his foot in this world”202 because experience 
of the suffering servant entailed an identity crisis, misunderstanding and rejection. 
Smith contrasts the various titles given in Isaiah 9 with the loss of form described in 
Isaiah 53. In the incarnation the rejected Son of God loses his rights and recognition 
in the eyes of humanity. In a similar way, MKs lose their status and identity when 
repatriating, entering an often unfamiliar world they had been taught to expect as 
their home. This description of the suffering servant and the incarnate Son resonates 
with the painful MK memories of expatriation, repatriation, separation, loss, and 
discrimination. From Smith’s perspective every relocation is a re-enactment of the 
incarnation, the prototype of all relocations. To borrow A. N. Whitehead’s phrase, 
God is here seen as “the great companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands.”203 
Michael G. Loftis takes this a step further. Himself an adult MK, he reflects on 
the value of growing up internationally and concludes: 
I learned to be flexible. (…) to survive you have to grab [the new foreign culture], 
fall in love with it, and make it yours. God understands, He did it too. Kinship with 
Christ is a special benefit of missionary life. How must he have felt as he spoke to his 
own people who saw him only as a misfit, not as an emissary from the throne of 
heaven? Perhaps this is the greatest benefit and gift of being an MK, the opportunity 
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to gain a glimpse of God’s world from his viewpoint.204 
Not only is God the one who understands, Loftis claims that it is the MK who truly 
understands God. Thus the MK has a valuable and unique point of view: the MK is 
God’s companion, the fellow sufferer who understands God! MKs can recognize 
God’s salvific actions in their experience. God understands what it means to leave 
familiar worlds behind to face the unknown thereby losing one’s identity and MKs 
understand what it meant for the second person to empty himself of divine form and 
be rejected. 
Smith also puts the question of identity in the context of knowing and being 
known stating that “there’s no such thing as identity when a man is not in Christ”205 
meaning that to have an identity is to be known by God. This closely resembles Anne 
Elizabeth Murase’s remarks about a spiritual non-contingent core identity “akin to 
the intimacy of creature and Creator sung of by [David in Psalm 138]”, also 
described as a “spiritual ‘knowing and being known [by God]’.”206 Being known by 
other people in the context of relative cultures constitute a contingent peripheral 
identity that may undergo frequent changes, whereas a core identity constituted by 
being known by God transcends the immediate cultural context and endures through 
changes and is thus non-contingent.207 
To summarize, Smith suggests that Christianity is relevant to the MK 
experience and that MKs can recognize themselves in the incarnation and reversely 
see their experience as recognized by God. MKs can construct a core spiritual, non-
contingent identity by internalizing the experience of being known and knowing 
God. 
 
World Christians and the Transcultural Perspective of the Kingdom of God 
A second approach was presented by Ted Ward. The three ICMKs were brought to a 
close with a presentation by Ward that sought to sum up the significance of MKs for 
the future of Christianity.208 Whereas Smith sought to help MKs find their place 
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within the Christian faith by arguing for the relevance of Christianity to the MK 
experience, Ward does the same by arguing for the relevance of the MK experience 
to the church. The gist of his argument is an appeal to the purpose and value of the 
experience of MKs within the 21st century church.209 
Ward argues that MKs are able to see things from three cultural contexts: That 
of the first (home culture), the second (host culture), and that of the third 
(transcultural perspective). He writes that “[t]he beauty of growing up overseas is a 
third cultural context that is actually a foretaste of what I see as twenty-first century 
Christianity.”210 Ward stresses the need for ‘World Christians’, those whose 
commitment crosses national, ethnic, or racial lines, who are committed to Christian 
core values, and constitute an international community of the body of Christ.211 Ward 
contrasts the “painfully monocultural [majority of North American churches]”212 
with the cultural flexibility exhibited by MKs. From his point of view, MKs are the 
antidote to Christian ethnocentrism, fear of foreign cultures that results in anger and 
hostility, cultural superiority syndrome which insists on always being right at the 
expense of others, and social distance and isolation that creates Christian ghettos.213 
It is the MKs ethnorelative perspective that Ward sees as necessary for the Christian 
church to thrive in the 21st century. 
Ward makes this argument for the indispensable contribution of MKs as World 
Christians because he understands the kingdom of God to have a “transcultural 
perspective”214 by which he means that “[t]he church must be in a culture, and yet 
the church must rise above culture.”215 Undeniably, all human interaction takes place 
within and is conditioned by culture. However, a transcultural perspective offers 
people the awareness of how any interaction is conditioned by culture and enables 
people to transcend their own cultural conditioning and gain a critical perspective.216 
The transcultural perspective of MKs does not mean that MKs transcend culture in 
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general but that MKs recognize culture’s relativity. The transcultural perspective of 
faith Ward advocates is thus an ethnorelative perspective critical of ethnocentric 
churches. Ward comments that: 
Things aren’t as they should be. Racism still infects the church. Racism still blights 
missions. It is an evidence of fallenness. Racism and cultural superiority—we politely 
call it ethnocentrism. But whether it is Americans who do it, or Chinese or Nigerians, 
it is evidence of fallenness and sin. (…) We have been called to be different!217 
In the struggle against Christian forms of ethnocentrism, Ward sees MKs as 
potentially playing a prophetic role by embodying the transcultural perspective of the 
kingdom of God. 
Ward reverses Smith’s argument that Christian faith is relevant to the 
experience of MKs. Here, MKs’ experience is relevant to the church. It is the church 
which requires someone with a perspective such as that of MKs to overcome its 
ethnocentrism and racism. 
 
Conclusion 
Looking at the unique case of how MKs have, within the context of Christianity, 
processed their experience of international mobility shows that Christianity can 
indeed play a role in the development of a non-contingent spiritual core identity and 
that TCKs can value their transcultural perspective as not only compatible with 
Christianity, but indispensable to Christian faith. The experience of MKs is reflected 
in Christianity and their existence is validated. The ICMLKs show fruitful attempts 
to make sense of TCKs’ experience, both positive as well as painful, within the 
context of Christianity. However, these attempts as seen in the three ICMKs are 
mostly devotional or pastoral. Although, as we can see in Ward, hints are made that 
go beyond merely offering Christian condolences in form of biblical illustrations to 
the hardships endured by MKs, these fall short of a systematic theological treatment. 
The ICMKs reveal the need to give this emerging group of people, MKs in particular 
and TCKs in general, proper theological attention and glimpses of how fruitful this 
attention might be. 
  
                                                          




David Gibbons: Third Culture Church 
 
Introduction 
The International Conferences on Missionary Kids (IMCK) reviewed in the previous 
chapter attempted to make sense of the Missionary Kids’ experience through 
Christianity by comparing the experience of the MKs with that of the incarnate 
Christ and by arguing that the global outlook and adaptability of MKs is essential to 
the church. This chapter looks at the work of David Gibbons who takes this a step 
further and presents a model of the church based on the boundary-crossing outlook 
of TCKs.218 The Monkey and the Fish is a non-academic book mostly meant to 
inspire its readers to look beyond the confines of their homogenous churches rather 
than present a systematic theological treatment of TCKs and the church. However, 
Gibbons’ book is significant because it is the only theological monologue I know of 
that specifically uses TCKs as a central theme. It acknowledges the pain involved in 
leaving one’s comfort zone and focuses on the church’s primary calling to love 
people who are culturally, ethnically, racially, or economically radically different. 
 
‘God is Third Culture’ 
Gibbons starts out with a bold premise: “Those how follow Jesus embody fluidity, 
adaptation, and collaboration. It’s what we call the third-culture way. Adaptable to 
changing circumstances. To challenging cultures. To complex crises and 
problems.”219 He furthermore states that “third culture is who God is. Jesus best 
embodied third culture when, as an ‘outsider’ yet still the Son of God, he chose to 
fully live in the world that would eventually crucify him.”220 In an even more 
revealing passage, Gibbons proclaims “[third culture] is at the core of the gospel and 
who we are called to become.”221 Gibbons, rather sensationally, declares, first, that 
third culture describes who God is, and, second, that all Christians, regardless of 
their upbringing, ought to adopt a third culture outlook. 
Third culture for Gibbons means the ability to adapt and be sensitive to other 
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cultures222 and a key metaphor he employs to describe third culture is liquidity.223 
Furthermore, Gibbons stresses two points: First, third culture embraces one’s pain 
and that of the other to create a connection and, second, it extends generosity to the 
other across differences. In the context of the church, third culture means “the 
mindset and will to love, learn, and serve in any culture, even in the midst of pain 
and discomfort.”224 Pain is thus a central theme in Gibbons third culture theology. 
Pain is significant in two ways. First, Gibbons advocates the “pain 
principle”.225 Painful experiences can have the effect of deconstructing people to 
“[the] most genuine, humble, authentic selves.”226 Pain reveals the raw humanity that 
lies beneath constructed superficial identities meant to mask the person. Additionally, 
pain is universal and serves to connect people more intimately compared to success 
and triumphs. In reaching across differences, one’s experience of pain and loss is 
beneficial in understanding the radically different other. Second, pain accompanies 
reconciliation across differences: “Third culture is the gift of being more cognizant 
of and more comfortable with the painful fusion and friction inherent in cultural 
intersections.”227 True reconciliation requires the painful act of stepping out of one’s 
comfort zone to encounter the other on their terms. Thus, pain not only highlights 
our common humanity behind differences, it also accompanies this process of 
making peace with radically different others. 
Extending generosity across differences even if this means risking pain goes 
hand in hand with what Gibbons calls the “theology of discomfort”.228 He writes: 
If any word epitomizes Jesus’ life, it’s discomfort, from the beginning—his birth 
amid poverty (…)—to the end—his death, by the Via Dolorosa, full of shame, 
sacrifice, humility, pain, betrayal, and rejection. 
Embracing a life of discomfort means venturing into places we don’t feel like going, 
doings things we don’t wish to do, being with people we don’t feel comfortable being 
with, serving them, loving them, helping them—all of which demonstrates a not-of-
this-world brand of love that is irresistible to all people in all places.229 
The mandate to love one’s radically different neighbour is thus described as an 
uncomfortable cross-cultural endeavour akin to Christ’s passion. TCKs understand 
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this pain and discomfort of facing the unknown other well. However, Gibbons argues 
all Christians are called to accept this discomfort and pain. 
Underlying the painful embrace of the other is the celebration of difference. 
According to Gibbons “[t]hird culture actually enhances a culture’s uniqueness while 
at the same time celebrating the synergy of its fusion with other cultures. Third 
culture artfully flows in and out of multiple cultures like water.”230 Gibbons sees 
potential in the coming together of differences while also protecting the integrity of 
these differences that give rise to this synergy. Third culture plays the role of a 
transcultural facilitator that moves around freely between different cultural positions 
affirming each. 
 
Third Culture Church 
Gibbons criticises Christian ethnocentrism arguing that diversity within the church is 
essential for its well-being. He contrasts Donald McGavran’s concept of the 
“homogeneous unit principle”231 with Frans Johansson’s Medici Effect.232 The 
homogeneous unit principle states that people like to join churches without crossing 
racial, linguistic, cultural, or economic boundaries. It was originally intended to 
suggest that missionaries should not require believers to discard their own cultural 
heritage and adopt the culture of the missionary when becoming a Christian. 
However, according to Gibbons, the homogeneous unit principle that ‘like attracts 
like’ resulted instead in creating “church bubbles of homogeneous people” 233 who 
only minister to people of similar racial, ethnic, and economic background. 
Commenting on such homogeneous communities, Gibbons writes that “[w]e live 
under the illusion of a Herculean force. But what many people around the world see 
is a version of Christianity created in our own cultural image, a Christianity with 
diminishing power and influence and filled with a lot of pride, self-centredness, and 
wrongheaded metrics.”234 In other words, Christian ethnocentrism that refuses to 
embrace different others is a destructive and sinful force in the church. Ethnocentric 
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churches fail to protect diversity and seek the comfort of uniformity instead thereby 
setting up an illusionary ‘us versus them’ dualism that demonizes the culturally, 
ethnically, racially, and economically other. 
In contrast, the Medici Effect, suggests that diversity drives innovation. 
Gibbons argues that the third culture church standing at the intersection of cultures is 
in an uncomfortable but better position to solve problems because of the Medici 
effect. Third culture church intentionally leaves the homogeneous, ethnocentric 
comfort zone behind to obey God’s commandment to love and serve the stranger and 
also to face the challenges of a racially, culturally, and economically diverse twenty-
first century.235 
Thus Gibbons’ vision of a third culture church is not an option but a mandate 
for all Christians. In order to follow Christ, believers have to adopt third culture and 
embrace the discomfort of making oneself vulnerable for the sake of serving the 
alien stranger. In Gibbons’ words, “our task is (…) to learn with the apostle ‘to be all 
things to all men.’ We need to learn to walk in the blur and in the intersections of 
cultures, to bust the walls that separate us from a world of colliding cultures and 
generations, and shifting of roles, responsibilities, and influence.”236 The 
ethnocentric, homogeneous church is out of touch with the ethnorelative and 
thoroughly diverse world. By willingly placing itself in the midst of cultural conflict 
and lovingly embracing one’s neighbour even amid pain, the third culture church has 
the power to fulfil its calling of facilitating true reconciliation. 
 
Criticism of David Gibbons’ Third Culture Church 
Although unique in its treatment of third culture and ecclesiology, Gibbons’ book is 
not without major problems. First and foremost, it lacks any systematic and rigorous 
theological analysis of third culture. Second, Gibbons’ definitions of key terms such 
as third culture are vague. For example, his claim that “God is third culture”237 or 
“[third culture] is at the core of the gospel”238 makes little sense beyond a vague 
impression that loving one’s culturally different neighbour is somehow divine. This 
brings us to a third weakness: Gibbons’ argument mostly consists of sporadic slogans 
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mixed with anecdotes and poetic illustrations. The book lacks a coherent argument 
that would lend validity to the above mentioned vague claims about God and third 
culture. Overall, the book seems to work mostly as a means to inspire leaders who 
want to venture outside the church’s self-imposed ethnocentric boundaries. 
However, more from intuition than from logical argumentation, Gibbons seems 
to have stumbled upon an interesting group of people, TCKs, and recognized the 
powerful critique that their ethnorelative and transcultural position holds against 
Christian ethnocentrism. In bringing in TCKs to his discussion of what the church 
ought to be, Gibbons has made TCKs relevant beyond their peer group. Gibbons 
points out that something about this third culture resonates with aspects of Christian 
living, especially in a globalizing world and argues that TCKs’ outlook is not only a 




Gibbons’s work is adequate as a guide for church leaders but falls short in terms of a 
systematic theological treatment of TCKs. However, Gibbons points in the right 
direction in that he makes the case that TCKs have a purpose in the church and that 
their experience is meaningful in the eyes of God. What Gibbons work offers is the 
idea that TCKs’ outlook is a powerful position from which to critique an insular 
church culture and thereby relevant to the church in general and that the gospel can 
be described in terms that are familiar to TCKs. In this sense the ICMKs and 
Gibbons are in agreement. 
 
Bringing Part One to a Close 
Chapters two and three served to introduce TCKs and explore some of the issues 
they face, foremost the question of belonging and identity. From this starting point 
part one looked at the question of TCKs and religion, specifically Christianity. First, 
chapter four makes the case that TCKs’ identity development benefits from a 
spiritual, non-contingent locus of integrity that helps integrate their various 
experiences on a higher level. Next, chapter five looked at how a subgroup of TCKs, 
MKs, has incorporated Christian faith as their spiritual locus of integrity through 
recognizing relevancy and finding purpose. Finally, chapter six reviewed how David 
Gibbons advances this alliance between MKs and Christianity and places third 
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culture at the core of who the Christian God is as well as argues that TCKs’ outlook 
is at the core of how the church ought to be. 
This leaves us with two conclusions and one observation. First, Christian faith 
can play a positive role in the identity formation of TCKs and, second, TCKs are 
seen as having a positive contribution to make to Christianity. However, we can 
observe that although TCKs have enjoyed their well-deserved academic attention in 
such areas as education, cultural studies, sociology, and psychology, serious 
theological treatment of third culture which goes beyond popular piety is absent from 
this discussion. 
The attempts by the ICMKs and David Gibbons fall short of a coherent and 
systematic theological treatment of this group. A Christian response to the experience 
of TCKs is not only necessary but also beneficial to the Christian church. The latter 
half of this dissertation seeks to present a contextualized theology from the 
perspective of TCKs to fill a neglected gap in scholarship. Two reasons justify this: 
First, as Barbara Schaetti points out spirituality potentially plays a crucial role 
in TCK identity development. The ICMKs have partially answered that call to make 
sense of the TCK experience from a Christian point of view to assist TCKs in 
forming their core spiritual identity. The question of what resources Christianity has 
to offer to enable TCKs to develop their identity and thrive is thus a valid question. 
Second, as Ted Ward’s contribution to the ICMKs has outlined and Gibbons’ 
work has sought to spell out, Christianity can benefit from a third culture point of 
view to resist Christian nationalism and ethnocentrism. TCKs’ experience can 
highlight transcultural aspects of Christianity that have been neglected. Potentially 
fruitful results of the cross-pollination of TCKs and theology thus justify the 
contextualization of the TCK’s experience within Christianity. 
Important groundwork has been laid by the attempts of the ICMKs and 
Gibbons to view the TCK in terms of the suffering servant / incarnate Christ (the 
fellow sufferer who understands), the apostle Paul (who became all things to all 
people), and the Good Samaritan (extending generosity across boundaries). These 
unique efforts to look for points of contact between TCKs and Christianity are 
important.  However, they fall short of a much needed rigorous and thorough 
theological treatment. The task of laying out a TCK theology asks for a robust 
framework which can benefit both TCKs and the field of theology. A systematic 
treatment touching on key aspects of Christian theology would be required to create 
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a coherent theological picture able to serve as an orientation for TCKs and the 
church in general. 
Due to the transcultural perspective of TCKs, a theology of third culture would 
necessarily result in the following. First, it would be a theology highly critical of 
nationalism and nationalistic Christianity. Only a theology that can correct the fatal 
mistakes the German and Japanese churches made during the last century can be 
suitable for the church of this century. A TCK theology seeks to destroy arbitrary 
national identities in favour of a core Christian identity that can put all other 
peripheral identities into proper context. Second, a theology of third culture would be 
highly critical of ethnocentrism. Only an ethnorelative theological perspective which 
rises above cultural contradictions and rivalries can prevent attempts by dominant 
Christian groups to impose their culture on others. A TCK theology seeks to uphold 
cultural diversity since its theological identity requires it to stand at the very 
intersection of cultures and seeks to protect the integrity of the culturally powerless 
against cultural oppression. Third, unlike any other contextualized theologies which 
only take into account a single cultural context and are, therefore, inherently limited 
in its approach, a TCK theology would be a theology marked by transculturality 
which will firmly assist TCKs and others in developing their identity as mediators 
and reconcilers standing between different cultural perspectives. The core of a TCK 
theology, thus, is the validation of diversity and realization of reconciliation. 
The outline of the project will be as follows. The first task will be to identify a 
reliable framework which clearly sets out what is meant by third culture and which is 
capable of acting as points of contact between TCKs and theology. Part two will look 
at transculturality, liminality, non-place, and constructive marginality through 
mediation in order to construct our conceptual tools to make sense of the experience 
of TCKs theologically. The second task, in part three, will be to creatively apply 















Transculturality and Third Culture Kids 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of part two (chapters 7 to 11) is to set forth a theoretical framework that 
will serve as the foundation for the theological application in part three. The key task 
is to find conceptual tools that highlight central aspects of TCKs. The concepts 
identified in this part will act as guiding themes in part three in order to create a high 
resonance between the experience of TCKs and the applied TCK theology. 
This chapter begins the discussion by addressing the problematic essentialized 
notion of culture and presenting an alternative model of culture using Wolfgang 
Welsch’s notion of culture as ‘transculturality.’ Next, chapter 8 presents Victor 
Turner’s ‘liminality’ as the most central guiding theme for understanding TCKs as 
both ‘neither/nor’ and ‘both/and’. Further adding to this central concept is the 
discussion of Marc Augé’s concept of ‘non-place’ in chapter 9 and Zygmunt 
Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’ in chapter 10. Finally, chapter 11 discusses Janet M. 
Bennet’s idea of ‘constructive marginality’ especially through acting as a mediating 
person. 
The present chapter is roughly divided into two parts. First, it discusses the 
environment that gives birth to TCK as a mediating ‘third culture’. Second, it 
discusses transculturality and how TCKs fit into this model of culture. The key 
question this chapter treats is how TCKs’ third culture is related to other cultures as 
well as differs from other cultures. 
 
Origins of Third Culture 
How did third culture came into being and came to be described as a ‘mediating third 
between two others’? According to David Pollock and Ruth Van Reken, the term 
‘third culture’ was coined by Ruth Hill Useem and John Useem in the 1950s to 
describe the expatriate communities of Americans living and working in India.239 
The home or passport culture of the expatriates was defined as the first culture and 
the host culture that the expatriate family lived in was named the second culture. The 
Useems then identified the shared lifestyle of the expatriate community as an 
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interstitial culture, a culture between the first and second culture, and called it third 
culture.240 Expatriate communities with different sponsors had their own 
peculiarities, but there evolved a shared mindset among expatriates different from 
both first and second culture. 
 
Modern Third Culture as a Culture of Mediation 
The Useems and John Donoghue identified mediation as a key function of the third 
culture.241 According to Ruth Hill Useem, a major shift in the relation among 
peoples of the world occurred in the middle of the 20th century.242 The ending of 
colonialism, major progress in science and technology, and the emergence of two 
relatively new superpowers in the aftermath of the Second World War changed 
global dynamics. The Useems had been studying professionals supported by 
organizations which cross societal borders and engage in roles that relate two or 
more societies. In the late 1950s the Useems examined the third culture of 
Americans living and working in India primarily as diplomats, missionaries, 
technical aid workers, businessmen, educations, and media representatives and their 
accompanying dependents. 
Useem et al originally defined third culture as “the complex of patterns learned 
and shared by communities of men stemming from both a Western and non-Western 
society who regularly interact as they relate their societies, or sections thereof, in the 
physical setting of a non-Western society.”243 This third culture is not simply a 
fusion of two separate cultures but patterns of behaviour emerged around the crucial 
roles of cultural middlemen/women who mediate between societies and cultures. 
Thus, “as men continue to associate across societies while engaged in common 
enterprises, they incorporate into the ethos of the ingroup, standards for interpersonal 
behavior, work-related norms, codes of reciprocity, styles of life, networks of 
communication, institutional arrangements, world views, and on the individual level, 
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new types of selves.”244 This new type of self is neither a part of the host nor of the 
home society but is unique to the members involved in mediation across differences. 
Unlike the earlier colonial third culture that was based on superordination of 
Western society and subordination of non-Western society, modern third cultures 
were based on coordinate relations, meaning that each side had the authority to 
initiate or terminate the enterprise. The vast differences prevailing between the two 
culture systems required sensitivity on both sides in order to successfully fulfil the 
function of the third culture in the post-colonial setting.245 Useem et al likened the 
third culture and the members of both home and host society whose behaviour is 
organized by it to “a bridge between societies”246 meant to overcome differences for 
the benefit of both parties. 
Two characteristics of these so called ‘men in the middle’ are emphasized: 
First, they are not just individuals from different societies relating themselves 
personally to each other but are representatives relating societies to each other. This 
is primarily done through personal interaction, through the organizational structures 
that the third culture establishes, and the cultural patterns as mediators that ‘men in 
the middle’ create, learn, and share.247 Second, third culture and its members are 
marked by high mobility and change. People constantly flow in and out of the third 
culture communities. 
These mediating characteristics are not limited to the American expatriate 
community but are common to all third culture communities. The significance of the 
third cultures that Useem et al saw emerging not only in India but all over the world 
are boldly proclaimed. They argue as follows: 
In terms of the evolution of human societies, and especially the developing non-
Western societies, we propose that future “civilized” nation-states will be 
characterized by those of high access to and creative participation in the emergent 
worldwide third cultures. Our future “primitives” will consists of those societies (…) 
which reject or are cut off from the mainstreams of the world-encompassing third 
culture.248 
What Useem et al saw occurring locally, they ascribe global importance to. In a 
world filled with diversity where the smooth exchange of people, commodities, and 
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information is indispensable to survival and flourishing, third cultures and ‘men in 
the middle’ seek to bridge the gulf between different groups of people. 
Thus, the third culture which emerged as a result of the increased interaction 
between peoples is, first and foremost, a mediating culture with its own complex of 
patterns that are different from both the home and host culture. Ann Baker Cottrell 
adds that third culture is “a culture created at the interstices of societies, by people 
who mediate. It is a bridging culture which obviously reflects the participants' 
cultures (first and second). It transcends those cultures; it is not a blended 
culture.”249 While maintaining that there is an underlying unity to all third cultures as 
mediating cultures that transcend both home and host culture, Cottrell also points out 
that some of the shapes and forms that this mediating third culture takes are 
determined by the nature of the first and second cultures. However, Cottrell stresses 
that third culture is not merely an aggregate of cultural elements but somehow 
transcends the local particularities. 
 
Current Third Culture 
While John Useem went on to study how expatriate adults interact with members of 
the host society, Ruth Hill Useem became interested in the common characteristics 
among those who grow up in this third culture and whom she subsequently named 
“third culture kids.”250 Whereas previously the focus was on the created and shared 
patterns of expatriate professionals in their endeavour to fulfil their sponsoring 
organizations purpose, the focus shifted to how those whose primary socialization 
takes place within the context of this unique lifestyle embodied the third culture. The 
question thus changed from “How do I accomplish my task as a person in the 
middle?” to “Who am I as a third culture kid?” 
Another shift occurred in the third culture communities themselves. Whereas 
modern third cultures tended to be sustained within an expatriate community 
compound, this is less the case in current third cultures. Instead of emphasizing third 
culture as a culture of a certain space such as a military base, missionary compound, 
or boarding school, it has come to mean a certain outlook on life that the shared 
experience of growing up between cultures creates. Pollock and Van Reken ask if 
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this renders the “culture” in third culture meaningless since people who share these 
patterns of behaviour do not physically live together.251 Laura Cockburn responds 
that even though expatriate families tend to be more independent than before, “the 
concept of this 'third culture' would still seem to be appropriate in terms of defining a 
particular group of people who have a shared experience.”252 The definition of third 
culture thus changed to mean the lifestyle created, shared, and learned by those who 
are from one culture and in the process of relating to another one.253 In spite of the 
diversity in terms of first and second culture or sponsoring organization, TCKs share 
a remarkably important and similar life experience by living in and among different 
cultures during their developmental years regardless of whether this took place in a 
specific expatriate community. The third culture as a meaning sustaining system can 
thus be thought of independently from a physical place and is instead grounded in 
shared experience. 
TCKs who embody the third culture specifically share two experiences with all 
other TCKs.254 First, TCKs experience growing up in a genuinely cross-cultural 
world, mediating and negotiating differences. Adult expatriates mediate externally as 
their main concern is the task at hand. In contrast, TCKs have internalized the cross-
cultural experience and thus attempt to answer the question of cultural identity. 
Second, TCKs are raised in a highly mobile world. TCKs’ question of cultural 
identity must be asked anew with every relative change. 
 
Dynamics of Third Culture 
 Growing up in the third culture, a culture different from both the host as well as the 
passport culture which nevertheless is influenced by the interaction and relation 
between the two cultural domains, gives rise to paradoxical statements about 
belonging that reflect the in-between state of TCKs. Two statements suffice to 
illustrate the complexity of the situation. First, Useem and Cottrell suggest that 
TCKs are simultaneously “at home everywhere and nowhere.”255 Furthermore, 
Useem and Downie argue that TCKs become simultaneously “both a part of and 
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apart from”256 the situation that they find themselves in. These seemingly 
paradoxical statements point to the fact that TCKs cannot be properly defined simply 
as those belonging to the third culture as if the third culture is a culture among 
cultures akin to the passport or host culture. The third culture might be similar to e.g. 
German culture or Japanese culture as a lifestyle created, learned, and shared among 
its members. However, since it is cultivated on the border or in the middle, it can 
only be understood in terms of its own dynamics in contrast to conventional 
understandings of culture. 
Useem and Cottrell argue that TCKs find themselves at ‘home everywhere’ 
because TCKs are comfortable in foreign settings and are more likely to be able to 
“relate to anyone, regardless of differences such as race, ethnicity, religion, or 
nationality”257 than their non-TCK peers. Two aspects need to be distinguished. 
First, the statement applies in so far as TCKs build relationships to both passport and 
host countries. For example, persons who have grown up mediating between German 
and Japanese culture find themselves at home to some extent in both German and 
Japanese cultures and might well be able to function perfectly in both settings. 
Similar to biculturality, TCKs can thus fit into categories of ‘both/and.’ 
Remarkably, Useem and Cottrell go beyond this sense of feeling at home in 
only the countries that are mediated in the context of the TCK's immediate third 
culture. Thus, second, the statement can apply to any culture which TCKs find 
themselves in. In this sense, ‘feeling at home everywhere’ indicates that TCKs can 
feel authentic regardless of the physical location they find themselves in because, 
paradoxically, it is the experience of ‘not being at home’ that feels familiar and 
comfortable and thus creates the sense of being at home. TCKs can also find 
themselves at home anywhere in the sense that they can relate to the common 
humanity of the others. 
On the flip side, being at home nowhere, according to Useem and Cottrell, is 
the result of TCKs' realization that they differ significantly from their non-TCK 
peers in their passport or host cultures. Useem and Cottrell are quick to point out that 
this does not necessarily imply isolation or alienation. Rather, it suggests that TCKs 
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develop a “global identity”258 which is fundamentally different from an ethnocentric 
identity. Belonging to the third culture is precisely what does not let TCKs fully and 
simply identify with either passport or host cultures. In this sense, TCKs fall into the 
category of ‘neither/nor.’ 
Analogously, Useem and Downie argue that TCKs are described as being ‘a 
part of’ each culture that they relate to.259 Since humans are bound to express 
themselves in some cultural form or another, TCKs cannot escape their cultural 
influences. Even though third culture does not have a language it calls its own nor 
certain rituals or norms, TCKs always speak in some language and always employ 
some cultural forms in expressing themselves. Even though third culture does not 
have a geographical territory it calls its own, TCKs always find themselves in a 
certain space at a certain time. Inevitably TCKs become and are a part of the cultures 
that they mediate between. 
Simultaneously, Useem and Downie suggest that we cannot give a full account 
of TCKs without also speaking of how they are ‘apart from’ their immediate cultural 
context. It does not mean that TCKs can escape being cultural. However, in terms of 
belonging to third culture which is neither this culture nor that culture, in a sense, 
TCKs always remain foreign to their immediate cultural context.  Instead, it is 
primarily the shared experience that can make sense of who TCKs are and thus give 
meaning to TCKs. 
Thus, the dynamics of third culture cannot be described in terms of exclusive 
and ethnocentric ‘either/or’ categories nor can they be described only in terms of 
multiple ‘both/and’ categories as in bi- or multi-culturalism. What Useem, Cottrell 
and Downie seem to point to is the fact that TCKs can only be described in terms of 
both ‘both/and’ and ‘neither/nor.’ Thus, for example, a TCK growing up in both 
Germany and Japan is both German and Japanese in one sense and neither German 
nor Japanese in another sense. 
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a confusion of cultures. 
Uniquely me. 
I think this is good 
because I can 
understand 
the traveller, sojourner, foreigner, 
the homesickness 
that comes. 
I think this is also bad 
because I cannot be understood 
by the person who has shown and grown in one place. 
They know not 
the real meaning of homesickness 
that hits me 
now and then. 





a United Nations. 
Who can recognize either in me but God?260 
In Graham James' words, the dynamics of third culture can only be expressed using 
both the metaphor of an island (different and separate from all) and that of the 
United Nations (incorporating all) and interestingly adds a religious perspective to 
third culture in the last line. 
There is thus a local dimension firmly grounded in the cultures surrounding the 
TCK as well as a global dimension that views all of these as relative and none of 
these as sufficient to fully express and give meaning to TCKs. The two dimensions 
need to remain in tension to give a full account of people in third culture. It is in the 
‘in-between’ of simultaneously being local and global, feeling at home and not at 
home, and being a part of and apart from that third culture can be fully understood. 
 
Third Culture and Transculturality 
Third Culture cannot be adequately understood as another culture among other 
cultures and yet is related to other cultures. Nina Richter has contributed to the 
discussion of third culture by introducing Wolfgang Welsch's idea of transculturality 
to better accommodate the idea of a culture spanning cultures.261 According to 
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Richter, third culture is transverse rather than monocultural, multicultural, or 
intercultural. Welsch suggests that not only third culture but all cultures are to 
varying extent transcultural. If so, a transcultural model of culture would serve to 
normalize the cultural heritage of TCKs and make TCKs the exemplification of 
current cultural beings rather than the exception. Transculturality also serves as a 
more adequate model for culture than an essentialized notion of culture. 
Paul Hiebert defines culture as “the integrated system of learned patterns of 
behavior, ideas, and products characteristic of a society.”262 Culture consists of 
general patterns of how people are expected to behave (norms), the deeper concepts 
that underlie these patterns (values), and distinct artefacts particular to that society 
that are produced. All components are linked together to form a relatively stable 
system of meaning understood by members of that culture. Culture is thus a socially 
constructed shared and learned system. The difficulty, however, in defining a 
particular culture lies in identifying the borders where a particular culture ends and 
another culture begins. Cultures, territories, peoples, and nation-states have often 
been conflated, giving rise to the misleading impression that cultures are independent 
islands that express an ‘essence’ of a place, people, or nation-state. This view is 
highly problematic especially in the age of globalization and would render third 
culture an anomaly at best and a ‘non-culture’ at worst effectively declaring TCKs to 
accidental freaks of recent history or simply meaningless ‘non-people.’ 
Welsch advocates an alternative model of culture and cultural identity based on 
transculturality.263 He contrasts his model with the traditional model of culture put 
forth by Johann Gottfried Herder.264 According to Welsch, Herder’s outdated 
concept of culture has three main elements: Social homogenization, ethnic 
consolidation, and intercultural delimitation.265 First, the traditional model holds that 
every member of a culture is an unmistakable instance of this particular culture in all 
regards. Second, every culture is always a culture of a specific folk. Third, every 
culture is distinct and clearly separated from all other cultures. We can recognize 
                                                          
262 Paul G. Hiebert, Cultural Anthropology Second Edition (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book 
House, 1983), 25. 
263 Wolfgang Welsch, "Transculturality - the Puzzling Form of Cultures Today," in Spaces of 
Cultures : City-Nation-World, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 1999); 
"Rethinking Identity in the Age of Globalization - a Transcultural Perspective," Aesthetics & Art 
Science 1 (2002). 
264 Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784 - 1791). 
265 Welsch, "Transculturality - the Puzzling Form of Cultures Today," 194-95. 
75 
 
how the idea of third culture itself, with a first passport culture and a second host 
culture, arose within an understanding of culture similar to Herder’s. Third culture 
arises because of clearly defined differences between cultures the TCK experiences. 
However, we have also noticed that third culture cannot make sense within Herder’s 
model. 
Welsch argues that this nationalistic concept of culture is not only untenable 
but also dangerous. First, cultures are not as uniform as imagined. Welsch argues 
that “modern societies are multicultural in themselves, encompassing a multitude of 
varying ways of life and lifestyles.”266 The inner complexity of modern cultures does 
not allow us to speak of ‘the German culture’ or ‘the Japanese culture’ as if the 
perfect form of what it means to be a member of a culture existed abstractly in pure 
form. Second, whereas Herder imagined cultures as closed spheres and autonomous 
islands each corresponding to a geographic area, Welsch argues that historical 
evidence shows that patterns of behaviour, ideas and products have crossed cultures 
from very early on. Therefore, cultures cannot be understood in isolation but only in 
relation to each other. Finally, Welsch argues that Herder's emphasis on the own and 
exclusion of the foreign is a form of “cultural racism.”267 What defines cultures 
today are not its clear cut borders but its various networks of relations to other ideas 
that are similar to varying degrees. 
Welsch argues that a more accurate concept to grasp the nature of today's 
cultures is transculturality. Transculturality is a consequence of both the “inner 
differentiation and complexity of modern cultures”268 and “cultures' external 
networking.”269 Cultures are internally diverse and externally interconnected and 
entangled with other cultures. Therefore, for every culture, other cultures have 
become inner components to varying degrees and, hence, there is nothing absolutely 
foreign to cultures any more. Instead of the own/foreign separation, the only 
classification that can be made is in metaphorically spatial terms of near/far. Instead 
of individual islands, culture should be understood as a spider web that is connected 
to all other spider webs with relative centres that can shift with every new connection 
established. 
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This has serious consequences for individual cultural identity. Welsch starts 
from the premise that modern individuals possess multiple attachments and identities 
that cut across cultures270 and argues that transcultural identities cannot be equated 
with national or civic identities. Welsch writes that “the insinuation that someone 
who possesses an Indian or German passport must also culturally be an Indian or a 
German and that, if this isn't the case, he's some guy without a fatherland, or a traitor 
to his fatherland, is as foolish as it is dangerous.”271 Detached from national 
circumscription and civic categorization, only cultures understood as transcultures 
can become genuine cultures and transcultural people can become genuinely 
cultural, freed from the constraint of the state. 
Against the criticism that transculturality will inevitably lead to a uniform 
world-civilization, Welsch argues that transculturality is able to account for both 
globalizing as well as particularizing tendencies.272 Instead of uniformization, the 
transcultural permeations create diversity of local cultures. Welsch explains that 
“transcultural webs are (…) woven with different threads, and in different 
manner”273 and thus the more transculturally connected cultures become the more 
global the transculture will be in terms of its scope and connectedness and the more 
unique the transculture will be in terms of content. Welsch concludes that 
“[transculture] is able to cover both global and local, universalistic and particularistic 
aspects, and it does so quite naturally, from the logic of transcultural processes 
themselves.”274 There is thus a distinction between the global dimension 
(connectedness, mode) and local dimension (diversity, content). 
Richter argues that Welsch's model of transculture fits third culture but she still 
distinguishes between transcultures, such as third culture, and other cultures to which 
transculturality does not apply, effectively denying Welsch's claim that all cultures 
are transcultural.275 According to Welsch’s model, however, third culture should not 
be an exception to cultures but an example of transculturality, and the difference 
between e.g. German culture and third culture is not one of nature but one of degree. 
This would suggest that different third cultures should have formed increasingly 
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diversified transcultural subcultures that should have made any commonalities 
between TCKs from different host and home cultures virtually unrecognisable. This, 
however, is not the case since third culture is not a fusion of several cultures but 
rather a culture of mediation and TCKs have no problem recognizing each other, 
relating to each other, and identifying with each other. While particulars such as 
languages used or customs observed differ from TCK to TCK, these are not the most 
salient features of the TCK’s self-understanding. The particulars might constitute the 
peripheral identity but not the core identity of TCKs. 
The unifying element in third culture is thus not to be found in the local 
dimension but in the global dimension. What distinguishes third culture from other 
transcultures is that it establishes connections between transcultures of high degrees 
of disparateness and across wider cultural distances in a highly fragmented fashion. 
In the case of non-third culture transcultures, it is the diverse content emerging from 
the network that creates local distinctiveness and relatively distinguishes one 
transculture from another transculture. Although cultures in this sense only differ 
relatively and not absolutely, we can still easily distinguish between cultures, e. g. 
Japanese and German culture. In the case of third culture, it is the transcultural mode 
of connectedness and interaction between various networks of transcultures behind 
all transcultures that creates the recognizable commonness among all TCKs. Welsch 
is thus correct in insisting that all cultures are transcultures and Richter is right in 
arguing for a distinction between transcultural cultures, where content and local 
dimension take precedence, and the transcultural third culture, where mode and 
global dimension take precedence. 
 
Conclusion 
Welsch’s model of culture as transculture helps see third culture not as an anomaly 
but an extreme example of the widespread trend of transculturality. While originally 
first culture, second culture, and third culture relied on an outdated essentialized 
notion of culture, Welsch’s model serves as a better explanation for culture in 
general and third culture in particular. Every relative culture finds itself negotiating 
and mediating between different cultural positions. TCKs and non-TCKs thus differ 
in degree. However, it is the extent of the degree that makes a difference in saliency. 
Whereas for first or second cultures, the transcultural content, which can but does 
not have to coincide with the majority of a nation-state, a geographical place, or an 
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ethnic group, takes on importance and attains high saliency, for the third culture the 
transcultural mode stands out as the most salient aspect of TCKs. Third culture and 
TCKs can thus only be understood in terms of their mediation and negotiation 
between relative cultural centres found in the global web of cultural 
interconnectedness. 
Mediation thus stands out as a core value for TCKs. Strongly identifying with 
the transcultural mode of spanning different cultures, TCKs find themselves 
negotiating between differences finding themselves both being a part of the different 
relative centres of transcultures as well as apart from individual transcultures. The 





Liminality and Third Culture Kids 
 
Introduction 
In order to further shed light on TCKs finding themselves both ‘neither/nor’ and 
‘both/and’ in their transculturality this chapter now turns to the concept of 
‘liminality’. Liminality, from the Latin word ‘limen’ meaning ‘threshold,’ 
‘doorway,’ or ‘limit,’ describes the psychological, neurological, or metaphysical 
state of in-betweenness. Liminality serves two purposes in this discussion. First, it is 
useful in describing the transcultural position of TCKs, betwixt and between 
different cultural positions. Second, liminality also features in Christianity (e.g. 
Christ on the cross; the believer undergoing baptism) and therefore serves as a bridge 
to bring together our sociological discussion of TCKs and the later theological 
application. Liminality, adapted under the impact of our discussion of transculturality 
and the following key concepts of non-place, liquidity, and marginality, thus 
constitutes the underlying theme which runs through this work. 
 
Liminality: Betwixt and Between 
Barbara Schaetti and Sheila Ramsey suggest that the social-psychological concept of 
liminality lies at the very core of third culture and its members.276 Liminality is a 
state of transition, betwixt and between what is left behind and what will come. 
Liminality describes a state of neither this nor that which escapes conventional 
categorization. For TCKs who experience repeated transition between places, 
liminality is an appropriate notion to apply. 
Liminality as an anthropological concept was coined by Arnold Van Gennep 
(1873-1957) and further developed by Victor Turner (1920-1983). Van Gennep 
explored liminality through cultural or religious ‘rites of passage’.277 Transitions in 
these rites follow three stages. First, there is the phase of separation where 
individuals detach themselves from a set of cultural conditions. The second phase is 
one of marginality or liminality marked by ambiguity. Here individuals pass through 
a realm that has few or none of the characteristics of the previous or next state. 
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Finally, the passage is completed by aggregation or reincorporation, where 
ambiguity is resolved and status is regained. Usually the transition is ritualistic and 
starts with a triggering event. Attaining adulthood constitutes a typical example of 
liminality in the context of rites of passage. An adolescent boy separates himself 
from his parents, effectively dying to his childhood. Next, he goes through a liminal 
state of neither boy nor man where he must prove that he is ready for adulthood. 
Finally, he is accepted back into the community as an adult male. Thus, liminality 
describes a state in between one's former identity and one's new identity. 
Turner focused on the state of liminality.278 He describes “liminal personae,” 
people in the state of liminality, as follows: 
The attributes of liminality or of liminal personae (“Threshold people”) are necessarily 
ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of 
classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities 
are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and 
arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial.279 
Liminality escapes cultural categorization and the liminal person is in a state of 
limbo, neither governed by the norms and values of the previous cultural status nor 
of the anticipated cultural status. It is a state of neither/nor and is rich with ambiguity 
in terms of cultural identity.  
Liminality, however, is not simply a matter of only neither/nor. Turner argues 
that when passing from one opposite position to the other extreme “the opposites, as 
it were, constitute one another and are mutually indispensable.”280 Liminality thus 
cannot exist in isolation from before and after and even though it eludes being 
entirely defined either by the preliminal or the postliminal.  Turner writes that the 
liminal persons are symbolically “neither living nor dead from one aspect, and both 
living and dead from another.”281 He calls this “peculiar unity of the liminal.”282 
During the transition the liminal person is suspended in the air by the gravitational 
pull of both stable states. Without keeping the before and after in tension, the liminal 
space would collapse and the liminal person would simply be alienated. Liminality is 
therefore a state of both ‘neither/nor’ and ‘both/and.’ 
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Liminality and Identity 
Nic Beech applies Turner's concept of liminality to identity construction and 
reconstruction during times of turbulent social transition.283 When the sense of self is 
significantly disrupted a person experiences liminality and the reconstruction of 
identity. Beech summarizes Turner arguing that the ‘liminar’ (i.e. liminal person) or 
interstructural person has four main characteristics. First, the liminar is “socially if 
not physically invisible.”284 Turner writes that “most of us see only what we expect 
to see, and what we expect to see is what we are conditioned to see when we have 
learned the definitions and classifications of our culture.”285 Due to the ambiguity the 
liminar is outside of definition and thus not recognized as existing legitimately. 
Second, liminality is linked to death.286 This symbolic death entails the destruction 
of self, where the liminar, stripped of preliminal attributes, is reduced to 
nothingness.287 Beech comments that often the ritually dead are regarded as 
“unclean” and need to be separated from others so as not to “pollute” them.288 The 
elusiveness of liminars is perceived as a threat to the stability of non-liminars. Third, 
during liminality, the liminar has no rights.289 Deprived of status and possession, the 
liminar is at the mercy of the power brokers of the preliminal and post liminal 
cultural systems. Four, liminality is a stage of reflection where outside the box 
thinking is possible.290 Upon critical reflection, the liminar forms a new identity with 
new influence and responsibilities. Through the disrupting experience of the 
triggering event, the liminar forms a new identity that is meaningful for the 
individual and community, ideally thereby resolving liminality.291 
Far from merely being a state of deprivation, freedom and flexibility are also 
marks of liminality. For example, Turner writes that “liminality is the realm of 
primitive hypothesis, where there is a certain freedom to juggle with the factors of 
life (…) there is a promiscuous intermingling and juxtaposing of the categories of 
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event, experience, and knowledge,”292 implying that not being circumscribed by 
categories deprives the individual of power but also of limits. Turner calls this 
“sacred poverty.”293 
In the sense of reconstructing one's identity through liminality, Beech 
envisions a temporary transition that results in aggregation and stable meaning. For 
example, a person who is made redundant at work (triggering event) goes through 
the experience of unemployment (liminality) and finally finds a new job 
(reintegration). However, Beech also leaves open the possibility of a “more 
longitudinal experience of ambiguity and in-between-ness within a changeful 
context”294 such as that of a temp worker who is neither unemployed nor fully 
employed but cannot resolve this situation. From Beech's perspective, identity 
construction occurs in the interplay between people's self-identity (the person's self-
concept) and their social-identity (the person in external discourse, institutions and 
cultures). Liminal identity work practices, such as experimenting with new versions 
of oneself, recognizing one has become a different person, or reflecting through self-
questioning, occur at the intersection of the person's agency and the surrounding 
institutional or cultural structure.295 People are in between or in the liminal when, 
during their transition from one constructed identity to the next reconstructed 
identity, partial and incomplete identity changes occur due to instabilities in the 
social context, ongoing ambiguity and multiplicity of meanings, and the lack of 
resolution. For example, workers who change their career, go through a transitional 
time where their status is in limbo until they are fully reintegrated and have 
established their role and place in the new context. Through the instability and 
flexibility of the liminal state, workers are able to (re)construct their identity and 
adapt to new responsibilities and challenges. 
Beech shows how liminality, a concept originally from anthropology, can be 
used to understand people’s ambiguous identities after a triggering event. A 
disruption in a person's environment calls that person's identity into question causing 
the person to enter a state of liminality. This state of self-questioning and self-
reflection can be temporary or more or less permanent. 
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Liminality and Third Culture Kids 
Schaetti and Ramsey apply liminality to the experience of TCKs.296 TCKs typically 
go through transition cycles resembling Van Genneps rites of passage. For example, 
missionary kids accompanying their parents are typically on a 5-year transition 
cycle. The family moves to their assigned mission field, spends 4 years there, and 
returns for a one-year furlough to their passport country before starting the same 
cycle again. Similarly, military dependants, diplomat kids, or business kids go 
through regular transition cycles often during the entire time of their developmental 
years. Furthermore, TCKs in boarding schools go through seasonal transition cycles 
moving back and forth between the school and the parents’ home during extended 
vacations. Each move can be seen as a triggering event followed by a liminal phase. 
According to Pollock and Van Reken, these transitions follow five stages: 1. 
Involvement; 2. Leaving; 3. Transition; 4. Entering; 5. Re-Engagement.297 The first 
two stages correspond to Van Gennep's phase of separation. The TCK says goodbye 
to family, friends, places, and most importantly to the cultural environment that had 
been supporting the TCK's status and identity. The transition stage corresponds to 
the liminal phase. This can range from a 24-hour airplane ride to a week-long family 
vacation as often times families take the opportunity to travel after completing their 
previous responsibilities and before being assigned new responsibilities. Stages four 
and five correspond to van Gennep's reintegration phase. Families settle down in the 
new place and (re)create their lives in light of the new environment. 
In terms of identities, TCKs are often forced to reinvent themselves with every 
transition that they go through. New friends have to be made, new languages learned, 
new responsibilities mastered, new norms and values adopted, new statuses acquired, 
and ultimately new identities formed. Only taking geographical relocation into 
account, TCKs repeatedly and regularly go through temporary liminal states that are 
ideally resolved once the family settles down or repatriates. 
In a different sense, however, the whole third culture community can be said to 
exist in a liminal state suspended between first and second (or more) cultures. In this 
sense TCKs spend a significant part of their developmental years in a “perpetual 
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liminal state” 298 on the threshold of their parent’s culture and their host culture(s), 
always mediating between several cultures and navigating the ambiguity produced 
by conflicting cultural systems. Reintegration and identity resolution are perpetually 
deferred and are actually impossible. Here, liminality in TCKs differs slightly from 
Beech's liminality which is a process of reconstructing one's identity that will end in 
a resolution. In addition, the liminality of TCKs consists of the ambiguity between 
multiple internalized cultural systems, whereas the liminality of Beech comes from 
the discrepancy between the self and the surrounding structure. For TCKs, the 
preliminal and postliminal states are imagined cultural selves or internalized cultural 
roles that the TCK performs. The cultural contradiction runs through the TCK's inner 
self. According to Schaetti and Ramsey “the experience of liminality becomes the 
most constant, lived experience”299 and is therefore not the process by which TCKs 
construct, deconstruct, and reconstruct their cultural identities, but is the very place 
betwixt and between multiple conflicting cultures TCKs find themselves at home. 
Liminality is closely intertwined with the common themes of change, 
relationships, worldview, and cultural orientation: Change is the ongoing triggering 
event that brings about the TCK’s liminality; relationships occur within the liminal 
phase of always simultaneously meeting, relating, and parting with people across 
race, ethnicity, and language; the TCK's transcultural worldview of conflicting 
cultural norms and values is kept in balance by liminality, the simultaneous 
neither/nor and both/and; and, finally, TCKs’ cultural identity finds itself at home in 
liminality. In liminality TCKs are “exposed to multiple cultural traditions during 
their developmental years (…) [and] have the opportunity to achieve identities 
informed by all, constricted by none, balanced on the threshold of each.”300 The 
‘neither/nor’ and ‘both/and’ are balanced in liminality. Third culture is thus 
suspended in between two or more cultures, refusing to be incorporated and 
categorized by any one culture, separated as foreign by each culture, socially 
invisible due to its ambiguity, marginalized to some extent due to the status as 
‘other’, yet free and flexible due to its transcendence of categories and borders. To 
use Turner's comparison of liminality to death, TCKs ‘die’ to their surrounding 
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cultures and whatever ethnocentric identity that might be constructed is destroyed. 
TCKs are liberated from form and borders to embrace a transcultural, ethnorelative 
third culture identity. 
TCKs can take ownership of their liminality and stop viewing it as a mere 
deficiency imposed upon them by fate. Schaetti and Ramsey suggest that instead of a 
world of ‘either/or,’ liminality makes possible to find a sense of home in the 
complex world of ‘both/and.’301 While actively participating in each cultural context 
TCKs share in, TCKs can nevertheless transcend them by also remaining neither this 
nor that, choosing to identify with TCKs instead. TCKs thus find themselves not 
only mediating between several cultures but also constantly negotiating within 
themselves in between ‘both/and’ and ‘neither/nor.’ By finding themselves at home 
in liminality, TCKs are at home everywhere and nowhere and are a part of their 
surrounding cultures as well as apart from them. Liminality thus serves as a useful 
concept to grasp the complexities of the experience of TCKs. 
 
Liminality and Christianity 
Liminality in rites of passage often has religious significance. It is thus an 
appropriate lens through which to look at both TCKs as well as a TCK theology. 
One illustration of liminality in a rite of passage is the sacrament of baptism where 
the neophyte passes through a symbolic death to re-emerge with a new identity. 
However, Turner goes further to suggest that liminality can become an 
institutionalized state, making transitions a permanent condition akin to the state of 
TCKs in relation to culture.302 Turner writes that “the Christian is a stranger to the 
world, a pilgrim, a traveller, with no place to rest his head”303 indicating that the 
whole life of a Christian believer is marked by liminality. Liminal beings such as the 
Good Samaritan are seen as redemptive figures who can restore equilibrium and 
eliminate injustice because of their in-between status that permeates dividing 
categories and is free from arbitrary definitions. 
The striking similarity between TCKs and Christians in terms of liminality is 
well illustrated in this section from the Epistle to Diognetus: 
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For the Christians are distinguished from other men neither by country, nor language, nor 
the customs which they observe. For they neither inhabit cities of their own, nor employ 
a particular form of speech, nor lead a life which is marked out by any singularity. (…) 
But inhabiting Greek as well as barbarian cities, according as the lot of each of them has 
determined, and following the customs of the natives in respect to clothing, food, and the 
rest of the ordinary conduct, they display to us their wonderful and confessedly striking 
method of life. They dwell in their own countries, but simply as sojourners. As citizens, 
they share in all things with others, and yet endure all things as if foreigners. Every 
foreign land is to them as their native country, and every land of their birth as a land of 
strangers. (…) They pass their days on earth, but they are citizens of heaven.304 
Similar to TCKs, Christians are simultaneously participants and strangers in their 
own culture due to their liminal status. Furthermore, as a citizen of the kingdom of 
God which has simultaneously already arrived and is still yet to come, Christians are 
liminal beings suspended between Christ’s first and second coming. Central to both 
the question of TCK identity and Christian identity, liminality thus serves as an 
adequate point of contact between TCKs and a theology and acts as a key theme in 
the applied TCK theology. 
 
Conclusion 
Third culture is a mediating culture located on the threshold of several cultures. 
Third culture belongs to both home and host cultures in one sense, yet are neither 
home nor host cultures in another sense. Similarly, TCKs feel at home everywhere 
and nowhere exhibiting a two dimensional identity that has a local (a part of) as well 
as a global (apart from) dimension. Liminality is useful in conceptualizing this in-
between world of both ‘neither/nor’ and ‘both/and’ of TCKs describing both the 
deprivation of status and rights (symbolic death) as well as the freedom to transcend 
conventional categories (sacred poverty). Liminality also provides the crucial point 
of contact with theology. Using liminality as a key concept, subsequent chapters will 
further inform and shape this concept to be finally applied as the cornerstone to an 
applied TCK theology. 
  
                                                          




Non-Place and Third Culture Kids 
 
Introduction 
In order to further explore the theme of liminality, we will examine TCKs in their 
relation to place and cultural identity. Whereas liminality often refers to a time in 
between before and after, using the categories of ‘place’ and ‘non-place’ by Marc 
Augé will serve to imagine liminal in spatial terms. This helps to imagine the ‘in-
between’ as a place to belong to. Furthermore, the discussion of ‘non-place’ in 
conjunction with TCKs’ experience of loss draws attention to the nature of TCK’s 
cultural identity as a ‘non-identity’. 
 
Marc Augé’s ‘Non-Places’ 
With every transition TCKs find themselves boarding another plane, roaming 
through another transit lounge to the extent that these transient places through which 
information, people, commodities rush through become strangely familiar and even 
relieving. As one person in the short documentary Les Passagers: A TCK Story puts 
it: “Before I learned how to walk, I already knew how to fly.”305 Closely related to 
the liminal transcultural identity of TCKs are these liminal spaces, such as airports, 
stations, or highways. These spaces, though they are solely designed to be passed 
through as quickly and efficiently as possible, become places of significance for 
TCKs. Each third culture community away from the first culture is itself a temporary 
space that sees people, information, and commodities pass through. The constant 
frequenting of places brings to the forefront the question of the place TCKs belong 
to, the question of home. Marc Augé names these transient places ‘non-places’, 
whose emergence is a consequence of ‘supermodernity’ (his word for 
postmodernity) and contrasts these spaces with the conventional ‘anthropological 
place’.306 A discussion of Augé's non-places sheds further light on the TCK's relation 
to places as well as point out the challenges of seeking an identity in liminal space. 
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This chapter will first analyse Augé’s concept of non-place and, second, discuss its 
relevance to TCKs. 
 
Anthropological Place 
Augé defines the place where a culture is located and cultivated ‘anthropological 
place’. This geographical area is “occupied by the indigenous inhabitants who live in 
it, cultivate it, defend it, mark its strong points and keep its frontiers under 
surveillance.”307 It is as much real, since it exists in time and space, as it is an 
invention since it is a “symbolic construction of space”308 invested with meaning for 
the people who live in it. It is the place of culture and nation states. 
Anthropological places have three important characteristics: identity, relations, 
and history.309 First, anthropological places are places of identity. Simply put, to be 
born in a place is to belong to the place and identify with the meaning assigned to the 
place. Second, to inhabit this place means to occupy a position relative to other 
inhabitants. Anthropological places are thus defined by relations. Third, these places 
are necessarily historical places as history provides stability to identity and relations. 
The organization of space and the setting in time is thus how identities and relations 
are maintained and protected. Anthropological places are historical places that 
employ monuments which transcend temporal contingencies and in which 
inhabitants can recognize themselves. 
Augé argues that conventionally places are the locus of culture. A person's 
motherland or home town thus has a particular significance to the acculturated 
person. The question ‘Who are you?’ is inevitably linked to the question ‘Where are 
you from?’ Augé also reminds the reader that these anthropological places are, in a 
sense, illusions as they are imagined places. This is not to say that these illusions 
have powerful real-world consequences for people. 
 
Supermodernity 
What has made our contemporary world and the cultural places it consists of much 
more complicated is the new situation Augé calls ‘supermodernity’. Supermodernity 
is characterized by its essential quality of excess that relativizes anthropological 
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place and overwhelms it. 310 Augé names three figures of excess: Overabundance of 
events; spatial overabundance; and individualization of reference (overabundance of 
egos). 
First, the overabundance of information and increasing interdependence of the 
world make it difficult to make sense of the whole of the present and to ascribe 
meaning to the recent past. Augé writes that this overabundance of events threatens 
to rob our experiences of meaning. Second, progressing globalization causes the 
shrinking of the planet and leaves a sense of spatial overabundance. Every place on 
earth feels within reach. Augé names three factors behind the excess of places: first, 
the sense of the vastness of the universe reduced our earth to an infinitesimal point; 
second, rapid means of transportation are giving us access to places all over the 
world; third, the media's 24-hour news cycle presents us with simultaneous vision of 
events taking place on the other side of the globe. 
These two figures of excess relativize the way we view ourselves in our time 
and place and give rise to the third figure of excess, namely that of the individual. 
Augé observes that “the individual wants to be a world in himself; he intends to 
interpret the information delivered to him by himself and for himself.”311 The 
individual, divorced from collective identification, from history, from grand 
narratives, must create meaning for him or herself. Thus a multitude of frames of 
references are created as each person judges the world from his or her point of view. 
Supermodernity is a new situation with new kinds of human beings making 
different use of space. TCKs are one kind of these new human beings who are 
dislocated from anthropological place which used to be the basis for stable and solid 
identities, relationships, and historical roots. Enabled by the shrinking of the planet 
and free from history and stable identities by the overabundance of events, globally 
mobile TCKs find themselves restless and rootless. It is not a coincidence that the 
TCK documentary Les Passagers shows clips of trains, air planes, ships, and people 
rushing through urban centres with a clock ticking in the background symbolizing an 
overabundance of events and places and a sense of urgency and immediacy. TCKs 
are a product of Augé's supermodernity at the heart of which lies ‘non-place’. 
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From Place to Non-Place 
In the context of this new situation, Augé claims that “if a place can be defined as 
relational, historical, and concerned with identity, then a space which cannot be 
defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity will be a non-place.”312 
Supermodernity produces these non-places. Augé elaborates on this non-place: 
A world where people are born in the clinic and die in hospital, where transit points and 
temporary abodes are proliferating under luxurious or inhuman conditions (hotel chains 
and squads, holiday clubs and refugee camps, shantytowns threatened with demolition or 
doomed to festering longevity); where a dense network of means of transport which are 
also inhabited spaces is developing; where the habitué of supermarkets, slot machines 
and credit cards communicate wordlessly, through gestures, with an abstract, unmediated 
commerce; a world thus surrendered to solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the 
temporary and ephemeral (…).313 
These non-places are marked by movement and change. Augé almost sounds as if he 
laments the decline of anthropological places and presents non-place as a lonely, 
cold, void place where transactions are wordless and automated and history is 
reduced to road signs and travel guides. Non-places are airplanes, highways, super-
malls, and bullet trains as well as the facilities related to these such as hotels, lobbies, 
stations, airports, and parking lots. Often entire urban centres are non-places. Non-
places are designed to be passed through and also to bypass anthropological places. 
This leads to a feeling of disorientation and discontinuity in the passer-by. 
The typical person who frequents these non-places is the supermodern solitary 
traveller which Augé contrasts with the pilgrim of past times.314 The discontinuity 
and disorientation of the solitary traveller prevents him or her from being fully 
present in anthropological places. For travellers neither identity, nor relations, nor 
history really make any sense. The travelling self becomes his or her own spectacle 
moving through spaces in which “solitude is experienced as an overburdening or 
emptying of individuality.”315 Unlike a pilgrimage whose destination is overloaded 
with meaning, for the traveller, the space of non-place “creates neither singular 
identity nor relations; only solitude, and similtude.”316 The numerous travellers thus 
find themselves alone together in the anonymity of non-places. Furthermore, Augé 
writes that “there is no room for history unless it has been transformed into an 
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element of spectacle, usually in allusive text. What reigns there is actuality, the 
urgency of the present moment.”317 Simply put, non-places do not give identities, do 
not establish relations, and do not have a history. The impression that Augé leaves of 
non-places is one of aloofness, artificial humanity, and sterilized loneliness but 
strangely with a hint of freedom from the ethnocentrism of anthropological place 
which lets each person be themself. 
Augé finally asks the unavoidable question: Where are these individuals who 
perpetually pass through non-places at home? He concludes that in the world of 
supermodernity people are always and never at home.318 This echoes the mantra that 
TCKs are home everywhere and nowhere. 
 
Criticism of Marc Augé 
The question that emerges is whether non-places or liminal spaces really cannot 
provide identities and whether people at home in liminal space cannot have a sense 
of belonging together. For Augé, non-places are by definition not a source of identity 
and people frequenting non-places are necessarily condemned to solitude. However, 
the nihilistic depiction of non-place is oversimplified and biased. 
Emer O’Beirne argues that the context in which Augé writes about non-places 
is that of a “contemporary existential crisis, a crisis of relations to the other, and by 
extension a crisis of individual identity constituted through such relations.”319 Augé 
sees a threat in non-places to identities and communities. This highlights the position 
from which Augé writes, namely nostalgia. O'Beirne comments that Augé writes 
from a perspective of “one on the wrong side of middle age, for whom the world is 
changing too fast, who is nostalgic for the world of his childhood, and who, while 
not yet out of touch with current fashion, feels more allegiance to customs and 
values that have disappeared or are disappearing.”320 In other words, when Augé 
writes that non-places lack identity, relations and history what he means is that a 
place that lacks identity, relations, and history for him must be a non-place. 
The distinction between anthropological place and non-place is not as 
objective as Augé would like the reader to believe but is rather a matter of 
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perception. What is an anthropological place for Augé, might actually be a non-place 
for others.321 For example, Augé is inconsistent when it comes to the Paris Metro, 
which should be a typical non-place but for Augé is a place intimately intertwined 
with his own personal history as a Parisian and thus clearly an anthropological place 
he identifies with. Rather than being void of meaning, the metro is full of meaning 
for Augé, who knows the station names and the history behind the places that the 
trains stop at.322 One person’s anthropological place might be another person’s non-
place. 
Similarly, what might be a non-place for Augé can actually be the workplace 
and home for others. Sarah Sharma writes that “[i]n fact it is not the non-place that 
displaces the local or creates asocial facelessness inasmuch as the theorist of non-
places erases the local in these accounts of non-place”323 suggesting that it is Augé 
himself who refuses to view certain places as anthropological and thereby does not 
allow identity and community to emerge. The answer to whether a place is a non-
place or not depends on who has the power to define that place. Sharma especially 
emphasizes the labour performed at non-places that results in an emergence of 
locality, in other words: identity and community. She writes “[i]f labor was taken 
into consideration then no claim to local bypass or extraterritoriality of its contents 
can justly be made.”324 For the people who work at e.g. hotels and airports, these 
spaces effectively cease to be non-places and become an anthropological place. One 
person’s non-place might be another person’s anthropological place. 
This does not, however, answer the question whether people who still perceive 
non-places as temporary and liminal spaces rather than permanent places to work 
and live at can claim such places to be anthropological places. Airports are two 
different places for the passenger and the airline employee. If the standard by which 
identity, community, and history as recognized in anthropological place is applied to 
non-places as non-places then people such as TCKs, who do not claim to primarily 
belong to any anthropological place but rather belong to liminal space as non-places, 
are effectively ‘non-people’ as those who categorize such places see them as invalid 
places to belong to. It is from within anthropological place that non-identities, non-
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histories, and non-relations are imposed on internationally highly mobile people in 
non-places. 
Similarly to the culturally liminal person who is invisible, uncategorizable, 
powerless, or simply ‘dead’ by the standards of stable cultural states, liminal spaces 
are invisible, uncategorizable, ‘anti-places’ (and therefore rightfully called ‘non-
places’), when evaluated from anthropological places. Just as cultural liminality is a 
state of suspension betwixt and between multiple conflicting cultures, non-place is 
liminal space suspended in the nowhere, betwixt and between anthropological 
places. Augé thus is correct in suggesting that judging from within anthropological 
place, people who do not belong to any particular anthropological place and find 
themselves within non-place lack the identity and community of anthropological 
place. Anthropological place plays part in the destruction of the anthropologically 
placed person in non-place and the creation of the liminal ‘non-person’ who claims 
non-place as their own non-territory. 
 
Non-Place and Third Culture Kids 
Augé's distinction between anthropological place and non-place corresponds to the 
contrast between first/second culture and third culture. Both first and second cultures 
are firmly grounded in anthropological place that provides its inhabitants with a 
stable and continuous identity and community. Conventionally, people are born in 
one place, identify with that place, and build their lives in the context of that place. 
Third culture, on the other hand, transforms its location into a non-place. Both non-
place and third culture are characterized by transience as both are marked by the 
movement of people, commodities and information. Unlike immigrants, third culture 
families are dispatched to third cultures expected to return to the parent's 
anthropological place. Even while residing in the host nationals’ anthropological 
place, the TCK’s situation is always a temporary, non-anthropological arrangement. 
We see here the collapsing of the ‘temporally between’ and the ‘spatially between’ 
into one continuum governed by liminality. Thus, not only do TCKs spend a 
significant amount of their lives in non-places such as hotels or airports living out of 
their suitcases, more significantly, third culture itself is firmly placed in non-place 
(neither here nor there but everywhere and nowhere) and timed in non-time (neither 
then, nor next but always and never). 
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From the point of view of anthropological place, the liminal space of third 
culture is not a legitimate place with a permanent and stable identity and community. 
Just as liminal people are segregated and feared, so non-place is perceived as 
threatening and is resisted. Thus TCKs are illegitimate ‘non-persons’ with an 
identity, a history, and relations not recognized by the standards of anthropological 
place. This experience surfaces as a sensation of loss, often hidden, and 
disenfranchised grief.325 Pollock and Van Reken identify four key areas in which the 
TCK experiences losses due to their upbringing in non-place: people, places, pets, 
and possessions.326 In addition to these four concrete areas of losses, Kathleen 
Gilbert also identified existential losses on a deeper level, especially loss of personal 
identity and loss of home.327 These losses correspond to the lack of identity and 
community that Augé imposes on non-place. 
It is the nature of these losses that deserves particular attention. Gilbert 
observes that at the root of the problem of loss lies mobility, the key characteristic of 
non-place. She writes that “this mobility leads to almost perpetual state of 
psychological transition”328 indicating that any place TCKs find themselves in are 
typically experienced as non-places. When moving from one place to another certain 
things have to be given up or cannot even be claimed to be possessed in the first 
place. According to Gilbert, “many of the losses experienced by TCKs, particularly 
those that are hidden, are ambiguous. Ambiguous losses are those that lack clarity 
and can lead to sharply different assessments of exactly who or what has been 
lost.”329 This makes sense if third culture is seen as taking place in a non-place 
occupied by liminal non-people who by definition cannot possess or establish 
relations, as permanent possession of things and permanent relations properly belong 
to anthropological place and the pre- or postliminal person. Thus “losses often are 
hidden, and being hidden, are not acknowledged”330 and the grief of losing a piece of 
themselves is disenfranchised. In terms of liminality, as liminal persons TCKs are 
powerless and deprived of the right to belong, including the right to possess. Since 
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this loss is not recognized, TCKs are also deprived of the right to grieve what has 
been lost. 
A poem titled “Mock Funeral” by TCK Alex Graham James illustrates this 
well: 
There was no funeral. 
No flowers. 
No ceremony. 
No one had died. 
No weeping or wailing. 
Just in my heart. 
I can't... 
But I did anyway, 
and nobody knew I couldn't. 
I don't want to... 
But nobody else said they didn't. 
So I put down my panic 
and picked up my luggage 
and got on the plane. 
There was no funeral.331 
This poem expresses the inseparableness of the deprivation of rights and 
disenfranchised grief of the TCK as non-person and the mobility of non-place. It also 
reflects how a transition such as a plane ride can be experienced as the death of the 
person, echoing the metaphor of death used in connection to the liminal phase. One 
participant in Gilbert's study put it as follows: “everyone acted like it was such a 
good thing that my friends are leaving, or that we were leaving, to go 'home.' I don't 
think they saw how hard it was for kids.”332 The losses experienced within non-place 
are not recognized and instead the return ‘home,’ i.e. the return to the supposedly 
only legitimate anthropological place where rights and power are restored, is hailed 
as a victorious escape from non-place and a glorious restoration from liminal non-
person to a ‘real person’. For parents, repatriation means the return to what is 
familiar and stable (anthropological place) and concludes the liminal phase of being 
on the move with a satisfying resolution and reintegration. When these expectations 
are projected on TCKs, however, what TCKs had come to expect as normative (non-
place, liminality) is denied as having any validity. Losses take place within the 
context of disenfranchisement and what, from the point of view of TCKs, is 
possessed (including existential aspects such as home or identity) is denied from the 
point of view of anthropological place. 
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Worth taking a closer look are the loss of persons, loss of place, loss of 
identity, and loss of home. The loss of persons due to mobility within non-place 
consists of a peer network that is “a constant state of flux.”333 Gilbert observes that 
commonly TCKs learn to accept the loss of friends as inevitable, and one participant 
in the study even noting that “one grows comfortable with the notion that friendships 
last as long as a posting does.”334 Thus, non-place are places that lack relations by the 
standards of anthropological place because they are not seen as lasting. 
In terms of loss of place, Gilbert observes that each move to a new place 
dislocates some TCKs into a void where not only relationships are lost, but for some 
the very sense of place is lost. Gilbert writes “a significant minority of participants 
indicated they 'have no definite sense of place. There is no place for me that is more 
important than another,' and 'I've never felt tied to anyplace'”335 and continues to 
observe that “unlikely as it seems, they truly did not feel a sense of loss of place with 
their moves.”336 The ‘loss of non-place’ due to moving from one third culture space 
to another for these TCKs is an ambiguous loss or rather a ‘non-loss of place’. 
Whether a place could have been claimed as their own in the first place is doubted by 
TCKs themselves. 
Beyond practical losses such as persons or place, TCKs frequently spoke in 
terms of symbolic loss, e.g. of identity. Gilbert comments that “for TCKs, questions 
of who they are, what they are, where they are from, what and who they can trust are 
examples of existential losses with which they must cope.”337 Augé thus accurately 
predicts the existential loss TCKs experienced in non-places in terms of identity 
(who they are), history (where they are from), relations (loss of a sense of 
belonging). Interestingly, Gilbert concludes that “it was only when [TCKs] leave a 
world where the only constant is change (…), where others entered and exited one's 
life, and where it is normal for people to move from setting to setting and from 
country to country, that TCKs learned they were different,”338 thus confirming that 
the lack of identity, history, and relations when confronted with the return to 
anthropological place is something imposed upon the TCK from outside the non-
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place. Who within the highly mobile non-place appeared as a normal and fully 
acceptable ‘person’, is judged as a ‘non-person’ by non-TCKs within monocultural 
anthropological place. Non-persons might be singled out as “circus freaks” or pushed 
to the margins as “terminally unique” resulting in “profound loneliness – an inability 
to ever completely mesh with a given culture.”339 As a consequence of TCKs' 
liminality and upbringing in non-place, TCKs are “between identities” feeling 
“[the]y had nowhere where [they] could be who [they] thought [they were].”340 
Again, the sensation of a loss of identity occurs when, from a point of view of 
anthropological place, the right to identity within non-place is rejected as invalid. 
Finally, Gilbert mentions loss of a place TCKs can call ‘home’. Instead of a 
straightforward loss, however, Gilbert comments that an absence of home is more 
accurate. She writes “the absence of a home in their [TCKs] life became most 
apparent when participants left the TCK lifestyle and moved to their passport 
country (…) for many, the place that was assumed to be their home was, in fact, 
strange to them.”341 Again, confronted with anthropological place and its standards of 
what home ought to be, the TCK realizes the lack of home. The question of where 
one is from cannot produce the desired answer for the anthropologically located 
person resulting in the sometimes painful realisation by TCKs that they have no 
place to belong to and are in fact ‘nowhere.’ Participants in Gilbert's study expressed 
“homesickness for a home that either does not exist or is a place to which they can 
no longer return.”342 Unable to accurately place the TCK on a map, the liminal TCK 
become invisible to the anthropologically placed person. 
Rendered invisible, TCKs are stripped of their right to participate in any 
discourse rooted in anthropological place. Most importantly for us, any theology that 
is rooted in anthropological place is thus off limits to the TCK and any attempt to 
participate is seen as a dangerous, uninvited intrusion by an outsider. As long as 
theology is understood to be a discourse within anthropological place, TCKs as 
TCKs are unacceptable. Theology remains alien to the TCK and TCKs remain alien 
to the theology of anthropological place. 
                                                          
339 Ibid., 105. See also: Cottrell, "ATCKs Have Problems Relating to Own Ethnic Groups." 
340 Gilbert, "Loss and Grief between and among Cultures: The Experience of Third Culture Kids," 
105. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid., 106. 
98 
 
The standards of anthropological place by which TCKs are required to produce 
identity, history, and relations in order to be legitimately recognized as persons, are 
actually the driving force behind liminality. Augé's refusal to judge non-places by 
any other standard than by anthropological place sustains non-places and are part of 
the very dynamic of liminality. As Turner described it, the liminal state is akin to 
death. 
 
The Potential of Non-Place 
Liminality and non-place require thinking outside the box of anthropological place. 
Just as liminality has its own dynamic when it comes to identity, so non-place has its 
own dynamic of identity that is different from that of anthropological place. O'Beirne 
writes that rather than “simply presenting such spaces as repositories of alienation 
and loneliness [we should] explore their potential to produce contemporary forms of 
relation, and therefore identity and meaning.”343 Potential for resurrecting and 
reconstructing identity from the death of liminality can be found within the freedom 
found in non-place. O'Beirne even suggests that “the non-lieu, precisely because of 
its apparently blank quality, can be a salvation for the individual”344 from the 
constraints of anthropological place. New identities can be forged within the relative 
freedom of non-place. 
TCKs can construct an alternative identity and community within the context 
of their liminality which will fundamentally differ from how identity and community 
are constructed in anthropological place. In terms of home, Gilbert observes that 
some TCKs “settled on defining home as within themselves, wherever they were, 
where their family was, within their faith community, or see themselves as global 
citizen.”345 Alternative notions of ‘home’ thus emerge from the vacuum left in non-
place. TCKs are given more freedom in defining themselves than anthropologically 
located people. Geographical notions of home are replaced with psychological, 
universal, social, spiritual, or global notions of home that provide the TCK with an 
alternative identity, history, relations and ultimately meaning. Importantly, as Gilbert 
points out faith communities can play a crucial role in the construction of liminal 
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identities. ‘Home’ from the perspective of non-place can thus also be theological. 




This chapter has focused on the question of where to belong. Since belonging to a 
place (anthropological place) holds such influence over who people are, TCKs 
naturally have a complicated relation to place. Growing up mobile within non-place, 
TCKs are judged to be invalid ‘non-persons’, relations to their peers that do not last 
and lack significance, and their personal history is hacked into disconnected pieces. 
These losses are often unacknowledged. Augé’s non-place sheds light on how TCKs 
experience their liminality and his critical view towards non-place highlights the 
challenges that TCKs face in making liminality / non-place their legitimate place to 
belong to. The only redemption seems to be the salvific potential non-place has in 






Liquid Modernity and Third Culture Kids 
 
Introduction 
Along with non-place, liquidity is another concept to further deepen our 
understanding to liminality. Liquidity, contrasted with solidity, as a metaphor for 
dynamic in-between identities serves to additionally highlight aspects of TCKs. This 
chapter will introduce Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of liquid identities and also point 
out the pitfalls of identifying with liminality, namely the danger of becoming a 
passive bystander who cannot commit. 
 
Zygmunt Bauman: Liquid Modernity and Identity 
Zygmunt Bauman346 views the modern world through the metaphor of liquid. Unlike 
Marc Augé347, who saw himself as standing within ‘solid’ anthropological place, 
Bauman’s background itself is part of ‘liquid modernity’ where structures such as 
nation states are not as rigidly defined, and he is therefore less critical of it. Bauman 
is much more forthcoming than Augé in granting a way of life to highly mobile 
people. There are significant overlaps between his own life, his use of liquid as the 
metaphor to describe our times, and the situation that TCKs find themselves in. 
Bauman himself moved countries frequently, eventually settling in the UK as a 
Polish Jew in exile. Martin Jay remarks that Bauman’s nomadic background is what 
“enabled him to be so sensitive to the changes in modern life”348 arguing that 
Bauman lived the very liquid modernity that he was writing about. Bauman confirms 
this, writing: 
[O]nce I had been set in motion, pulled out from wherever could pass for my ‘natural 
habitat’, there was no place where I could be seen as fitting in, as they say, one 
hundred per cent. In each and every place I was – sometimes slightly, at some other 
times blatantly – ‘out of place’.349 
Expelled from his anthropological place, Bauman confesses to finding himself more 
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or less in non-place. This in turn raises complex questions of identity, questions that 
Bauman shares “practically with all men and women of the ‘liquid modern’ era.”350 
Bauman’s liquid modernity presents an insider perspective concerning the question 
of identity in liminality and non-place. 
 
Liquid Modernity 
Augé states that non-places are the measure of our time. Similarly, Bauman uses 
liquid as the leading metaphor to describe the present state of modernity. The 
concept behind both of these is mobility. What liminality describes in terms of time 
and non-place in terms of place, Bauman describes in terms of shape. Bauman writes 
“fluids do not keep to any shape for long and are constantly ready (and prone) to 
change it; and so for them it is the flow of time that counts, more than the space they 
happen to occupy: that space, after all, they fill but ‘for a moment.”351 Instead of 
being rooted in a solid anthropological place and having a fixed shape or identity, 
Bauman argues that people flow through space and take on temporary identities. 
Bauman argues that ‘melting the solids’ has always been a theme in modernity, 
but distinguishes between two phases: Solid modernity and liquid modernity. In early 
modernity, social structures were melted in order to emancipate them from pre-
modern beliefs and loyalties. However, “one of the most powerful motives behind 
the urge to melt them was the wish to discover or invent solids of – for a change – 
lasting solidity, a solidity which one could trust and rely upon and which would 
make the world predictable and therefore manageable.”352 The improved rigidity of 
social structures and categories were to ensure the freedom of the rational modern 
person. Bauman argues that “configurations, constellations, patterns of dependency 
and interaction are all thrown into the melting pot, to be subsequently recast and 
refashioned. (…) No mould was broken without being replaced with another.”353 
People thus had stable points of orientation, by which they could securely find their 
place in society and “the task confronting free individuals was to use their new 
freedom to find the appropriate niche and settle there through conformity: by 
faithfully following the rules and mode or conduct identified as right and proper for 
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the location.”354 Although people found new freedom to move and change, 
eventually, the goal was to settle in a solid place with a solid identity. In other words, 
the liminal person eventually reintegrated into society; the traveller passing through 
non-place eventually arrived at their destination, an anthropological place. 
Bauman contrasts this solid modernity with liquid modernity, where melting 
has acquired a different meaning. What is now being melted are the bonds between 
individuals and human collectivities. Patterns and configurations that had been 
melted and recast before are no longer given. Bauman writes: 
[W]e are presently moving from the era of pre-allocated ‘reference-groups’ into the 
epoch of ‘universal comparison’, in which the destination of individual self-
constructing labours is endemically and incurably underdetermined, is not given in 
advance, and tends to undergo numerous and profound changes before such labours 
reach their only genuine end: that is, the end of the individual’s life.355 
Individuals are constantly on the move going through change after change because 
structures such as peer groups have melted. Evolving as a person has become 
unpredictable but necessary. Liquidity means being alive and death is the ultimate 
solid state. 
Augé’s anthropological place is part of the solid modernity, where ‘place’ is 
valued over ‘time’, rootedness over mobility. Modernity gave rise to the means to 
move more freely but in solid modernity people still settled in the next place. The 
melting of the solids and re-casting into new and improved solids thus corresponds 
to movement from one anthropological place to another anthropological place. 
Mobility only made sense in terms of destinations. These modern movements we 
know from waves of immigration. Non-places, on the other hand, are melted 
anthropological places that remain fluid. Instead of seeing non-place as a means to 
another end, namely of arriving at the destination, Bauman is suggesting that the 
fluid state itself has become the end. The goal is not to arrive, but to keep on moving. 
Stability became liability. 
 
The Question of Identity in Liquid Modernity 
Unlike Augé’s impression that identity is either present or absent, Bauman sees 
                                                          




identity as a task that was “a problem from its birth [in modernity].”356 When one is 
not sure where to belong, identity is “a name given to the escape sought from that 
uncertainty.”357 The question of who one is therefore only arises when there are 
options from which to choose from. In the context of modernity, Bauman writes: 
[H]uman nature, once seen as a lasting and non-[negotiable] legacy of one-off divine 
creation, has been thrown, together with the rest of divine creation, into the melting 
pot. No more was it seen – no more could it be seen – as a ‘given’. Instead, it has 
turned into a task, and a task which every man and woman had no choice but to face 
up to and perform to the best of their ability.358  
During solid modernity, the task was to create a “tough, durable, reliable and 
trustworthy”359 identity. The goal was to conform to the established patterns and to 
live ‘true to kind.’ Individuals might go through so-called ‘identity crises’, but the 
norm, according to Erik H. Erikson, was to have “a subjective sense of an 
invigorating sameness and continuity.”360 In contrast to Erikson, Bauman suggests 
that ‘sameness’ and ‘continuity’ are seldom felt by today’s liquid individuals and that 
Erikson’s assessment is outdated.361 
The conditions of identity changed with the shift from solid to liquid 
modernity. Bauman declares that: 
In our liquid modern times the world around us is sliced into poorly coordinated 
fragments while our individual lives are cut into a succession of ill-connected 
episodes. Few if any of us can avoid the passage through more than one genuine or 
putative, well-integrated or ephemeral ‘community of ideas and principles’, so most 
of us have trouble resolving (…) the issues of [the consistency and continuity of our 
identity over time]. Few if any of us are exposed to just one ‘community of ideas and 
principles’ at a time, and so most of us have similar trouble with the issue of 
[coherence of what distinguishes us as persons].362 
In other words, the world that Augé nostalgically longed for, of people rooted in 
anthropological place with consistent, continuous, and coherent identities is rare in 
liquid modernity. Instead, liquid lives of people need to be seen as a history of 
different identities adopted and discarded. Bauman further argues that in liquid 
modernity solid identities are not desirable for some to begin with. The aim is to 
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keep as many options open and to not tie oneself down in order to not regret one’s 
decision later.363 
Identity becomes liquid modernity’s dilemma: On the one hand, “longing for 
identity comes from the desire for security. (…) [F]loating around without support in 
a poorly defined space, in a stubbornly, vexingly ‘betwixt-and-between’ location, 
becomes in the long run an unnerving and anxiety-prone condition.”364 On the other 
hand, “a fixed position amidst the infinity of possibilities is not an attractive prospect 
either. (…) To sum up: ‘to identify oneself with…’ means to give hostages to an 
unknown fate which one cannot influence, let alone control.”365 Liquid people want 
to escape the uncertainty of being liquid and long for the comfort of solidly 
belonging to some place. At the same time, they dread the possibility of becoming 
stale, of losing their freedom and creativity in their solid confinement. 
Identity is thus not a straightforward process of creating or inheriting who one 
is. Bauman suggests that for denizens of liquid modernity instead of speaking about 
identity it would be more suitable to speak about identification, which is “a never-
ending, always incomplete, unfinished and open-ended activity in which we all, by 
necessity or by choice, are engaged.”366 Similarly, the denizens of non-place should 
not think of their identity in terms of a firm place but think of it as the activity of 
engaging with people  
and groups that flow through the life of the globally mobile person.  
 
From Pilgrim to Tourist 
Augé contrasts the destination oriented pilgrim with the solitary consumer tourist. 
Similarly, Bauman compares the identity building of solid modernity to a pilgrimage. 
A pilgrimage is seen as progress towards a destination or goal. Progress must go on as 
long as there is a distance between the goal, i.e. future identity, and the present, i.e. the 
place and current identity of the wanderer. 367  The distance meant a delay in 
gratification and provided the motivation for identity-building. Life was thus 
directional, continuous, and unbendable. Although the life of the pilgrim leaves the 
impression of a liquid state of being, it is only possible in solid modernity. Bauman 
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Pilgrims had a stake in [the] solidity of the world they walked; in a kind of world in 
which one can tell life as a continuous story, a ‘sense making’ story, such a story as 
makes each event the effect of the event before and the cause of the event after, each 
age a station on the road pointing towards fulfillment. The world of pilgrims – of 
identity-builders – must be orderly, determined, predictable, ensured; but above all it 
must be a kind of world in which footprints are engraved for good so that the trace 
and the record of past travels are kept and preserved.368 
The relative freedom to build one’s identity and to actually make lasting progress 
was guaranteed by the solidity of the structures surrounding the pilgrim. 
Furthermore, although the pilgrim can be in a liquid, liminal state, it is only meant to 
be temporary until the final solid identity strived for is achieved. The goal of what 
one ought to be is thus solid. 
The challenge for the pilgrim is how to keep track of and preserve the progress 
that has been made. With the increasing liquidity of structures surrounding identity-
building, this is becoming increasingly difficult. Bauman describes liquid modernity 
as a “world inhospitable to pilgrims”369 due to its transient nature. Whereas the solid 
world of rootedness in anthropological place was predictable and regular, the liquid 
world of non-place is in constant flux causing “the rules of the game to keep 
changing long before the game is finished.”370 Durability and commitment to a set of 
rules then become a liability instead of an advantage. Whereas in solid modernity the 
driving question is how one can construct a meaningful identity and maintain it, in 
liquid modernity the question is primarily how one can avoid fixation and keep one’s 
options open.371 To illustrate this, Bauman lists a set of ‘Do Nots’ that have become 
the rule of thumb for liquid identification: 
Do not plan your trips too long – the shorter the trip, the greater the chance of 
completing it; do not get emotionally attached to people you meet at the stopover – 
the less you care about them, the less it will cost you to move on; do not commit 
yourself too strongly to people, places, causes – you cannot know how long they will 
last or how long you will count them worthy of your commitment; (…) Above all, 
do not delay gratification.372 
Liquid persons are thus free as long as they remain liquid. Freedom to commit, to 
care, to make long term goals are not included in liquidity. 
                                                          
368 Ibid., 23. 
369 Ibid., 23 - 26. 
370 Ibid., 25. 
371 Ibid., 18. 
372 Ibid., 25. 
106 
 
In contrast with the pilgrim of solid modernity, Bauman gives four metaphors 
that each describe aspects of the denizen of liquid modernity: the stroller, the 
vagabond, the tourist, and the player.373 Each of these characters is a potential 
outcome for TCKs and thus warrants a closer look. 
First, the stroller’s life is one without commitment or deep engagement. 
Encounters with strangers remain episodic and without impact. Pleasures of modern 
life are enjoyed without consequences and without the need for courage. The best 
places for strolling are non-places, where anonymity protects the “totally private, 
secure, locked and burglar-proof world of the lonely nomad.”374 Impulsive and 
undirected curiosity drives the stroller. Blending in with the crowd without being of 
the crowd is the stroller’s strength. Unlike the pilgrim, commitment is shunned and 
consequences are dreaded. 
Second, the masterless, free-roaming vagabonds pride themselves in escaping 
local control and authority. The vagabond is unpredictable and directionless. Unlike 
the pilgrim the vagabond has no destination and “wherever the vagabond goes, he is 
a stranger; he can never be ‘the native’, the ‘settled one’, one with ‘roots in the 
soil’”375 Rather than settling down like a pilgrim at the end of their journey or 
invisibly blending in like the stroller, the ‘out-of-placeness’ of the vagabond is 
insisted on. 
Three, the tourist is similar to the vagabond in that they visit places in order to 
remain strangers. However, tourists move purposefully in order to gain novel often 
exotic experiences for excitement and amusement. Key to the tourist is safety. The 
exotic other must be tamed, domesticated and no longer frightening. Furthermore, 
unlike vagabonds, tourists have a more complicated relation to ‘home.’ For the 
tourist, “having a home is part of the safety package.”376 Home, however, becomes 
more and more obscure for the tourist with every subsequent move to another 
exciting location. Eventually it becomes “a dream of belonging”377 that is perpetually 
deferred into the future. Unlike the pilgrim, gratification is not to be delayed, and 
unlike the vagabond, real risks are never taken. 
Finally, for the player the events in the world are moves in an endless cycle of 
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successive games. The world itself is an adversary in the game. A successful player 
stays ahead of the game. Each game has a clear ending and beginning so that “it 
should not ‘spill over’ into the time after: as far as later games are concerned, no 
game played before must handicap, privilege or otherwise determine the players – be 
of consequence.”378 No game has lasting consequences and everything is understood 
to be just a game, thus leaving no grudges or scars behind. Life is a series of games 
with no consequences. Unlike a pilgrimage, life as a game is competitive but also not 
truly real. 
These four metaphors for the denizen of liquid modernity have several aspects 
in common. Human relations are fragmented, responsibilities are avoided, and 
distance between the individual and the other are promoted. The four caricatures, 
however, cannot be integrated into a cohesive way of life. Here, liquid life is too 
incoherent and messy to expect clear cut life strategies.379 Each person might react 
differently to liquidity. Anyhow, Bauman here presents far reaching consequences of 
the uncertainties of identifying in a liquid word. The freedom of being liquid, of 
being liminal and belonging to non-place, comes with the risk of non-engagement. 
Rootlessness and restlessness can become aloofness. If from Augé’s perspective of 
anthropological place a person in non-place are ‘non-person’ without recognizable 
identity, community, and history, then similarly Bauman makes the case that for the 
liquid person believing to only be alive in perpetual mobility the solid person is 
‘non-person’ who has surrendered their life to mortal solidity. 
Bauman’s discussion on liquid modernity highlights two important points. 
First, Bauman points out that “the styles once practiced by marginal people in 
marginal time-stretches and marginal places, are now practiced by the majority in the 
prime time of their lives and in places central to their life-world.”380 Thus, what 
might have been strategies of select liminal and marginal individuals have become 
the new norm in liquid modernity. TCKs are thus not out of place after all but 
forerunners of a liquid world that is only slowly coming to terms with itself. Second, 
Bauman’s makes the case that the task of identifying in liquid modernity has a 
negative side of disassociation. Commitments make the liquid person liable and 
therefore in order to remain mobile the person seems to have no choice but to remain 
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aloof. In Bauman’s description of the stroller, the vagabond, the tourist, and the 
player we have a powerful critique of TCKs. Liminality can lead to disregarding the 
local others and risks alienating everyone else. 
 
Liquid Modernity and Third Culture Kids 
The fragmented life of TCKs, high mobility, cultural incoherence, rootlessness, and 
restlessness correspond to the conditions of liquid modernity. Structures and 
categories that might have previously been solid for non-TCKs, such as ‘home’, 
‘cultural identity’, ‘friendship’, ‘motherland’, ‘mother tongue’ to mention a few, 
have melted and become liquid for the TCK. Loyalties to countries, primary 
languages, network of friends, the sense of belonging, and ultimately the answer to 
the question ‘Who am I?’ can easily change with a single airplane ride. Bauman 
suggests that TCKs prefer not to have a solid identity and yet are tormented by the 
hidden need for security and recognition as Kathleen Gilbert has observed through 
the experiences of losses and grief among TCKs.381 Characteristics of TCKs such as 
confused loyalties382, avoidance of commitment383 are reflected in the four 
caricatures presented by Bauman. 
The picture presented by Bauman of liquid modernity dominated by the 
strollers, vagabonds, tourists, and players proves unsatisfactory even to Bauman 
himself. Bauman sees a risk of “unstoppable experimentation” when it comes to 
trying out new identities in the condition of liquid modernity. He explains that 
“[e]xperiments never end. You try one identity at a time, but so many others, as yet 
untried, wait around the corner for you to pick them up. Many more undreamt-of 
identities are still to be invented and coveted in your lifetime.”384 The risk of never 
being able to settle for who one is, is real for the restless TCK always anticipating 
the next move. Commitment issues arise for such liquid TCKs.385 Liquidity can 
mean the possibility of freely choosing one’s form at will. However, liquidity can 
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become encapsulating and paralyzing.386 In such a case, the liquid person would thus 
be pushed and pulled by whatever current might be the strongest. 
Furthermore, the degree of freedom implied in the above quote can be 
misleading. Even though Bauman gives the impression that liquid individuals have 
the flexibility to, for at least the moment, become whomever they want to be, Augé 
reminds us that some options are denied. Ethnic, political, financial, or racial reasons 
prevent TCKs to freeze their liquid state into a solid identity and to actually be 
someone accepted and recognized by others as a real ‘person’ as opposed to a ‘non-
person’. For example, the fluid Caucasian TCK who grew up in Japan might want to 
choose to become a solid Japanese person, but have this option denied by the 
Japanese government and be regularly reminded of their alien status by the relative 
yet obvious difference in skin colour. For some TCKs, to remain fluid, i.e. to remain 
permanently liminal, to be at home in non-place is not only the only familiar way of 
life but the only reasonable option. 
The question is thus how TCKs can remain liminal, liquid, and in non-place 
without resorting to fruitless experimentation, falling into encapsulating paralysis, or 
attempting to escape to a nostalgic solidity that might never be an option. Bauman’s 
picture of liquid modernity thus still seems rather bleak for the TCK. What is clear, 
however, is that solid structures still remain as powerful constructs dominating the 
task of identifying. The interplay between anthropological place and non-place can 
equally be observed along the lines of solid and liquid structures. The TCK’s 
struggle arises from being in between solid and liquid states, at home in any 
anthropological place but simultaneously a denizen of non-place. Just as the liminal 
state is sustained by the gravitational pulls of both the preliminal and postliminal 
other, and non-place arises only because it happens to be on the route connecting 
anthropological places, so liquidity also only exists as the intentional antithesis to 
solidity. Solid structures shape and mould liquid. TCKs being both a part of and 
apart from solid structures are both solid and liquid: Solid in terms of the places they 
happen to be in, the language they use, the behaviour they adopt; but liquid in terms 
of the way they flow back and forth between solid-seeming states with surprising 
ease and flexibility. 
 
                                                          




This chapter has used Bauman’s liquid modernity as a tool to better understand 
TCKs’ predicament. Liquidity and its pitfalls present a powerful critique of TCKs 
who in their marginality become encapsulated and waste their potential floating 
around. Rather than engage TCKs can become trapped in the comfort of remaining a 
‘wallflower’ or like the vagabond feel the need to actively distance themselves from 
all others (‘screamers’).387 
What is needed is a way to distinguish between fruitful ways and crippling 
ways of living in liminality. Rather than merely being ‘neither/nor’ or ‘apart from’, 
how can TCKs also be ‘both/and’ as well as ‘a part of’ their surrounding world? How 
can TCKs engage with the world as TCKs without having to give up their 
uniqueness? 
  
                                                          




Constructive Marginality and Third Culture Kids 
 
Introduction 
The discussion of non-place and liquid modernity has served to give words to the 
frustration and struggles that TCKs experience in their liminality. While glimpses of 
creative possibilities have shone through, the discussion’s mood has remained rather 
pessimistic. It is time to show that liminality need not be negative. Janet Bennett’s 
distinction between ‘encapsulated marginality’ and ‘constructive marginality’388 will 
serve this purpose. This chapter discusses Bennett’s marginality as encapsulated and 
constructive and gives two examples of a constructive marginality: Muneo 




When describing the four caricatures of liquid modernity Zygmunt Bauman remarks 
that “styles once practised by marginal people in marginal time-stretches and 
marginal places, are now practised by the majority in the prime time of their lives 
and in places central to their life-world; they have become now, fully and truly, life 
styles.”391 All four thus exhibit characteristics of marginality. Marginals who used to 
be banned to the far off margins of powerful and influential solid structures such as 
race, class, gender, nationality, and ethnicity have with the progressive melting of 
these structures moved towards the centre of society. Being in between categories 
itself has become a way of life. Whereas before the solid continents of 
anthropological place were the centre, now it is the liquid ocean, non-place, between 
shrinking solid structural islands that have become the new centres of these times. 
Marginal people with their liquidity are filling the gaps opened by the receding, 
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melting solids. Bennett has shed further light on the liquid modern condition of 
marginality by distinguishing between “encapsulated marginality” and “constructive 
marginality.”392 
Bennett draws on the classic marginal literature found in Robert Park393, 
Everett Stonequist394, and Milton Goldberg395 to develop her dual approach to 
contemporary cultural marginality found in disparate groups such as refugees, 
immigrants, TCKs, multicultural people, adult sojourners and minorities among 
other groups. What these groups have in common are issues of self-concept and 
identity.396 Bennett defines cultural marginality as “a cultural lifestyle at the edges of 
where two or more cultures meet”397 and emphasizes that it is a conflict of 
competing cultures “within oneself.”398 Cultural marginality is thus a self-
contradiction. As the classic literature on marginality points out this can lead to 
“powerlessness, isolation, anxiety, insecurity, ambivalence, self-consciousness, 
malaise, and self-doubt”399, characteristics that find resonance in liminality, non-
place, as well as liquid modernity. Bennett argues that responses to marginality can 
be either encapsulated or constructive. 
 
Encapsulated Marginality 
Bennett defines encapsulating cultural marginality as follows: “When a person 
responds to this internal dialog with a compromised ability to establish boundaries 
and make judgments, we can say that the individual is ‘encapsulated’ or trapped by 
marginality. The encapsulated marginal is a person who is buffeted by conflicting 
cultural loyalties and unable to construct a unified identity.”400 The internalized 
conflict between solid cultural structures that torments the liquid person results in 
disjunction, conflicting loyalties, loose boundary control, and “[give] decision 
making the character of a trial-and-error effort.”401 Different roles and identities are 
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tried or enforced by others and discarded. Lines between the self and the other are 
unclear and commitments to causes are unreliable. 
The encapsulated marginal experiences “a sense of alienation described 
variously as including powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, cultural 
estrangement, self-estrangement, social isolation, anomie, or anxiety.”402 In such 
circumstances, establishing enduring goals, clear values, or strong personal 
attachments prove immensely challenging for encapsulated marginals. The 
incapability of finding a peer group can lead to the state of perceived irresolvable 
“terminal uniqueness.”403 When forced to conform by powerful solid social 
institutions, the assigned role can feel inauthentic and ultimately pointless. Like 
Bauman’s player figure every action is merely a move in a yet another meaningless 
game. Under such circumstances feeling truly at home is impossible. 
Bennett’s encapsulated marginal and Bauman’s liquid person share several 
important characteristics. First, both speak of the inability to find a peer group as an 
important factor.404 Bennett writes that “[t]he sense of being alone with this cultural-
identity struggle often causes marginal people to feel detached from all reference 
groups.”405 For the encapsulated marginal as well as the liquid person, there are no 
stable orientation points and no reference group. However, Bennett remarks that 
“[m]any [marginals] are frequently unaware of the existence of a global community 
of [marginals] with whom they might identify”406 suggesting that peer groups can 
play a role even in marginality. Second, both describe the lack of commitment to 
enduring solid roles. Bennett writes of commitments as a process of “trial-and-
error”407 and Bauman speaks of “instoppable experimentation.”408 For Bauman this 
is a matter of wanting to keep as many options as possible open as well as of the 
dilemma between security and freedom. Bennett observes that this is due to the 
attempt to satisfy the conflicting demands of not yet melted solid social constructs, 
suggesting that power of anthropological place over non-place plays an influential 
role as Marc Augé’s409 critical discussion of non-place shows. Overall, the world of 
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marginals that Bennett presupposes is a mixture of liquid and solid constructions that 
create internal confusion and conflicts leading to encapsulation. 
 
From Encapsulating to Constructive Marginality 
Bennett adapts William Perry’s intellectual and ethical development model410 to 
examine cultural marginality. According to Bennett, Perry suggests that there are 
four successive stages of development: dualism, multiplicity, contextual relativism, 
commitment to relativism.411 
First, cultural dualism sees norms and values dictated by authority figures and 
is deeply ethnocentric. Dualism is rigid in its structure and belongs to the categories 
of anthropological place and solid modernity. A person is either this or that. Second, 
multiplicity is marked by confusion and conflict as can be seen in encapsulated 
marginality. Bennett writes that “[t]he ‘terminal uniqueness’ posture of the 
encapsulated marginal fosters multiplicity, where ambiguity seems overwhelming 
and strongly stated opinions seem prejudicial or biased.”412 Norms and values are 
still recognized as solid structures and therefore cause conflicting perspectives 
leading to the loss of agency. 
Third, contextual relativism shifts norms and values from the solid to the 
liquid. Marginals come to terms with ambiguity and freely adjust frames of reference 
according to the demands of the context. Decisions are driven by the relative context. 
However, commitments only last as long as the situation does. Marginals become 
aloof and unreliable. Bauman’s tourist, stroller, vagabond, and player fall into this 
developmental stage of indifference. Fourth, Bennett argues that marginals can arrive 
at commitment in relativism. Bennett suggests that “[h]ere choice is an accepted 
responsibility. (…) The cultural marginal who can master this stage has become a 
constructive marginal, capable of constructing identity and making commitments in 
the face of ambiguity.”413 The marginality is thus acknowledged and owned by the 
marginal. A constructive commitment to ‘in-betweenness’ replaces confused loyalties 
between differing solid norms and values and indifference. 
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In contrast to encapsulated marginality, Bennett describes constructive marginality as 
follows: “[B]y maintaining control of choice and the construction of boundaries, a 
person may become a ‘constructive’ marginal. A constructive marginal is a person 
who is able to construct context intentionally and consciously for the purpose of 
creating his or her own identity.”414 Constructive marginals form clear boundaries, 
become self-reflective, feel authentic in their roles, and recognize that “one is never 
not at home in the world.”415 According to Bennett this realization comes from “the 
acknowledgement that one does indeed have a peer group. It is not fellow members 
of one’s own culture, but rather a group of fellow marginals with whom one has 
more in common than with anyone else.”416 Identifying a peer group of marginals 
helps normalize the experience of liminality. Indeed, higher affirmation, belonging, 
and commitment to an in-between identity correlate with higher self-esteem, 
reflecting a constructive transaction of marginality, and lower cultural homelessness, 
i.e. encapsulated marginality.417 Comfort can be achieved by intentionally owning 
the non-space one inhabits and creating familiarity by oneself.418 Marginality can 
then constructively be seen as one’s ‘home’. 
Bennett argues that the marginal needs to resolve two essential developmental 
tasks in reaching the stage of constructive marginality: integration of identity and 
personal commitment.419 First, Bennett suggests that fragmentation needs 
integration. The marginal needs to come to terms with the multiplicity of frames of 
reference. Secondly, Bennett argues that personal commitment to acting responsibly 
while tolerating ambiguity and paradox are required of the constructive marginal. 
In order to develop a constructive marginality Bennett suggests a double 
epistemology that involves “a separate epistemology” and “a connected 
epistemology.”420 In other words, Bennett argues that constructive marginals ought 
to both doubt and believe what is being confronted. In doubting, the marginal 
confronts the other as ‘Other’. In believing, the marginal identifies with the other, 
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thus shifting frames of reference and entertaining multiple perspectives. The 
constructive marginal should see themselves as both ‘being a part from’ and ‘apart 
of’ the situation, transcending the demands of the situation in one sense, yet 
immersing oneself in the situation in another sense. 
Furthermore, Bennett suggests marginals ought to see themselves in terms of 
“self-as-process” rather than “self-as-object.”421 Bennett explains that “[w]atching 
the self and becoming a collectivity of intrapersonal impressions of one’s own fluid 
identity are hazards of marginality.”422 Instead of becoming mere passive observers, 
marginals ought to see themselves as agents who take the initiative to act. 
Marginality must be actively owned rather than merely passively recognized. 
TCK Barbara Schaetti’s own experience serves as a good illustration of 
realizing one’s constructive marginality through the discovery of agency and a peer 
group. Schaetti writes about herself: 
I went to graduate school, studied intercultural conflict management, and trained to 
be a mediator. My studies and subsequent work as a corporate consultant helped me 
learn to use my marginality constructively, to help me become a part of society rather 
than apart from it. 
I found my marginality benefited me (…). 
I could move in and out, between and among conflicting parties, building bridges 
across their differences, but never settling firmly on one side or another, in one place 
or another. I was introduced in my late twenties to the concept of global nomads (…) 
and found a community with whom I belong. (…) As I get older I am evolving a 
personal truth to which I am fully committed, while maintaining my ability to 
appreciate the truths of others.423 
In the role as mediator, Schaetti states that she has found a way to shape her own 
marginality in a positive way. Bennett concurs as she argues that “[t]he combination 
of multiple frames of reference, connected and separate knowing, and commitment 
in the context of relativism makes an ideal background for a rational, empathetic go-
between.”424 In other words, we can make the case that due to the very flexibility to 
move between different frames of references, constructive marginals have the 
potential to act as intermediaries. As such they are committed to their very fluidity, 
purposefully filling the gaps between solids, using their fluidity to gently embrace 
solid structures, and flexibly taking on shapes and forms without being consumed by 
them. 
                                                          
421 Ibid., 127. 
422 Ibid., 126. 
423 Schaetti, "Phoenix Rising: A Question of Cultural Identity," 185 - 86. 
424 Bennett, "Cultural Marginality: Identity Issues in Intercultural Training." 
117 
 
In terms of non-place, constructive marginals can intentionally carve out non-
places to make interaction between anthropological places possible. Non-places then 
become mediating places. In fact, in a sense constructive marginals who sustain 
fluidity and construct non-places are in turn liberating anthropological place from its 
encapsulating solidity providing the flexibility and room, the neutral non-place, for 
the eye-opening encounter between different anthropologically rooted people. 
This constructive approach is conditional on what Schaetti termed ‘personal 
truth’ which holds up in the face of relativism.425 Bennett suggests that in order to 
develop a constructive marginality marginals must come to terms with the reality 
that “all knowledge is constructed”426 and must construct whatever frame of 
reference to be adopted by themselves. Schaetti elaborates on Bennett’s idea: 
Bennett argues that the single most important ingredient in building a constructive 
experience of marginality is developing a sense of one’s own truth. Certainly it is 
valuable to be able to understand different truths as represented in different cultures, 
to withhold judgement and interpretation. That is part of the global nomad’s 
birthright. At the same time, however it is important for the adult global nomad to 
plant his or her feet in personal truth, one not dependent on circumstance.427 
In other words, the liquid person needs to find a frame of reference which is not 
dependent on any solid constructs that he or she is negotiating between in order to 
remain both liquid and committed. Schaetti argues that liquid persons must find a set 
of personal truths that are faithful to liquidity itself, a personal truth that holds true 
regardless of the cultural contexts in which the liquid person finds him or herself. 
This means that, for example, a theological understanding of one’s identity and 
purpose can serve as such a personal truth to cement commitment even amid 
liminality. 
 
Models of Constructive Marginality 
With the distinction between encapsulated and constructive marginality, it is now 
possible to review constructive models of marginality that seek to infuse the liquid 
liminal person in non-place with meaning and purpose. Two examples will serve to 
outline a model of mediation which fits naturally with TCKs emerging from a 
mediating culture. First, Muneo Yoshikawa has developed a so-called double-swing 
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model of dynamic in-betweenness based on Martin Buber and Buddhist concepts.428 
Second, Bochner et al. have proposed a model of a mediating person for bicultural 
and multicultural persons.429 
 
(A)  Muneo Yoshikawa’s Dynamic In-Betweenness 
Yoshikawa addresses the concerns of Augé’s supermodernity. The excess of time, 
place and egos has intensified intercultural encounters with the other. He proposes 
the double-swing model as a solution to how to construct a creative dialog between 
cultures, nations, and people.430 He argues for a dynamic in-betweenness that 
transcends binary perceptions of absolute and relative, category and non-category. 
The double-swing model is a dialogical mode of encounter and communication 
between the self and the other. It is a dynamic paradoxical relationship that 
simultaneously maintains independence and interdependence.431 Yoshikawa draws 
on the philosophy of Martin Buber432 and on Buddhism to develop his model. He 
argues that Buber proposes an integration of opposites in the I-thou relationship that 
is neither a unity based on the absorption of both opposites nor an elimination of one 
opposite. Instead, “it is a kind of integration in which two sides of the pole cannot be 
excluded.”433 This unity of the opposites takes place in the sphere of the between, 
marked by both distance and relation. Yoshikawa argues that the between is “no 
happy middle” but rather a “type of unity that does not eliminate the tension created 
between opposites. It endures the contradictions between basic potentiality and 
apparent duality”434 and is thus both a monistic world of unity and a dualistic world 
of separation, but neither of these if taken separately. 
Yoshikawa adds insights from the Buddhistic concept of the ‘Middle Way’, 
which views reality neither absolutely nor relatively but recognizes the paradoxical 
nature of the world. Yoshikawa writes that according to Buddhism “the world is 
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viewed as a complementary interplay of the world of category and the world of 
noncategory.”435 Thus in an encounter between two parties there are “not one, not 
two.”436 
Yoshikawa applies these insights to intercultural encounters suggesting that 
two parties can find themselves in a dynamic in-betweenness that transcend binary 
opposition of self and other. He uses the Möbius strip or the infinity symbol (∞) as 
an illustration for the simultaneous distance and relation between two cultural 
positions that are at odds with each other. Yoshikawa describes the dynamics of this 
in-betweenness as a journey which starts at one loop of the infinity symbol, proceeds 
to the other side where anomalies are encountered that lead to a crisis, and finally 
returns to one’s initial point having transcended the binary opposition.437 The sense 
of crisis through the encounter with the other plays an important role in Yoshikawa’s 
double-swing model in that it leads to the liberation of the person from a binary 
perception of the world.438 Instead of simple opposition between two others or 
elimination of the other, the “unity of monism” and the “separateness of dualism” are 
both embraced in the double-swing model.439 In Yoshikawa’s words, “[t]his model 
indicates that one is neither this side nor that side nor both sides, but one is the 
between. This position (…) is a dynamic, tension-laden ‘between’ in which there is a 
constant pull from both sides of the pole. (…) [O]ne feels keenly alive.”440 
By seeing beyond the apparent binary opposition between the self and the 
other, between absolute reality and relative reality, between solid states and liquid 
states, the person can take the initiative to create a space between and around these 
opposites marked by openness, sensitivity, responsiveness, and also vulnerability. 
Yoshikawa thus sees the margins of structures, where encounters with the other take 
place as creative spaces. Thus, “[i]ndividuals who are in the double-swing state are 
able to accept and draw nourishment from their first as well as second culture.”441 
Bennett remarks that this dynamic in-betweenness is a constructive marginality as it 
suggests a comfortable flowing movement between solid cultural identities where 
integrated, multicultural existence is maintained and a frame of reference that lets 
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one make decisions prevails.442 Tension and contradiction are not to be resolved and 
eliminated but maintained and utilized as a catalyst for creativity that transcends 
binary opposition. 
Thus, Yoshikawa presents a model for constructive marginality. Its strengths lie 
in the creative use of the space ‘between’ in which one actively seeks to create 
meaning not in isolation but in relation with the other. It goes beyond the detachment 
of liquid individuals who are trapped in a neither/nor world and live in binary 
opposition between competing solid and liquid identities. The marginal ought to feel 
the contradiction in the tension of being in between. Contradictions are not to be 
avoided but embraced. This ‘unhappy middle’ pushes the person into action. 
Yoshikawa ascribes a concrete purpose to the dynamic in-betweenness, namely that 
of relating with the other. However, Yoshikawa focuses heavily on the individual. 
Instead of mediating between two cultures, Yoshikawa’s model addresses the 
encounter of the self with the other. The mediating constructive marginal is thus not 
truly in-between two others but merely relating the self with the other. 
 
(B) The Mediating Person 
A lesser known further example of constructive marginality, more relevant to TCKs, 
is the model of the mediating person proposed by Bochner et al.443 This section will 
focus on the contributions by Stephen Bochner444, Beverly McLeod445, and Ronald 
Taft446 in describing the contours of the mediating person. 
Stephen Bochner defines mediating persons as follows: “[c]ultural mediators 
are men and women who function as links between diverse cultural systems.”447 The 
purpose of mediating between two or more cultural parties is “mutual growth which 
also preserves the integrity of each participating culture.”448 Bochner sees two threats 
behind the need for better mediators. First, there is “the tendency for the nations and 
cultures of the world to meet each other in a spirit of confrontation, mutual 
suspicion, and exploitation.”449 Conflict needs to be resolved through mutual 
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understanding facilitated by mediators. Second, Bochner mentions the danger to the 
integrity of local cultures posed by the “diffusion of innovation based on fallacious 
assumptions about the superiority of Western technological practices.”450 Bochner 
argues that Western ethnocentrism, will lead to the extinction of cultural 
heterogeneity, a loss for the whole of humanity. ‘Mediators-as-translators’ work to 
eliminate bias and misunderstanding and ‘mediators-as-synthesizers’ help prevent 
the destruction of local cultures by not merely communicating between the parties 
but actively providing creative solutions of how e.g. Western ideas can be transferred 
into non-Western contexts. 
The mediator is thus a translator and as well as a creative problem solver.451 
Bochner suggests that “[f]ormally, the role of the mediator as synthesizer is to create 
a new concept out of the various elements that were previously parts of different 
worlds. The product will be a new configuration that incorporates and harmonizes 
these elements, but is different from the sum of its parts.”452 Successful mediators 
are capable of integrating the various conflicting elements at a higher level. While 
showing competence in the participating parties, the mediator remains an impartial 
broker who represents one side to the other but who ultimately “belong[s] to a 
transcultural reference group whose norms transcend national and cultural 
barriers.”453 The translating and synthesizing mediator while heavily involved 
remains marginal to all participants. 
Bochner contrasts the mediator figure with the ‘marginal man’ described by 
Everrett Stonequist.454 Bochner argues: 
Unlike the mediating person, who can be thought of as linking two or more groups, 
the marginal person is someone who has fallen between the various social systems. 
His problem consists of a simultaneous identification with two conflicting or 
incompatible reference groups, with the result that he belongs to neither culture.455 
The difference between the marginal man and mediator lies in intention and agency. 
Unlike the encapsulated ‘marginal man’, the mediator is an active agent who seeks to 
integrate differences through coordination and reconciliation.456 Mediators show 
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control over their accepted responsibilities and succeed in funnelling their 
marginality into creativity. 
Bochner argues that in order to produce more mediators rather than 
encapsulated marginals “the mediating person must have social support (…) and a 
reference group.”457 What Bochner has in mind is precisely third culture, a “culture 
of multiculturality.”458 Ideal mediators are “individuals who by accident of their birth 
were raised simultaneously in more than one culture.”459 Supporting TCKs to 
develop their liminal skills and helping them find others of similar background helps 
create constructive mediators. 
Beverly Mcleod adds further insight into factors that produce outstanding 
mediators. She argues that merely being multicultural does not guarantee one is a 
successful mediator.460 McLeod discusses the question of acceptance of the mediator 
by the participants concluding that “[i]t is necessary for the mediator to convince 
people that the unusual is not inherently threatening, and may even be interesting and 
beneficial.”461 Different cultures might perceive the mediator as an outside threat to 
their stability and it is in the mediator’s own interest to shape the participant’s 
perception of themself. 
McLeod also acknowledges that the mediator is in no easy place due to the in-
between position. In order to avoid becoming an encapsulated marginal, mediators 
need to be able to smoothly shift between cultural contexts. McLeod writes that 
“[b]eing a successful mediator may require a good deal of cognitive juggling and 
perhaps a certain amount of abstraction from, or objectivity of perspective on, one’s 
activity and habits.”462 The mediators must be able to remove themselves from each 
particular situation in which they act for assessment, yet without becoming a passive 
bystander. Further inner conflicts may arise in terms of language usage and values of 
cultures. There is the risk that “instead of being freed by his knowledge of more than 
one culture, the mediating person may in fact be bound by the norms of two cultures 
instead of just one.”463 Bochner stresses that mediators need to be committed to 
cultural relativism, meaning the acceptance that “there is no one right way of doing 
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things.”464 McLeod agrees suggesting that “[i]f such a relativistic outlook were 
common, a continued diversity of life-styles, values, and approaches to human 
problems would be guaranteed”465, displaying a commitment to relativism that is 
focused on creatively solving problems rather than being avoiding problems in their 
marginality. 
In terms of an ideal mediator, McLeod names Edwin O. Reischauer466 as an 
example.467 Reischauer, a TCK, was born in 1910 to American missionaries in Tokyo 
and during his life acted as a mediator between Japan and the USA, first as a leading 
scholar of the history and culture of Japan at Harvard University and later as the US 
ambassador to Japan. Reischauer served as a link between two cultures. McLeod 
argues that an objective perspective is crucial to the mediator negotiating between 
cultures. This is significant in two ways. First, the mediator must objectify one 
perspective in order to present it to the other side. Second, the mediator must in a 
sense remain an outsider, an ‘other’ who confronts and enters. In Mcleod’s words 
“[t]he mediator should be like a poet, who takes familiar words and allows the reader 
to see them in a new and different manner.”468 While showing competence in the 
participating cultures, the mediator thus operates on the threshold, providing an 
objective point of view through which participants can see themselves as well as the 
others in an altogether new way. In other words, the mediator as a native faithfully 
represents both parties while as an outsider belongs to neither party. 
Ronald Taft stresses the mediator’s dual competence illustrated by the phrase 
“two skills in one skull.”469 ‘Skill’ highlights how mediation is a constructive 
marginality that involving agency and initiative around a specific task. Taft sees a 
mediator between two cultures as someone who is able to participate to some extent 
in both cultures stating that the “ideal situation for mediation between cultures would 
almost certainly require the bicultural person to be highly identified with each 
one.”470 At the same time Taft mentions that while being competent in both cultures, 
“the mediator must be able to transcend the cultures concerned.”471 Taft’s point 
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comes out more clearly in his comments on world-mindedness, i.e. global outlook. 
He suggests that the primary reference group of a world-minded person would be 
humanity rather than one specific culture.472 Recognizing the underlying human 
unity between parties in conflict benefits mediation. A global outlook lets the 
mediator experience being part of something bigger than the local particularities. 
Bochner et al. thus present a model of marginality marked by a clear 
constructive purpose. The marginal person becomes a link between cultures, 
enriching the cultures but also protecting the cultures’ integrity from exploitation or 
elimination. Rather than Yoshikawa’s I-thou dynamic in-betweenness, here we have 
a model that sees the marginal as a facilitator between two others. The mediator’s 
identity lies in serving multiple others. 
Strong emphasis is put on dual competence and identification which are not 
only seen as possible but as desirable. At the same time cultural relativism is a 
requirement and a reference group other than one of the cultures being mediated is 
recommended. The mediator must identify with the reconciled parties (both/and) as 
well as remain detached from them (neither/nor). This is in order to ensure the best 
possible representation of one party to the other as well as to maintain objectivity 
and flexibility. 
This model of the mediating person fits TCKs for whom mediating between first 
and second culture comes naturally. The mediator model encourages multiple 
identification for the clear purpose of serving the first and second culture equally and 
for their own benefit but also stresses the need to transcend the immediate context 
and remain an impartial outsider in order to remain free and flexible. Being 
impartial, however, does not mean the mediator is not committed to mediation. 
Mediation seeks to overcome encapsulated marginality by supplementing simple 
relativism with a commitment to mediation and allegiance to humanity. 
 
Conclusion: Third Culture Kids as Mediating Persons 
This chapter has reviewed two models of constructive marginality each expressing a 
more or less clear picture of mediating. Both models maintain Bennett’s distinction 
between a separate and connected epistemology, insisting that the dynamic person 
in-between and the mediator both need to identify with the other(s) (relation) as well 
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as remain separate from the other(s) (distance). For TCKs this means intentionally 
being both a part of different contexts but also remaining apart from all relative 
contexts. 
The control of choice and construction of boundaries Bennett insists on find 
their concrete expression in TCKs seeing themselves as agents rather than victims. 
Both for Yoshikawa and for Bochenr et al. taking the initiative to stand in between or 
to be the mediator are important to creating a constructive marginality. 
Yoshikawa suggests that by existing in the dynamic in-between TCKs can 
acknowledge both the importance of belonging to an anthropological place and 
conforming to solid structures while also insisting on belonging to non-place and 
remaining liquid. The in-betweenness holds these two in tension. TCKs are 
encouraged to learn languages, develop cultural competence, and engage others but 
need not let go of their creative freedom to belong nowhere and remain shapeless. 
As Bochner et al. argue TCKs are especially apt to become global mediators 
since they are able to unify different, and even conflicting, cultural skills in ‘one 
skull,’ within their person. While acting as a link in between is no happy middle, 
Bochner et al. present a way that the TCK’s unique position can benefit others. There 
can be meaning and purpose to the TCK’s liminality in mediation. Barbara Schaetti 
is not the only person to have discovered a natural talent for mediation. Many TCKs 
choose to continue to be involved internationally and facilitate understanding across 
borders.473 Constructive marginality is a lived experience of many TCKs who have 
discovered their potential to be involved as well as to transcend and developed a 
sense of agency. 
By identifying labels such as ‘global mediator’ TCKs can find peer groups to 
belong to and turn their marginality into a constructive one. Of course, there needs to 
be a ‘personal truth’ behind the label that makes sense to the TCK. Commitment to 
relativism in mediation requires a set of principles and values that can accommodate 
the precarious position TCKs are in as liminal figures. 
 
Bringing Part Two to a Close 
Part two has looked at the themes of transculturality, liminality, non-place, liquidity, 
and constructive marginality. Liminality has proven to be a useful concept to 
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understand the in between position of TCKs. While liminality is usually understood 
in terms of a specific time period, non-place has helped to conceptualize liminality in 
terms of the in-between place TCKs find themselves in and identify with. As non-
place is often not accepted as a valid place to belong to, it pushes TCKs to realize 
their status as non-person who is neither this nor that. Liquid modernity further 
highlighted how this in-between state of being comes with its own set of insecurities 
and uncertainties. However, liminality also comes with the potential for freedom and 
creativity. Being a liminal liquid person can thus be both a positive as well as 
negative experience. The distinction between constructive and encapsulated 
marginality helped draw out suggestions of how to find purpose and meaning as a 
liminal person occupying non-place. A constructive marginality accepts the tension 
between liquid identities and solid identities and succeeds in integrating one’s 
identity and showing personal commitment. Identifying as a mediator is one example 
of such constructive approach to liminality. 
The above discussion of conceptual tools to describe the struggles and 
potential of TCKs should suffice as a solid foundation upon which to build a 
constructive TCK theology. This theology should act as a ‘personal truth’ that can 
help TCKs function as mediators both as a part of the context and apart from the 
context they are in. Framing the discussion of integrating one’s identity and TCKs’ 
personal commitment in the context of Christianity also helps TCKs to find a peer 
















Nozomu Miyahira’s Theology of ‘Between’ 
 
Introduction to Part Three 
Having surveyed the key issues found in the TCK literature in part one (chapters 2 to 
6), then identified conceptual tools to focus particularly on the liminal position of 
TCKs ‘in between’ as potential mediators in part two (chapters 7 to 11), part three 
now seeks to construct a theology using these concepts. A TCK theology takes 
‘liminality’ as its central metaphor to contextualize Christianity for TCKs in a way 
that creates a resonance TCKs can recognize themselves in. The purpose is to present 
Christianity specifically tailored for TCKs as a ‘personal truth’ TCKs can commit to 
within relativism and creating a spiritual locus of integrity that allows for higher 
order integration of multiple identities. 
Chapters twelve and thirteen lay the ground work for a TCK theology: This 
chapter begins the process of contextualizing theology for TCKs by looking at the 
case of Nozomu Miyahira’s theology for the Japanese context which features 
‘betweenness’ at its core. Miyahira presents an example of the structure of an applied 
theology that a TCK theology can adopt. Chapter thirteen then answers the question 
of identity from a theological perspective in dialog with Emil Brunner. Brunner 
makes the case that believers are ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’ whose identities are 
recreated through participation in the death of Christ. God constitutes the ground of 
human identity. 
Chapters fourteen to eighteen present the core of a TCK theology: first, 
identifying Thomas Torrance as a suitable theological resource (chapter 14); second, 
constructing a doctrine of the Trinity using liminality as a core concept (chapters 15 
and 16) ; third, constructing a doctrine of Christ as liminal mediator between God 
and humanity (chapter 17); fourth, bringing these insights together to construct a 
doctrine of soteriology which highlights believers’ newly given identity as liminal 
figures through justification through Christ (chapter 18). 
The overall aim is to make sense of Christianity from the perspective of TCKs 
by utilizing concepts that TCKs identify with. The third part ultimately argues the 
case that Christianity can accommodate the interests and concerns TCKs have and 
that commitment to Christianity as one’s personal truth encourages a constructive 
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Liminality, non-place, liquidity, and mediation are concepts that make sense of 
TCKs’ experience ‘in between.’ This chapter looks at the Japanese concept of human 
nature as 人間 (Ningen, human being)474 or ‘human betweenness’ and the unique 
contextualised theology it gave birth to in the work of the Japanese theologian 
Nozomu Miyahira (1966- )475. Miyahira is a valuable resource to a TCK theology for 
two reasons: Firstly, he is keenly aware of the need to appropriately contextualize 
theology and in this regards serves as a strong ally in our attempt to contextualise 
theology for TCKs. Secondly, while not a TCK himself, having been educated in 
Japan, the U.S.A., as well as the U.K., Miyahira consciously stands in between 
different cultural traditions himself. 
‘Betweenness’476 (間 aida), while rarely used in the English language, plays a 
central role in the Japanese context. Culturally speaking, ‘betweenness’ primarily 
means finding oneself among or amidst others and defining oneself in constitutive 
relations to others. William James’ insight that “a man has as many social selves as 
there are individuals who recognize him”477 serves as a good illustration of what is 
meant by this ‘human betweenness’. Intimately related to ‘betweenness’ is the 
pursuit of concord or harmony (和 wa) in relation to others. 
In comparison, ‘betweenness’ in terms of TCKs’ liminality describes the 
quality of being on the threshold: neither here nor there, neither belonging to this 
nor to that group; yet somehow finding oneself both here and there, participating in 
both this and that group. This is illustrated by statements such as “at home 
everywhere and nowhere”478 as well as “a part of and apart from”479. TCKs 
purposefully use this unique position to their advantage by playing mediatorial 
                                                          
474 Japanese characters will be followed by the pronunciation in italics and the English meaning if 
necessary. 
475 Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity. All 
Japanese names will appear in the Western order of first name, last name instead of the of Japanese 
reverse order. 
476 ‘Betweenness’ in its technical sense as 間/aida will appear in inverted commas. 
477 William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), 294. 
478 Useem and Cottrell, "Adult Third Culture Kids," 32-33. 
479 Hill Useem and Downie, "Third-Culture Kids," 22. 
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roles.480 While ‘betweenness’ for both TCKs and Japanese society describes how 
relations to others enter into one’s self understanding and how it creates multiplicity 
within the self, important differences also need to be acknowledged between the 
Japanese dual concepts of human ‘betweenness’ (間 Aida) and concord (和 Wa) with 
which Miyahira works and TCKs’ experience of liminality and mediation. Culturally 
speaking, ‘betweenness’ as found in the Japanese society is of limited use to TCKs. 
However, Miyahira takes ‘betweenness’ beyond its cultural origins to function as a 
theological resource for his contextualized theology and thereby makes it possible 
for us to incorporate key ideas into a TCK theology. Theologically speaking, 
‘betweenness’ and concord are resources of great utility to the construction of a 
contextualized theology for TCKs in their liminality and as mediators.  
This chapter consists of three parts. First, Miyahira’s work is set in its proper 
Japanese context. This section explores how ‘betweenness’ has come to shape the 
meaning of person in Japanese society and how ‘betweenness’ became distorted 
within Japanese nationalism during WW2 and compares it to TCKs’ liminality. 
This discussion, while interesting in and of itself, will set the stage for the 
second, more relevant, part of exploring how ‘betweenness’ functions theologically. 
In a one-of-a-kind theology, Miyahira applies ‘betweenness’ as a central theological 
theme to speak of the Trinity, Christ, and the believer. 
Finally, this chapter adapts Miyahira’s insights for the purpose of a TCK 
theology. ‘Betweenness’ can function as a thread which runs through a specific 
theological vision tailored towards TCKs. The goal is to appropriate the theological 
structure Miyahira develops along the lines of ‘betweenness’ and outline a theology 
fitting for TCKs. 
 
The Japanese Context to Miyahira’s Theology of ‘Betweenness’ 
When it comes to the Japanese understanding of a person, two concepts stand out: 
betweenness (間 Aida) and concord or harmony (和 Wa).481 The emphasis on 
‘betweenness’ and concord has developed naturally in harmony with the way of life 
and natural environment of the Japanese islands which the Japanese philosopher 
                                                          
480 Bochner, The Mediating Person: Bridges between Cultures. 




Tetsuro Watsuji calls 風土 (Fūdo, Climate).482 Watsuji’s broader concept of Fūdo 
includes both natural conditions and the corresponding cultural constructs. In Japan, 
cultural constructs such as ‘human nature’ emerged out of the interplay of the unique 
Japanese geography, climate, and the way of life, greatly shaped by rice agriculture. 
Miyahira argues that the Japanese warm and humid natural conditions as well 
as the mountainous terrain favoured rice agriculture and a settled life over livestock 
and a nomadic life.483 This dependence on rice agriculture conditioned the Japanese 
community. First, the labour intensive maintenance of rice fields and shared 
irrigation systems could not be performed by an individual on their own and thus 
encouraged a “sustained spirit of cooperation and solidarity.”484 A person was 
powerless without the help from the community which made survival possible. 
Flowing water, essential for planting rice, could not be owned by an individual but 
was regulated by the community. Second, the rice agricultural community follows 
the same regular pattern of planting and harvesting meaning that the same people 
have to work together again and again. Any discord within the community 
constituted a threat to survival and thus maintaining concord became vital. 
This Japanese Fūdo gave rise to the concept that what defines human beings 
are the social relations between people within the community and concord became 
the most highly esteemed virtue, even finding itself into the first article of the 
Seventeen-Article Constitution of 604AD.485 In order to keep this concord, a person 
takes on different roles in relation to different people to avoid conflict.486 The 
Japanese concept of human being in relation thus differs significantly from the 
Cartesian self in isolation. ‘Human being’ or ‘humanity’ in Japanese is literally 
spelled ‘human-between’ (人間 Ningen). 人間 (Ningen ‘human being’) employs 
spatial language to describe how humans find themselves positioned within a 
                                                          
482  Tetsuro Watsuji, Climate and Culture : A Philosophical Study, trans. Geoffrey Bownas (Tokyo: 
Hokuseido Press, 1961). Originally published in Japanese as: Fudo : Ningengakuteki Kosatsu 風土 人
間学的考察 (Climate : An Anthropological Discussion) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 1935). See 
also: Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 
109-13. 
483 Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 111-13, 24. 
484 Ibid., 112. 
485 Ibid., 121. 
486 This is similar to the different ‘I-positions’ the self takes in Hubert J. M. Hermans’ ‘dialogical self 
theory’. See: Hubert J.M. Hermans, "The Dialogical Self: Toward a Theory of Personal and Cultural 
Positioning," Culture & Psychology 7, no. 3 (2001). 
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community in a web of relations to others: human ‘betweenness’ signifies this 
relational humanity. 
Three Japanese thinkers help explore the meaning of human ‘betweenness’ in 
the Japanese context:487 First, the aforementioned philosopher Tetsuro Watsuji 
(1889-1960)488; second, the psychiatrist Bin Kimura (1931- )489; third, the sociologist 
Eshun Hamaguchi (1931-2008)490. 
For Watsuji, human nature is essentially communal. Betweenness (間 Aida) 
expresses the inherently relational dimension of human nature. Watsuji suggests that 
Ningen (人間), originally meaning the ‘world of humanity’ as opposed to the 
‘underworld’ or the ‘world of beasts’ among other worlds, came to supplement Hito 
(人), meaning person or human, to denote ‘human being’.491 The equation of the 
human person with the human world reflected the close association in the Japanese 
mind of the individual with the community. Hito can mean self, other, or society in 
general and is thus much broader in meaning than ‘individual’. This relational and 
communal definition of humanity leads Watsuji to interpret Ningen (人間) as Hito no 
Aida (人の間) literally meaning ‘human betweenness’ or ‘in between humans.’ Thus, 
human beings cannot be understood apart from the position they occupy among or 
‘between’ others of their community. 
The psychiatrist Kimura elaborates on what exactly this ‘between’ is. For 
Kimura, ‘betweenness’ is a category which precedes the self and the other. Kimura 
argues that there exists something prior to the individual, a primordial field he calls 
‘between man and man’ where relations between the self and the other come into 
                                                          
487 I am heavily indebted to Miyahira for these three thinkers. I am roughly following Miyahira’s 
outline found in: Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on 
the Trinity, 113-19. 
488 Tetsuro Watsuji, Ningen No Gaku Toshiteno Rinrigaku 人間の学としての倫理学 (Ethics as the 
Study of Man) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 1934).  
489 Bin Kimura, Hito to Hito No Aida 人と人の間 (Between Man and Man) (Tokyo: Kobundo Sensho
弘文堂選書, 1972). 
490 Eshun Hamaguchi, 'Nihon-Rashisa' No Saihakken「日本らしさ」の再発見 (The Rediscovery of 
'Japaneseness') (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988). Kanjinshugi No Shakai Nihon 間人主義の社会 日本 (Japan 
a Contextualistic Society) (Toyko: Toyo Keizai Shinposha 東洋経済新報社, 1982). 
491  Watsuji, Ningen No Gaku Toshiteno Rinrigaku 人間の学としての倫理学 (Ethics as the Study of 
Man), 14-19. See also: Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese 
Perspective on the Trinity, 113-15. 
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existence. 492 The person is always already in this interpersonal space ‘in between’ 
and cannot be understood apart from it. The dynamics of this relational 
‘betweenness’ (typically understood in terms of the five Confucian relationships of 
superior-subordinate, parent-child, husband-wife, older sibling-younger sibling, 
friend-friend493) determine the appropriate actions of each counterpart. Miyahira 
gives the example of ‘betweenness’ among parents and children where children 
define ‘parenthood’ as much as parents define ‘childhood’. The existence of both 
parent and child depends on the field of ‘betweenness’ that gives rise to their 
particular relationship.494 For Kimura, not the isolated individual, not even the 
encounter with the other, but the field of ‘betweenness’ constitutes the ground of 
human nature and the ground of ‘self’.495 
The concept of ‘self’ (自分 Jibun), literally meaning ‘self-portion’, illustrates 
that who oneself is depends on one’s participation in the ‘betweenness’ with others; 
the self is the portion of the communal ‘betweenness’ that concerns oneself in the 
specific relation to the other.496 Since the relationships a person finds themself in are 
multiple, there is not one definite self that transcends all social transactions but a 
multitude of different ‘I-in-relation-to-you’s bound to each context.497 The self (自分
Jibun) is never fixed but is fluid and changes shape depending on the particular 
situational dynamics experienced in the field of ‘betweenness’. 
Finally, the sociologist Hamaguchi sought to identify the worldview behind 
this Japanese relational thinking. He coined the word ‘the contextual’ (間人 Kanjin) 
and ‘contextualism’ (間人主義 Kanjinshugi), an inversion of the two characters of 
                                                          
492  Kimura, Hito to Hito No Aida 人と人の間 (Between Man and Man), 15f., 65. See also: Miyahira, 
Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 115-17. Kimura 
is influenced by Martin Buber’s personalism. Buber also speaks of a ‘realm of between’ where 
persons meet. See for example: Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (London: Collins, 1961), 240-
44. 
493 For a summary of how Confucianism influences Japanese relationships in contrast to Western 
relationships see: June Ock Yum, "The Impact of Confucianism on Interpersonal Relationships and 
Communication Patterns in East Asia," Communication Monographs 55, no. 4 (1988). 
494 Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 116. 
495 Kimura, Hito to Hito No Aida 人と人の間 (Between Man and Man), 75. 
496 Ibid., 154. 
497 Miyahira illustrates this by listing the various ways one can refer to oneself in Japanese: watakushi 
(私), watashi(私), atashi(私), boku(僕), ore(俺), onore(己), washi(私), ware(我) etc., all designating a 
different relation to one’s counterpart. Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A 
Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 117. 
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ningen (人間 Human).498 Hamaguchi contrasts Japanese contextualistic behaviour 
with that of individualistic behaviour.499 He argues that, while individuals shaped by 
Western individualism behave according to personal convictions and socially 
accepted norms, Japanese contextual persons tend to try to conform to particular 
situations.500 Rather than universal values, the immediate context dictates behaviour. 
Thus, Miyahira can say that for the Japanese person “to feel alienated from the 
context in which they are situated would be almost tantamount to denial of their 
existence.”501  Hamaguchi argues that being in relation and in harmony with one’s 
context constitutes true human existence. This would entail that discord in the social 
context does not only make the person feel uncomfortable but undoes the person’s 
very humanity. Whereas Western concepts of the individual (what Hamaguchi calls 
個人 Kojin) celebrate autonomy and freedom and sharply distinguish between the 
individual and society, the Japanese contextual person (間人 Kanjin) refers to the 
person in relation to others and in synch with the particular situation.502 
Being in synch, in harmony, with one’s surroundings constitutes ‘concord’, the 
second central aspect to human nature.503 Concord (和 Wa) features very dominantly 
in Japanese thought as a result of the efforts to maintain a harmonious environment 
to the extent that Japanese things are often designated by the character for concord: 
‘和’.504 Navigating the field of ‘betweenness’ in pursuit of concord became the mark 
of humanity. Hamaguchi gives three aspects of concord based on contextualism 
                                                          
498 Hamaguchi, Kanjinshugi No Shakai Nihon 間人主義の社会 日本 (Japan a Contextualistic Society). 
499 'Nihon-Rashisa' No Saihakken「日本らしさ」の再発見 (The Rediscovery of 'Japaneseness'), 14ff. 
See also: Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the 
Trinity, 117-19. 
500 The contrasts drawn here between Western (or North American) individualism and Japanese 
contextualism or collectivism is not without problems. Collectivism or contextualism turns out to be 
more universal than Hamaguchi’s arguments would led to believe. See: Yohtaro Takano and Shunya 
Sogon, "Are Japanese More Collectivistic Than Americans? Examining Conformity in in-Groups and 
the Reference-Group Effect," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 39, no. 3 (2008). 
501 Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 118. 
502 Hamaguchi, 'Nihon-Rashisa' No Saihakken「日本らしさ」の再発見 (The Rediscovery of 
'Japaneseness'), 67. 
503 For a detailed analysis of the role concord plays in Japan see: Yutaka Sakisaka, Wa No Kozo : 
Girisha Shiso to No Hikaku Ni Oite 和の構造 : ギリシャ思想との比較において (The Structure of 
Concord : Comparison with Greek Thought) (Tokyo: Hokuju Shuppan 北樹出版, 1979). 
504 For example: 和食 Washoku—Japanese food; 和風 Wafū—Japanese style; 和紙 Washi—Japanese 
traditional paper; 和製 Wasei—Made in Japan. 
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which he contrasts with Western individualism.505 First, individualism values self-
centredness; contextualism mutual dependence and reciprocity. Second, 
individualism esteems self-reliance; contextualism mutual reliance and trust in 
others. Third, individualism encourages self-interest and relations as a means; 
contextualism relations as an end.506 ‘Concord’ seeks to define what it means to be 
human in relation to others and in harmony with the situation. 
In summary, the spatial concept of ‘between’, the metaphorical field between 
person and person where constitutive relations are formed and where ‘self’-defining, 
concrete situations arise, plays a central role in Japanese thought as can be witnessed 
in the use of ‘between’ (間 aida) in the words for human being (人間 ningen) and in 
Hamaguchi’s contextualism (間人主義 kanjinshugi). ‘Betweenness’ can be found on 
both social as well as personal levels. Socially, ‘betweenness’ exists between people 
in a community. People find themselves positioning and repositioning themselves to 
navigate the different relational dynamics in the ‘field of betweenness’ of their 
community. Personally, ‘betweenness’ also exists within the multi-voiced person 
who switches back and forth between different selves within.507 
 
Japanese ‘Betweenness’ and its Limits 
This alternative perspective on human nature, emphasising how humans are 
embedded in their interpersonal and communal relationships, constitutes a powerful 
critique of the abstracted and isolated individual so far removed from how people 
actually experience themselves. However, uncritical appreciation of the Japanese 
concepts of ‘betweenness’ and concord would be foolish given the inhumane 
suffering Japan unleashed upon her surrounding neighbours during the Second 
World War. No discussion of ‘betweenness’ and concord can skip over its 
connection to Japanese nationalism. What has gone wrong among a people so keen 
                                                          
505 Hamaguchi uses Steven Lukes as his sparring partner. See: Steven Lukes, Individualism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1973); Hamaguchi, 'Nihon-Rashisa' No Saihakken「日本らしさ」の再発見 (The 
Rediscovery of 'Japaneseness'), 95ff. 
506 See also: Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the 
Trinity, 123. 
507 For multi-voiced selves in a Western context see: Hermans, "The Dialogical Self: Toward a 
Theory of Personal and Cultural Positioning."; "Mixing and Moving Cultures Require a Dialogical 
Self," Human Development 44, no. 1 (2001). To see how Hermans’ Dialogical Self Theory can be 
relevant for the study of TCKs’ identity construction, see for example: König, "Moving Experience: 
Dialogues between Personal Cultural Positions." 
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on maintaining harmony? Miyahira makes two criticisms of ‘betweenness’ and 
‘concord’ in the light of Japan’s Second World War aggressions.508 
First, attempts to create a unified nationalistic mindset led to the construction 
of an unquestionable all-encompassing concord which trumped individual freedom. 
‘Betweenness’ as a field in which the self and others exist should have functioned as 
a differentiating concept, a principle of uniqueness. However, in the name of 
national unity, individuality dissolved into the collective totality. Rather than human 
beings defining themselves between person and persons within the community, 
‘betweenness’ shifted to mean the relation between the person and the state. Concord 
took on a new meaning, that of enforced uniformity rather than harmony among 
diversity. Valuing concord above all else meant the silencing of any criticism that 
would have caused discord and thus the suppression of the individuality. When the 
relation to one’s community (in this case one’s nation) constitutes one’s very being, 
then doubting or criticising one’s nation effectively leads to self-destruction. Thus 
atrocities were committed in the name of the whole in order to protect the concord of 
the whole. Miyahira comments that “only the whole persisted with no distinct 
personal responsibility for the war.”509  The fluid persons quickly dissolved into a 
faceless mass (mis)guided by an imaginative nationalistic concord. 
Furthermore, it has to be said that Japan sought to forcefully impose its vision 
of total concord not only on its citizens but on her neighbours, thereby violating the 
individuality of other nations as well. Too much emphasis on creating an all-
encompassing harmony can only come about by eliminating any kind of friction-
causing criticism, warranted or not. Concord was effectively high-jacked by 
nationalism without the means to criticise it. Here, ‘betweenness’ and its emphasis 
on the central role of community aided the development of Japanese ethnocentrism. 
Interestingly, Watsuji supported Japanese nationalism.510 
Second, Miyahira argues that betweenness and concord traditionally only 
apply to the in-group. Miyahira writes that “concord (…) tends traditionally to be 
closed to those outside it” and “mutuality and relationality as ends in themselves 
often do not go beyond [one’s own] community.”511 The relative lack of ethnic and 
                                                          
508 Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 124-
26. See also: ibid., 201-02. 
509 Ibid., 125. 
510 Ibid. 
511 Ibid., 126. 
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cultural diversity in Japan ultimately lead to an ethnocentrism which only saw 
members of one’s own national ethnic group as valid human beings to be allowed a 
place in the metaphorical interpersonal space ‘between’. Others beyond the nation 
were not allowed to enter into relationship and no ‘betweenness’ was recognized 
between the people of Japan and the people of her surrounding nations. 
 
‘Uchi’ and ‘Soto’ 
One shortcoming in Miyahira’s work is that he keeps his criticism of Japanese 
ethnocentrism during the Second World War rather brief. If ‘betweenness’, even as a 
theological concept, is to play any role in a theology for TCKs this blind spot must 
be more thoroughly examined. Identifying the function of ‘betweenness’ in the 
emergence of Japanese imperialism will also help us distinguish it from 
‘betweenness’ in the context of TCKs and will aid us in applying theological 
‘betweenness’ more consciously and responsibly to a TCK theology. 
Miyahira’s discussion of how Japanese ‘betweenness’ and contextualism (間人
主義 Kanjinshugi) led to such blatant imperialism could have benefitted greatly from 
a more thorough investigation of how the strong emphasis on community as seen in 
‘betweenness’ and concord goes hand in hand with the Japanese dual concept of 
Uchi (内 inner) and Soto (外 outer). The expert work of the Japanese psychoanalyst 
Takeo Doi (1920-2009)512 will provide a much needed supplement to Miyahira’s 
shortcomings. 
Doi argues that the dynamics of in-group (内 uchi) and out-group (外 soto)513 
dominate Japanese social life.514 Uchi and Soto do not simply refer to the Western 
distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ but also to one’s inner circle (the 
community, in-group, one identifies with and which constitutes one’s social identity) 
and one’s outer circle, out-groups with which one does not primarily identify with. 
                                                          
512 Two works by Doi are especially of importance: Takeo Doi, The Anatomy of Dependence (Tokyo: 
Kodansha International Ltd., 1973). The Anatomy of Self : The Individual Versus Society (Tokyo: 
Kodansha International Ltd., 1986). These two were originally published in Japanese as: 'Amae' No 
Kozo 「甘え」の構造 (The Structure of Amae) (Tokyo: Kobundo 弘文堂, 1971). Omote to Ura 表と裏 
(Omote and Ura) (Tokyo: Kobundo 弘文堂, 1985). 
513 For social identity and in-group / out-group conflict, see the classic example: Henri Tajfel and 
John Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in The Social Psychology of Intergroup 
Relations, ed. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel (Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 
1979). 
514 Doi, The Anatomy of Dependence, 40-44. 
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Importantly, however, Uchi and Soto are relative as one person might belong to 
different in-groups (e.g. family, company, sports team, neighbourhood, region, 
nation all could function as an in-group in some regard) and what one person might 
assume to be an out-group could by another member be experienced as an in-
group.515 When dealing with one’s inner circle (内 Uchi) the person shows her Honne 
(本音, ‘heart’ or true intentions) but when faced with the outer circle (外 Soto) the 
Honne is concealed and instead expressed through Tatemae (建前 ‘face’ or outward 
expression).516 In a social world where there are multiple ‘I-in-relation-to you’s 
leading to obvious inconsistencies in the person, the skilful use of the duality of 
Uchi/Honne and Soto/Tatemae lets that person maintain harmony even among 
multiple differing constitutive relations. A view expressed within the context of one 
relation (Uchi/Honne) might change drastically when in another context 
(Soto/Tatemae) without seeming contradictory to the person expressing both 
views.517 
Referring to the famous quote by the American psychologist William James “a 
man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him (…) he 
has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about 
whose opinion he cares”518, Doi argues that, while this division of the person into 
different selves might function harmoniously, external conflict can also be 
internalized and lead to a split person. This tension can be eased through strong 
identification with an in-group.519 Thus ‘betweenness’ leads people to “divide their 
lives into inner and outer sectors each with its own, different, standards of behaviour, 
no one feeling the slightest oddity in this discrepancy.”520 Loyalty to in-groups, even 
when experiencing contradiction, are thus key to the Japanese concept the human 
person. To be means to belong to an in-group, a community of ‘betweenness’. 
‘Betweenness’ suggests that there is an underlying conflict within the person 
who is constituted by these various relations to others. Through Honne/Tatemae and 
                                                          
515 The Anatomy of Self : The Individual Versus Society, 29. 
516 Ibid., 35 - 47. 
517 Doi compares this Honne/Tatemae-duality to George Orwell’s Doublethink. Ibid., 101-02. George 
Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984), 35. 
518 Quoted in Doi, The Anatomy of Self : The Individual Versus Society, 88. Originally found in: 
James, The Principles of Psychology, 1, 294. 
519 Doi, The Anatomy of Self : The Individual Versus Society, 90. 
520 The Anatomy of Dependence, 42-43. 
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correspondingly Uchi/Soto these tensions are managed to maintain concord. In a 
sense, the concord even within the group is created outwardly (Soto) through the 
careful concealing (Tatemae) of the inner contradictions (Uchi/Honne). Criticism or 
disagreement is kept ‘within’ (Uchi/Honne) oneself while outwardly a consensus is 
maintained within the group (Soto/Tatemae). This obviously works much more 
smoothly within a homogenous in-group. 
‘Betweenness’ also suggest how important the community is and thus how the 
in-group to which one is bound encompasses the individual. Doi therefore notes that 
“[i]t is extremely difficult for a Japanese to transcend the group and act 
independently. The reason would seem to be that a Japanese feels vaguely that it is 
treacherous to act on his own without considering the group to which he belongs, 
and feels shamed, even, at doing something on his own.”521 The weakness of the 
Japanese concept of ‘betweenness’ and ‘concord’ during the rise of imperialism in 
Japan must be viewed within the context of the Uchi/Soto and Honne/Tatemae 
dualities without which such nationwide in-group could not have been formed and 
maintained. The pursuit of concord drove the Japanese to an all-encompassing 
national in-group and, while differences within were negotiated through the 
Honne/Tatemae distinction, the emphasis on ‘betweenness’ among one’s in-group 
resulted in the construction of an ultimate Uchi/Soto distinction between the 
Japanese people (in-group) and her surrounding Asian neighbours (out-group). 
Contradictions could not be pointed out as the immediate context could not be 
transcended and viewed objectively. It is in the light of this that Miyahira argues that 
the open-mindedness and efforts to establish common ground cease with the 
boundaries of the in-group and are refused to the out-group.522 Doi’s important 
insights on the Japanese psyche thus shed light on how Ningen (人間) encouraged the 
nationalistic society in the case of Japan and supplements Miyahira’s rather brief 
criticism. 
 
Japanese and TCK ‘Betweenness’ 
Examining the role of ‘betweenness’ within Japanese imperialism serves to further 
contrast Japanese ‘betweenness’ in its cultural context with the ‘betweenness’ of 
                                                          
521 Ibid., 54. 
522 Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 126. 
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TCKs in their liminality. ‘Betweenness’ (間 aida) roughly corresponds to TCKs’ 
liminality and concord (和 wa) to mediation, two concepts we have identified as 
central to TCKs. However, ‘betweenness’ in the Japanese context and ‘betweenness’ 
for TCKs lead to very different outcomes. Whereas in the Japanese situation, 
‘betweenness’ resulted in the dissolution of the individual in the collective and the 
exclusion of out-groups, in the case of TCKs, often times the opposite is the result: 
worldliness, tolerance, but also confused loyalties.523 While ‘betweenness’ in the 
Japanese context failed to allow Japanese people to transcend their immediate 
situation, ‘betweenness’ for TCKs allows TCKs to gain an outsider’s perspective. 
The danger in the case of TCKs’ ‘betweenness’ seems to lie in a cold disassociation 
(encapsulated marginality) from all groups rather than a blind commitment to one 
group.524  
The difference lies in the scale of ‘betweenness’. Whereas Japanese 
‘betweenness’ takes place within a largely homogenous intra-cultural context, TCK 
‘betweenness’ is the result of clashing cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and geographical 
realities. Compared to TCKs’ global ‘betweenness’, Japanese ‘betweenness’ remains 
fairly local. ‘Betweenness’ in Japan remains within what Marc Augé calls 
anthropological place; ‘betweenness’ for TCKs takes place between anthropological 
places, within non-place.525 ‘Betweenness’ in the Japanese context emphasizes the 
in-group to which one belongs. ‘Betweenness’ for TCKs is between different in-
groups placing the TCK in the category of ‘other’ not really within any group. The 
emphasis for TCKs is on the underlying humanity common to all while 
acknowledging the unique cultural traits of various in-groups.526 
‘Concord’ in Japan can be mistaken for a standard to which to conform in 
order to create uniformity. It is maintained through the skilful application of honne 
and tatemae within anthropological place. In contrast, mediation for TCKs aims to 
protect local uniqueness from forced assimilation by the dominant party and to 
facilitate reconciliation and mutual enrichment across differences without 
threatening the integrity of others.527 
                                                          
523 Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 85-98. 
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The key to redeeming ‘betweenness’ and to averting the dangers of relativizing 
the self lies in eliminating out-groups. Japanese nationalism was not able to see 
Japanese identity positioned in the metaphorical space between Japan and her 
neighbours. Neighbouring countries were not included in constitutive relations and 
were not thought of as ends in themselves. Japanese ‘betweenness’ during the 
Second World War succumbed to a pathetic vision of nationalistic uniformity at the 
exclusion of everyone else. ‘Betweenness’ and ‘concord’ must be radically expanded 
so as not to create any out-groups. ‘Betweenness’ must include relations to genuine 
others (foreigners) and ‘concord’ must have a place for justice for the oppressed, 
even those radically different from oneself. 
Japanese ‘betweenness’ itself falls short as a model for TCKs due to its 
tendency to create strong in-groups and sharply distinguish between in-group 
members and outsiders. However, Miyahira has taken ‘betweenness’ and ‘concord’ 
from the Japanese context and utilized it as a theological resource thereby taking it 
beyond its cultural shortcomings. As Doi has argued, as a cultural concept 
‘betweenness’ did not encourage people to transcend their immediate situation and 
even criticise their context. As a theological concept, however, Miyahira uses 
‘betweenness’ and concord in a way that lets people overcome quiet submission to 
nationalistic, ethnocentric in-groups. Hence, while ‘betweenness’ in the context of 
Japanese culture serves as the starting point for Miyahira’s contextualized theology 
and is thus of limited use to a TCK theology, theological ‘betweenness’ can 
nevertheless serve as a valuable resource. The theological use of ‘betweenness’ and 
concord will provide us with a structure to build a theology for TCKs which strongly 
resonates with the concepts of ‘liminality’ and ‘mediation’.  
 
Contextualization of Theology 
While there are significant differences that should not be ignored, the terminology of 
‘betweenness’ can still be utilised theologically. It is here that Miyahira, who has 
constructed a ‘theology of concord’528 for the Japanese context, presents a viable 
way forward. Miyahira uses ‘betweenness’ and ‘concord’ as key terms to 
contextualize doctrines such as the Trinity and Christology historically shaped by the 
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categories of ‘ousia’/‘substance’ and ‘hypostasis’/’person’.529 Following Miyahira’s 
example, a similar theological perspective for TCKs can be constructed. Both 
Miyahira’s ‘theology of concord’ and a TCK theology seek to present a meaningful 
and accessible version of Christianity for a specific target group who both hold a 
self-understanding involving ‘betweenness’. 
Is Miyahira warranted in using a social concept for a theological purpose? 
Much of his book is devoted to addressing this very question of the justification of 
the contextualisation of theology.530 While making Christian theology more 
accessible to the Japanese people seems like a noble task, does speaking of God in 
terms of human identity not reduce theology to anthropology à la Ludwig 
Feuerbach?531 Miyahira is convinced that “it is both orthodox and justifiable for 
those in a Japanese context to employ the Japanese cultural framework in 
formulating the doctrine [of the Trinity] (…) It is not merely orthodox but also 
necessary.”532 Two beliefs underlie the supposition that a contextualised theology is 
necessary: First, Miyahira believes that all theology must be contextual if it is to 
have any meaning.533 Theology has to find a language which resonates with its 
audience for it to have any kind of impact. In the words of C. S. Lewis: “Our 
business is to present that which is timeless (…) in the particular language of our 
own age. (…) We must learn the language of our audience.”534 To do theology 
meaningfully requires the use of meaningful terminology embedded in the 
experience of people. A theology with no points of contact to its human recipients, 
by definition, cannot make any sense. 
Second, Miyahira believes that theology can never be final but with every 
cultural shift has to be redone. In fact, cultural diversity lets us explore the width and 
                                                          
529 For the role ‘ousia’/‘substance’ and ‘hypostasis’/’person’ played in the development of the 
doctrine of the patristic doctrine of Trinity see: J. Warren Smith, "The Trinity in the Fourth-Century 
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531 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (New York: Harper, 1957). 
532 Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 4. 
Miyahira relies here on: John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York: C. Scribner, 
1966). 
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depth of the meaning of theology.535 Each cultural context contributes something 
unique to the theological discussion and serves to highlight a unique aspect. 
Contextualizing can only lead to a fuller understanding of God’s revelation. While 
all contextual theological perspectives inevitably fall short of the final beatific 
vision, it is always better to have an additional set of eyes, be they Japanese or 
belonging to a TCK, to supplement the communal theological outlook. 
Therefore, ‘betweenness’ is a valid construct through which to look at 
Christianity if it helps to make sense of theological doctrines for a specific audience. 
According to Miyahira, the “divine receptor-oriented approach,”536 displayed in the 
incarnation of the Word of God and the self-revelation of God, places such human 
concepts as ‘betweenness’ within the reach of God’s redemption. While the gospel 
will always remain universal, it needs to be expressed uniquely locally.537 Miyahira 
affirms as valid, therefore, the goal of presenting a uniquely particular vision of 
Christianity using the language and concepts found in the context of TCKs that 
makes sense of Christianity to TCKs. TCKs and their experience are a legitimate 
theological resource and tapping into this rich resource in no way threatens theology 
but adds to the increasingly rich understanding of God’s revelation. 
 
‘Betweenness’ as a Theological Resource 
The foundation of Miyahira’s theological vision is St. Athanasius’ account of the 
incarnation: the scope of Christ’s redemption is universal and permeates all of 
creation.538 It follows then that those within the Japanese natural and cultural context 
(風土 Fūdo) must be included within the scope of God’s redemption as well. It is 
valid to ask what it means for the Japanese people that the Word became flesh and 
dwelt among them. Interestingly, the Japanese translation of John 1:14 uses precisely 
the expression ‘between us’ (間 Aida) to speak of the Son becoming truly human, a 
human being among/in between other human beings.539 For Miyahira, it makes sense 
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then to employ the language of ‘between’ to speak of the Son taking on authentic 
human existence and establishing true concord between God and humanity. 
But does it make sense to use ‘betweenness’ and concord to speak of God 
beyond the incarnation? Miyahira thinks so. He confesses that “[t]here is hardly, as 
far as I know, any Christian theologian who has ever attempted to explain the triune 
God in detail in terms of (…) betweenness”540, however, there is a rich tradition of 
employing ‘relations of origin’ to distinguish the persons of the Trinity. Miyahira 
sees a connection that links the Japanese understanding of ‘human betweenness’, i.e. 
constitutive relations to others, and divine persons being distinguished, and thus 
constituted, solely by their relations to each other. 
Miyahira uses Gregory of Nazianzen who employed ‘relation’ to distinguish 
the three persons and specifically mentions ‘betweenness’ to speak of the Holy 
Spirit.541 He argues that ‘betweenness’ can also be applied to speak of the Father and 
the Son. Miyahira suggests that ‘betweenness’ is shared by all three persons equally 
within God and hence three sets of statements concerning the Father, Son, and Spirit 
follow: 
[I]f the betweenness is shared by the three, [1] we should also have the betweenness 
which the Father and the Holy Spirit share and that which the Son and the Holy Spirit 
share as well as that which the Father and the Son share. [2] We may also say not 
merely that the Holy Spirit is between the Father and the Son, but also that the Father 
is between the Son and the Holy Spirit; the Son is between the Father and the Holy 
Spirit. (…) [3]  [T]he Father exists ‘between’ the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Son 
‘between’ the Father and the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit ‘between’ the Father 
and the Son.542 
Miyahira goes on to clarify these three sets of statements. ‘Betweenness’ has a 
differentiating function as well as a linking function. The Holy Spirit between the 
Father and the Son is active as the giver of life in the generation of the Son; the Son 
between the Father and the Spirit is active as the one sending the Holy Spirit from 
the Father; and the Father between the Son and the Spirit is active as the one who 
begets and from whom the Spirit proceeds. Just as relations of origin distinguish the 
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persons, so each unique ‘betweenness’ distinguishes the two other persons and 
constitutes that person as distinguishing agent.543 
The key points Miyahira seeks to make are that, first, as in the case of human 
‘betweenness’ (relations), divine ‘betweenness’ (relations of origin) is intrinsic to the 
divine persons and, second, that ‘betweenness’ “is the differentiating factor in the 
triune God”544 as it is in human beings within the community. Since there is ‘human 
betweenness’ (人間 Ningen) in the Japanese context it makes sense to speak of 
‘divine betweenness.’ Miyahira here coins a new Japanese word: 神間 (Shinkan 
‘Divine-Between’). From this point of view, the ‘betweenness’ which the Son 
assumed in the incarnation is not a coincidence but, much more significantly, a 
reflection of the divine ‘betweenness’ that God eternally and inherently is.545 
Supplementing the concept of three ‘betweennesses’ is that of one ‘divine 
concord’. For Miyahira divine concord means unity in judgment and in love.546 This 
concord, however, is not a moral unity but results from the ontological unity of the 
one Godhead of the Father.547 Just as there is divine triune ‘betweenness’ revealed in 
the incarnation of the Son among (i.e. between) humans which resonates with human 
‘betweenness’ within community, so divine concord also finds its expression in the 
concord between the two natures in the incarnate Christ and is reflected in human 
concord among believers.548 Miyahira coins another new Japanese word for ‘divine 
concord’ to accompany ‘divine betweenness’: 神和 Shinwa (Divine-Concord). 
Thus, Miyahira proposes a new set of terms to make sense of the Trinity within 
the Japanese context and furthermore outlines a theology with ‘betweenness’ and 
concord at its core. The triune God is the “God of three betweennesses in one 
concord, or ‘sankan ichiwa no kami 三間一和の神’.”549 Divine concord is between the 
three divine persons. Similarly, there is concord between God and humanity in 
Christ, and, finally, there is concord between people, i.e. the redeemed concord of 
‘human betweenness’.550 
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Once Miyahira has established this basic pattern, he begins to flesh out his 
theological vision.551 On the one hand, ‘betweenness’ designates differences and 
diversity. It distinguishes between the begetter (Father) and the begotten (Son), the 
begotten (Son) and the proceeding (Spirit), and the breather(s) (Father or Father and 
Son) and the proceeding (Spirit). Each ‘betweenness’ gives each person their identity 
in relation to the others. On the other hand, concord between the divine persons 
consists of (1) intimate knowing, (2) entrusting, and (3) glorifying. All three are 
based on the free love that God is. The Father knows the Son completely and vice 
versa. The Spirit also fully participates in the perfect knowledge the Son has of the 
Father and vice versa.552 The Father entrusts his work to the Son and the Son in turn 
entrusts all things to the Father in his self-offering. The Spirit also participates in the 
entrusting by continuing the work of the Son and entrusting everything back to the 
Father.553 Finally, the Son glorifies the Father and the Father glorifies the Son in 
return by revealing himself and raising the Son. The Spirit also participates in the 
glorifying relationship with the Father and Son.554 Thus there is perfect concord 
between the three persons of the Trinity in knowledge, in trust, and in glory. 
 
Three areas of ‘Betweenness’ and Concord 
Miyahira applies ‘betweenness’ and concord within his unique theological structure 
in three key theological areas: first, the Trinity; second, the person of Christ; third, 
believers. 
First, there is ‘betweenness’ and concord as described above: within the triune 
God. ‘Betweenness’ designates difference in relation, constituting each unique 
person. Concord describes the perfect unity in knowledge, trust, and glorification.555 
Second, ‘betweenness’ and concord exist between God and humanity.556 Divine 
concord overflows to reach humanity in creation. The concord found between God 
and humanity is the very same concord within the triune God. However, Miyahira 
inverts the meaning of ‘betweenness’ between God and humanity: Human sinfulness 
has entered the relation between God and humanity to cause a threefold rift. 
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‘Betweenness’ stands opposed to concord on this level. Sinful ‘betweenness’ has 
three characteristics. First, it signifies human ignorance of God. Second, 
‘betweenness’ means disbelief and unacceptance. Finally, ‘betweenness’ shows itself 
in human dishonour of God.557 Human ignorance, disbelief, and dishonour are 
diametrically opposed to the divine concord of knowing, trusting, and glorifying. 
Thus, ‘betweenness’ and concord work against each other in the relation between 
God and creation. 
Concord between God and humanity is restored through the Son. The incarnate 
Son reveals the Father and the concord of knowledge is realized between God and 
humanity. Knowledge of God through the Son leads to believing in the concord of 
trust between the Son, the Father, and the Spirit. This leads to glorification of God 
through the Son by humanity. In return, God honours believers as God’s children. In 
short then, concord between the believer and God is established through participating 
in God’s concord. Concord with God is mutual but initiated by God alone. Knowing 
and trusting God leads to humans glorifying God and God honouring humanity in 
turn.558 Divine concord thus undoes the rift of sinful ‘betweenness’ between God and 
creation. 
This results in ‘betweenness’ and concord in the third theological area, namely 
that between people.559 Here Miyahira sees an opportunity to critique Japanese 
‘betweenness’ and concord in order to redeem it through the model of divine 
‘betweenness’ and concord and takes them beyond their Japanese immediate context. 
Whereas Japanese nationalism exploited ‘betweenness’ by prioritizing a superficial 
uniformity (concord) over against individuality (‘betweenness’), divine concord and 
‘betweenness’ are in perfect balance allowing for both unity and diversity. The 
individual is not dissolved into the collective, but God knows every person by their 
name. Miyahira argues that “the Son resides intimately between individuals, not 
merely among them.”560 Divine concord does not violate individuals but affirms 
them. Dominance of ‘betweenness’ (individuals) over concord (harmony) is also 
critiqued. Divine concord unites people across differences and reconciles them. 
There is unity with distinction, individuality with harmony. Worldly concord, as 
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could be seen during Japan’s period of imperialism, is coercive, competitive, and, 
exclusive. In contrast, divine concord based in God’s free love is voluntary, mutually 
serving, and inclusive as demonstrated in Jesus Christ.561 
 
Towards a TCK Theology of ‘Betweenness’ as Liminality 
Two conclusions follow from Miyahira’s contextualised theology pertaining to a 
TCK theology. First of all, Miyahira has shown that contextualising theology is a 
necessary part of any theology. In order to make sense to a particular group of 
people, in his case Japanese people, theology must make active use of their cultural 
constructs. This should not be any different in the case of TCKs. If Miyahira can use 
‘betweenness’ and concord in the Japanese context to construct a theology of 
‘betweenness’ and concord, then a similar theology contextualizing liminality and 
mediation is warranted. Miyahira’s contextualized theology is, however, not without 
its limits. Miyahira criticizes the ethnocentric ‘betweenness’ and concord in the 
Japanese and seeks to replace it with a redeemed ‘betweenness’ and concord based 
on understanding, trusting, and honouring others. However, it remains limited by the 
Japanese context. TCK’s ‘betweenness’ as liminality in contrast is much more 
radical and, as a result, presents a much more global theological vision in 
comparison to Miyahira. A TCK theology of ‘betweenness’ is more global in its 
outlook and concerns itself not only with making sense of Christianity for TCKs but 
transforming TCKs’ marginality into a constructive one. 
Second, while Miyahira shows how theology can use ‘betweenness’ and 
concord as a resource to formulate a doctrine of the Trinity, he does much more than 
speak of the Trintiy in his work. He sets forth a theological structure that begins with 
the Trinity of ‘three betweennesses in one concord’, extends to ‘betweenness’ which 
divides God and fallen humanity and is overcome by Christ and ends with a 
redeemed ‘betweenness’ and concord between people where individuality 
(betweenness) and unity (concord) can be found in balance. The dual theme of 
‘betweenness’ and concord permeates his theological structure and is applied in each 
key theological area. This God-Christ-believer structure is an outline that a TCK 
theology can emulate. 
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One weak point in Miyahira constitutes the inversion of the meaning of 
‘betweenness’ for the God-human relationship.562 While in the Trinity, 
‘betweenness’ underlies the distinction of the persons and establishes their 
distinctiveness in relation to the two others, when Miyahira applies ‘betweenness’ to 
speak of the relation between God and humanity it comes to mean the sinful distance 
of fallen humanity from God. Without denying that sinful humanity is estranged 
from God and thus in need of mediation, can ‘betweenness’ not be a positive quality 
to describe the relation between creator and creation? ‘Betweenness’ signifies the 
important difference between the transcendent creator and creaturely humanity and 
belongs inherently to the relation between Creator and creation. Rather than a gap, 
‘betweenness’ can designate the space between God and humanity where the two can 
meet in an encounter without one being reduced to the other. ‘Betweenness’ here 
takes on the qualities of Marc Augé’s non-place.563 ‘Betweenness’, the defining 
relation that God has to creation, distinguishes as well as relates the two. With 
creation and the incarnation, creation’s history has become God’s history. And, 
similarly, ‘betweenness’ from the perspective of creation denotes creation’s 
dependency on God. Unlike, Miyahira, this understanding of the relation between 
God and humanity does not see ‘betweenness’ as something to be overcome but 
something which ought to be appropriately maintained. This, of course, naturally 
leads to locating ‘betweenness’ in the mediator between God and humanity: the 
incarnate Son of God. Miyahira only sees the Son of God as betweenness in terms of 
his existence within the Trinity and in terms of his true humanity among fellow 
humans, not in terms of the two-natured incarnate mediator. A TCK theology sees 
the incarnate Son positioned between God and humanity, embodying a constructive 
marginality. 
A second weak point of Miyahira is his reliance on a rather static view of 
‘betweenness’ as a position in between rather than a movement and concord as a 
state of being rather than an activity. ‘Betweenness’ in the Trinity, in Christ, and in 
believers certainly captures something true and valuable about Christianity. 
However, liminality, non-place, liquidity carry a much more dynamic connotation 
which seems more fitting for a dynamic, active God. Similarly, mediation like 
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reconciliation is an ongoing activity rather than an achieved end like concord. A 
TCK theology of ‘betweenness’ must emphasize its dynamic nature in order to be 
much more attractive to TCKs who are used to mobility. 
With these two modifications to Miyahira’s theology of ‘betweenness’, a broad 
theological vision of a TCK theology emerges. The triune God can be described in a 
threefold mediating liminality, the Father distinguishing and mediating between the 
Son and the Spirit; the Son distinguishing and mediating between the Father and the 
Spirit; and the Spirit distinguishing and mediating between the Father and the Son. 
In each person’s case, the person is both ‘a part of’ the other two as well as ‘apart 
from’ the others. 
Furthermore, Christ as liminal saviour goes forth from God to act as mediator 
in between God and humanity. To borrow Karl Barth’s words, the Son in typical 
TCK fashion expatriates “into the far country”564 and embodies God’s mission 
towards creatures as well as humanity’s reconciliation to God.565 Christ is the 
archetypical liminal figure, a Third (so to speak) between God (Christ’s first 
‘culture’) and humanity (Christ’s second ‘culture’), and thus, for TCKs, a familiar 
in-between person who reveals a familiar in-between God. 
Finally, what kind of reconciled humanity would such a TCK theology 
portray? Miyahira argues that redemption leads to a restoration of humans as true 
‘human-betweenness’ whose mission it is to create concord among people, i.e. 
peace-makers.566 This makes sense to TCKs who aspire to find their purpose in 
mediation.567 Humans are meant to be liminal beings in the image of a liminal God, 
saved through a liminal saviour. A TCK theology sees humanity being perfected in 
liminality through mediation. 
 
Conclusion 
Miyahira’s theology of ‘betweenness’ sets an example of how a contextualized 
theology looks like. It does so, first, by utilizing the language of ‘betweenness’ as its 
                                                          
564 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. IV/1 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1956), 157-210. 
565 See also: Damon W. K. So, "The Missionary Journey of the Son of God into the Far Country: A 
Paradigm of the Holistic Gospel Developed from the Theology of Karl Barth," Transformation 23, no. 
3 (2006). 
566 Miyahira, Towards a Theology of the Concord of God: A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity, 201-
07. 
567 See for example the case of TCK Barbara Schaetti: Schaetti, "Phoenix Rising: A Question of 
Cultural Identity," 185-86. 
151 
 
key feature and, second, but outlining a theological structure starting with the triune 
God, followed by the incarnate Christ, and ending in the redemption of humanity 
permeated by ‘betweenness’ in each key area. Miyahira’s approach, with the 
appropriate changes, can easily be adopted to construct a TCK theology of 
‘betweenness’. 
Two areas, however, remain to be dealt with: First is the question of identity 
which is a prominent issue for TCKs but not for Miyahira; Second, is the need to 
give ‘betweenness’ a more dynamic connotation in its theological context. These two 




Emil Brunner: ‘Mensch-Von-Gott-Her’ 
 
Introduction 
This chapter serves two purposes. First, the all-important question of how to 
understand identity theologically needs to be answered in order to successfully cater 
to the needs of TCKs. This chapter compares how identity was constructed during 
the Third Reich with how the Swiss theologian constructed an alternative account of 
a Christian identity rooted in an encounter with God. Second, this chapter seeks to 
supplement Nozomu Miyahira’s theology of ‘betweenness’568 with a more dynamic 
account of a God who reaches out toward humanity. Brunner’s description of God as 
‘Gott-zum-Menschen-hin’ and humanity as ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’ adds a dimension 
of movement to ‘betweenness’ more appropriate to TCK’s liminality in mobility. 
Following Miyahira’s theological structure of Trinity, Christ, and believer, this 
chapter focuses on three key points in the context of the question of what it means to 
be human: First, who does God reveal Godself to be in terms of the human question 
of identity? Second, what did Jesus Christ accomplish? Third, who are human beings 
in light of these previous two questions? 
 
‘Identity as Encounter’ 
Emil Brunner (1889-1966) provides a theological answer to the question of TCKs’ 
identity. Writing extensively during the turbulent interwar period, his theological 
anthropology deals with the question of who we humans are and who gets to define 
human existence.569 This chapter looks at his 1937 Uppsala lectures, published the 
following year as Wahrheit als Begegnung.570 Of interest is how Brunner constructs 
human identity through theology in contrast with National Socialism’s construction 
of German identity along the lines of ‘Blood and Soil’ ideology (Blut und Boden). 
Brunner’s construction of human identity is based on a personal correspondence 
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between God and humanity and participation in Christ’s death on the cross. 
For Brunner, God is not an abstract ‘God-in-Godself’ but always a ‘God-
towards-humanity’ (Gott-zum-Menschen-hin) and, correspondingly, humans are 
never ‘humans-in-themselves’ but always ‘humans-from-God’ (Mensch-von-Gott-
her).571 Gott-zum-Menschen-hin signifies that God is a self-revealing and self-
mediating God as well as that God is the one who bestows identity on human beings. 
Mensch-von-Gott-her signifies that our human existence relies solely on the gracious 
and free act of God to create humanity ex nihilo. Humans as Mensch-von-Gott-her 
completely depend on the self-giving Gott-zum-Menschen-hin. Knowledge of God is 
linked through a personal correspondence with knowledge of ourselves and by 
personally encountering God humans become “truly personal.”572 Thus, when 
Brunner writes ‘truth as encounter’, from the perspective of TCKs, it reads as 
‘identity as encounter’. Brunner supplies an answer to the central question: Who am 
I? 
The significance of Brunner’s work on human identity comes to light when set 
in its proper context of the 1930s developments during the Third Reich. The rise of 
German National Socialism starting in 1933 was the background against which the 
Uppsala lectures were delivered. Both National Socialism and Brunner advanced 
competing claims to human identity. These two contrasting views can be described 
using Marc Augé’s categories of ‘anthropological place’ and ‘non-place’573: 
Germany’s National Socialism advocated a definition of human identity from within 
anthropological place based on the ideology of Blut und Boden. Brunner locates 
human identity in the ultimate theological ‘non-place’: the place of Christ’s death 
where God meets humanity to restore the lost identity as Mensch-von-Gott-her. This 
chapter will thus first look at Germany’s construction of identity in Augé’s 
anthropological place and, second, detail Brunner’s construction of Christian identity 
within the non-place of Christ’s death. 
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German Anthropological Place: Identity based on ‘Blut und Boden’ 
Brunner felt a theological responsibility to engage with the political context of the 
church and construct a contemporary theology which is capable of critically 
evaluating ideologies such as Nazism.574 The rise of National Socialism is very much 
linked to the question of how Germans sought to reconstruct their identity after the 
devastating consequences of the Great War. 
Several factors contributed to the rise of the Third Reich.575 The Weimar 
Republic (1919-1933), set up as a compromise, faced difficulties from the onset. 
Following the end of the Great War and the collapse of the Kaiserreich, Germany 
dealt with immense financial difficulties in the 1920s as the result of the 1919 Treaty 
of Versailles and further suffered from the unsuccessful Beer Hall Putsch 
(Hitlerputsch) in 1923. The slowly regained stability towards the late 20s was 
undone by the October 1929 stock market crash in the USA which caused banks to 
call in their loans from Germany. Germany found itself in crisis. This naturally 
triggered doubts about German identity and the need for some form of reassuring 
validation through strong identification. By 1932 the republic’s supporters had lost a 
commanding legislative majority and Adolf Hitler (1989-1945) was invited to form a 
government.576 
Protestantism in Germany also found itself in a difficult situation following the 
Great War. The Protestant church had supported the Kaiser’s disastrous war policies 
and had enjoyed a privileged status. During the Weimar Republic years, attitudes 
toward the Protestant church were critical and Germany saw a rise in secularism. 
Filling the void were alternative cultural and religious movements (völkisch-religiöse 
Bewegungen).577 One of these was the German Faith Movement (Deutsche 
Glaubensbewegung) founded by Jakob Wilhelm Hauer (1881-1962) based on 
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Hinduism and German ethnocentrism.578 This movement propagated the Blut und 
Boden ideology and sought to construct a German identity around the idea of race 
(German blood) and connection to homeland (soil) as well as the cult of Hitler’s 
personality. Blut und Boden idealized rural life in the country side (Augé’s 
anthropological place) and opposed urban culture (Augé’s non-place). Through the 
spread of the neopagan völkischen ideologies, German ethnocentrism, Aryan 
racialism, and National Socialism gained traction and became key markers of 
German identity. 
Employing Augé’s categories, German National Socialist identity was firmly 
rooted in Germany’s constructed anthropological place. The common characteristics 
of anthropological place are history, relations, and identity.579 Völkische ideologies 
constructed a history of ‘Germanness’ to give German people the sense of 
permanence and stability through a connection to its supposed origins. ‘German 
blood’ created a natural and unquestionable connection (relation) among all ‘true’ 
Germans. And finally, National Socialism constituted the umbrella identity under 
which everything was unified (Gleichschaltung). History, relations, and identity had 
to be guarded against their enemies through clearly marked lines of racial, 
ideological, geographical demarcation. Resembling the simplistic cultural model by 
Johann Gottfried Herder580, one German race, internally homogenous and opposed 
against all external ‘others’, protected German soil which was elevated to a quasi-
holy place. The Blut und Boden ideology is an extreme form of the construction of 
identity within anthropological place. 
 
German Religious Identity: Faith eclipsed by Anthropological Place 
How did Christianity respond to this construction of German identity? The following 
slogan found on a signboard in Lippe, Westphalia, in 1935 illustrates well how 
powerful the constructed German identity was: “Die Taufe mag ganz nützlich sein, 
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Doch glattet sie kein Nasenbein”581 (Though baptism might be useful, it won’t 
straighten a crooked nose). When pitched against German Blut und Boden-identity 
and its clear line of demarcation between races, Christian faith and its belief in 
equality before God did not stand a chance. In a sense true German salvation was 
found only in the German race and homeland. Christian faith was viewed with 
suspicion. 
In response, German Protestantism aligned itself with the increasing emphasis 
on völkische identity and responded in 1932 with a Christian version of the German 
Faith Movement called the ‘Faith Movement of German Christians’ 
(Glaubensbewegung Deutsche Christen), better known as ‘German Christians’ 
(Deutsche Christen).582 Following the Blut und Boden ideology, German Christians 
sought to create a Christian identity along racial lines with strong anti-Semitic 
tendencies. The goal was to create a spiritual home for Aryans of the Third Reich. 
Racial categories were thought of as divinely ordained and thus German Christians 
saw their cause as divinely sanctioned.583 Instead of a transcendent religious identity 
that could have relativized the construction of identity based on German Blut und 
Boden, German Christians constructed a German religious identity completely 
eclipsed by German anthropological place. 
German Christians fused Christianity with Nazism allowing Protestants to 
maintain their religious identity alongside their superior national identity. However, 
it is important to remember that German Christians were not a Nazi solution imposed 
on Protestantism. Rather, it was a Protestant initiative to adjust to the cultural milieu. 
Furthermore, far from being an unproblematic movement, within the church there 
was struggle with the Confessing Church over control (Kirchenkampf); there were 
rivalries with the German Faith Movement and the Nazi regime continued to view 
German Christians with suspicion.584 
In 1933, a unified German Protestant Church (Deutsche Evangelische Kirche) 
was established by Hitler and in the July Protestant church elections representatives 
of German Christians won two-thirds of the votes giving German Christians vast 
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control over church affairs. However, earlier support by Hitler himself ceased and a 
period of fragmentation followed the initial success of German Christians.585 With 
the creation of a new Ministry for Church Affairs (Reichskirchenministerium) in July 
1935 led by Hanns Kerrl, Nazi authorities sought to increase their control over the 
church and kicked off a period of regrouping. An increasingly systematic forced 
alignment (Gleichschaltung) of Protestantism with National Socialism started, 
reflecting a broader initiative of Gleichschaltung (1933-7) which sought to bring all 
institutions in line with Nazi ideology and thus under the regime’s control.586 
Interestingly, the influence of returning overseas missionaries also drove the 
Protestant church towards ethnocentrism.587 If other people (Völker) could have their 
contextualized Christianity, why shouldn’t Germans also have their own version? 
Rather than seeing a unifying humanity underlying differences in skin colour and 
culture, ‘race’ was seen as a divinely ordained absolute category. Christian faith was 
not meant to transcend racial differences. A Jewish Christian would remain Jewish 
and no baptism could ‘straighten a crooked nose’. The German church was 
understood to be called to remain ‘racially pure’ and faith could never undo or 
transcend German identity. Instead, being a good Christian meant being a good 
German.588 
 
The consolidation of German Identity: Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer! 
Within Protestantism, the völkische Blut und Boden-identity towered unrivalled over 
any theological attempt to define the worth of human existence. Similarly, within the 
broader context of German society the Gleichschaltung from 1933 onward sought to 
eliminate all rival claims to identity besides the National Socialist ideology and the 
cult of the person of Hitler.589 To be truly human was to be German, bound by oath to 
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the person of Hitler. Slogans such as ‘Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer!’ (‘one people, 
one empire, one leader’) illustrate well the extent to which humans were confined 
and controlled within one place. Gleichschaltung was as much a consolidation of 
power as it was a thorough consolidation of identity. Not even the church was able to 
unanimously oppose influence of this Gleichschaltung. 
We see here the construction of identity rooted in anthropological place. 
History, relations, identity were aligned in an attempt to create a Herderian utopia of 
one people, one race, one culture, one shared identity living together in one 
anthropological place. German Christians were the result of Christianity eclipsed by 
anthropological place. Powerless before the German ideals of Blut und Boden, 
Christian identity was utilized only to further reinforce a German identity rooted in 
anthropological place. 
 
Brunner’s ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’: Encountering God in Non-Place 
How did Brunner respond to this attempt to define human existence through 
National Socialism? Brunner saw the totalitarianism of the 1930s as the greatest 
threat to human existence. Nazi Germany and its attempt to exclusively define 
humanity according to National Socialism rested on a mistaken concept of human 
identity.590 A state, a culture, a skin colour, or even a geographical location cannot 
ever make an unrivalled claim to define what it means to be human. Far from 
constituting an authentic human identity, Brunner saw in the collectivism of National 
Socialism a de-personalising trend resulting in the loss of true personal identity.591 In 
order to restore true personal identity the power of anthropological place had to be 
resisted. Redemption cannot come from within anthropological place and the racial, 
ethnic, or geographical identities it casts; it has to come from somewhere beyond the 
grasp of anthropological place: God’s self-giving in Christ on the cross. Christ’s 
death here is a metaphorical place beyond nations, races, ethnicities. Thus in 
Brunner’s theology, Christ’s death constitutes a theological non-place opposed to the 
racial and nationalistic anthropological place Nazi Germany. 
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Influenced by the Personalism592 of Ferdinand Ebner (1882-1931)593 and 
Martin Buber (1878-1965),594 Brunner countered Blut und Boden with a strong 
emphasis on the personal and relational: The knowledge of God (and hence the 
knowledge of ourselves) comes through the personal encounter with God in which 
God reveals Godself as Gott-zum-Menschen-hin and restores the only truly valid 
human identity of Mensch-von-Gott-her. Humanity encounters God personally 
through the unconditional and total self-giving of God which correspondingly asks 
humanity to give itself unconditionally and totally in return. This mirrored act of 
human unconditional and total self-shedding severs all ties to anthropological place, 
its history, its identity, its relations, and the human identity as Mensch-von-Gott-
(allein!)-her is once again bestowed upon humans. Not blood, not soil, but the self-
giving person of Christ is the sole ground of identity. The encounter of God and 
humanity thus takes place in a non-place, at the cross, where the histories, relations, 
and identities constructed within anthropological places are undone. 
In making this personal encounter with God the construction site of human 
identity, Brunner rejects both an objectivist and subjectivist approach to the dual 
question of knowledge of God and human identity. Objectivism for Brunner is 
humanity, motivated by a quest for security, attempting to, through objectification, 
systematisation, or institutionalisation, forcefully bring something which by its 
nature cannot be controlled, such as God’s grace or revelation, under its control.595 
Humanity would like to hold the power of self-determination in its own hands 
thereby escaping being at the mercy of a transcendent God. National Socialism’s 
juxtaposition of baptism and a crooked nose is one attempt to domesticate God’s 
transcendent grace and place it under the more objective categories of race. The goal 
is to contain God’s authority within a human-controlled authoritarian system. While 
Brunner restricts himself to giving examples from church history, such as the Roman 
Catholic papacy or its corresponding Protestant ‘papierende Papst’ it is clear that this 
also applies to the developments taking place in Nazi Germany and thus he sees it as 
his responsibility to speak up especially in the times of crisis where humanity is ever 
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increasingly attempting to control God’s revelation and hence control human 
identity.596 
Opposing the trend to capture and objectify is always the instinct to be free 
which Brunner identifies with subjectivism.597 Subjectivism, where the Word of God 
ceases to be the authoritative revelation or foundation for faith and instead becomes 
a mere expression of subjective pietistic feelings (das fromme Gefühl), eventually 
leads to the subjectivist dissolution of theology (die subjektivistische Auflösung der 
Theologie).598 If Brunner’s objectivism describes the metanarratives of modernism, 
subjectivism describes the counter movement of postmodern loss of meaning. In 
terms of identity, objectivism stands for rigid, fixed identities along the lines of 
ideologies such as National Socialism or Marxist-Leninism, whereas subjectivism 
stands for the melting down of identities to perpetually liquid individuals completely 
lacking any kind of reference group. For Brunner, the solution to avoiding both 
extremes is not a matter of finding the right balance between two mistaken ideas 
(“Es gibt keine richtige Mitte zwischen zwei Irrtümern”).599 On the one hand, neither 
God’s truth nor human identity can be captured and controlled by humanity. On the 
other hand, individual humans cannot simply make up out of thin air God’s 
revelation or their own identity. Ultimately, neither the collective nor the 
emancipated individual can be the ground for an authentic human identity. 
 
Asymmetry and Correspondence 
Brunner’s identity establishing encounter with God exhibits two main features: 
Asymmetry and correspondence. First of all, the encounter is asymmetrical in that it 
solely rests on God’s initiative. God calls humanity into being from nowhere (“Gott 
ruft den Menschen aus dem Nichts ins Dasein”)600 and thereby establishes humanity 
as an authentic being other than God (ein reales Gegenüber) with a unique identity. 
Human freedom is thus grounded in complete dependence on God.601 The source of 
human identity is first and foremost God calling humanity into being from nowhere. 
Categories such as race, culture, location which belong to anthropological place are 
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secondary to the fact that human existence depends solely on God’s creative will. 
God calls humanity forth ex nihilo. In creating humanity out of non-place, no rival 
claims to human identity besides God’s gracious and free will to let humanity be 
humanity are possible. Humans originate from non-place, the place where humanity 
is completely dependent on God, but also completely free to be the authentic other to 
God. Encountering God through Christ follows the same asymmetrical relationship 
where humanity returns to a place of total insecurity (non-place, Christ’s death) to 
become once more completely dependent on God. 
Second, this encounter is based on a primal relation (Urbeziehung), a relation 
of personal correspondence (Verhältnis der personalen Korrespondenz)602 in which 
both God and humanity play a role. There are always two corresponding aspects to 
this foundational and continuing God-human encounter: on the one hand, the 
initiating and giving by Gott-zum-Menschen-hin who is necessarily first and, on the 
other hand, the receiving and responding by Mensch-von-Gott-her who is necessarily 
second and dependent on the former. This original asymmetry and personal 
correspondence play a central role in the reconstruction of human identity because it 
culminates in the death of Jesus Christ, the non-place God invites humanity into in 
order to bestow on it anew its identity as Mensch-von-Gott-her. Meeting God in the 
death of Christ is asymmetric because it rests on God’s initiative and grace and it is a 
correspondence because God’s total self-giving unto death invites humanity to 
respond with an equal self-giving ‘death’, a deconstruction of falsely constructed 
identities. In other words, Gott-zum-Menschen-hin invites the corrupted Mensch-von-
Gott-her to become Mensch-zu-Gott-zurück (Humanity-back-to-God). 
 
God’s coup d'état: Breaking the spell of Anthropological Place 
Brunner employs two categories to analyse this asymmetric personal 
correspondence: Lordship and Communion. Divine lordship (Gottes Herrseinwollen) 
corresponds with the unconditional obedience by humanity. Humans have no power 
or right against God but receive their independence and freedom precisely through 
obedience (Subjektsein). Thus, “Only God is the source of the being and freedom of 
humanity” (“Gott allein ist der Quell des Seins und der Freiheit des Menschen”).603 
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Divine lordship is not a means to control humanity but to set humanity free from 
whatever holds humanity captive, be it racism, nationalism, or ethnocentrism. 
Second, God gives Godself in communion to humanity and only because God gave 
nothing less but Godself can humans also give themselves completely to God and 
enter into communion (Gemeinschaft).604 Human identity emerges from within this 
loving communion with God. 
For Brunner, faith is unconditional trust and obedience (unbedingter 
Vertrauensgehorsam) as well as total freedom605 in response to the unconditional 
self-giving of God in God’s personal Word. Faith entails a self-giving without regard 
to one’s self-assurance, meaning faith gives up the security and comfort that 
anthropological place provides and vulnerably enters into non-place where the 
human markers of identification such as race, culture, nationality cease to hold any 
power. The leaving behind of the safety structures that anthropological place 
provides (Mensch-zurück-zu-Gott) sets humanity free to be re-created in the true 
image of God (Mensch-von-Gott-her). Anthropological place here is a source of 
distortion both of our understanding of God and of our understanding of ourselves. It 
substitutes our original divine source of being and identity with constructed 
alternatives such as ethnocentrism, racism, nationalism, etc. God is not recognized as 
the one who graciously gave all of Godself for the upholding of humanity (Gott-zum-
Menschen-hin) and humanity is not seen as having been called forth from non-place 
by God (Mensch-von-Gott-her). This personal encounter in non-place thus recasts 
both parties in a new light and restores both God’s and humanity’s original identity: 
“God is the God-towards-humanity because and only because he wills to be 
discerned in his Word; and humanity is the humanity-from-God because and only 
because in faith humanity has its true being.”606 In the divine communion, God finds 
Godself reconciled to humanity and humanity finds itself reconciled to God. Thus 
God can once again be Gott-zum-Menschen-hin, the source of human identity and 
freedom and humanity can once again be Mensch-von-Gott-her, existing 
authentically without being distorted by constructed idolatrous identities. 
In the completely personal God-human encounter, we do not glimpse a 
‘something’ but a pure ‘thou’ (Du) who rips us out of our I-isolation (Icheinsamkeit) 
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into communion (Gemeinschaft) with God which transforms our inner most being. 
Most interestingly, Brunner infuses the encounter with political meaning by calling 
this a Regierungsumsturz, a coup d'état!607 When passing from anthropological place 
over to non-place a complete reorientation takes place. Structures that once 
dominated a person’s identity lose their magical hold over humans and in their stead 
communion with God fills the space. Yet, for Brunner God is never a Übermacht, a 
totalitarian regime, who violates (vergewaltigt, literally meaning ‘rapes’) the other 
person in the encounter. God is not a cosmic Führer. The human person is not 
‘skipped over’ or ‘muted’ but their personality is truly granted in their free faithful 
response.608 The encounter with God in theological non-place enables a person to be 
whom the person was created to be namely something much more than skin colour, 
culture, or nationality, etc. 
 
Death the Ultimate Non-Place 
Brunner writes that through participation in and identification with God’s self-giving 
in God’s Word, humans are given not an ‘alien righteousness’ (i.e. an alien or 
borrowed identity), but a ‘real righteousness’ (i.e. an identity which truly belongs to 
the person) is created within humans through the Holy Spirit who takes up residence 
within humans.609 Brunner’s emphasis here is on the reality (Wirklichkeit) of the 
effects of the encounter with God: “In faith, the old human really dies, and, in faith, 
the new human really lives.”610 Humans are truly newly created in the encounter 
with God and are truly given a completely new identity. But how does this occur? 
In the context of the reality of the encounter with God through God’s Word 
Brunner interestingly speaks of death and dying, a theme earlier discussed as part of 
Victor Turner’s concept of liminality611 and which also relates to Augé’s non-
place.612 All previous false claims for dominance have truly been eradicated in the 
real participatory death of believers in the actual death of Jesus Christ. Brunner 
argues that, through personal correspondence, there is a mutual dying: Christ dies 
first and humans symbolically die in response as they are ‘sucked into’ Christ’s 
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God is always the first, the giver; humanity is always the second, the receiver. Here 
too, the death we go through is Christ’s death; in his death we are baptized; we are 
pulled with him into his dying. He himself pulls us unto his own death. (…) The 
whole person must give herself—therefore only the language of death is appropriate. 
(…) The person’s death corresponds to Christ’s death; Christ’s death is what needed 
to happen to make possible the necessary death of the person; the death of Christ is 
the principal occurrence within the person, and yet it must simultaneously occur as 
the person’s own death, she herself must say ‘yes’ to this death.613 
Brunner’s language of death expresses the disruptiveness of the encounter with God. 
Death illustrates how radical the identity as Mensch-zurück-zu-Gott is. A theological 
identity is not a compromise, not a power sharing-scheme with other claims of 
identification and, therefore, death is the only appropriate symbol to describe the 
transition from anthropological place to non-place, from a place with various human 
constructed claims to identity to a place where the only ground of being and source 
of definition is absolute dependence on God. Through baptismal dying and rising 
with Christ, believers take on the identity of Mensch-zurück-zu-Gott. Believers enter 
into Christ’s liminality to also become liminal beings whose preliminal identities 
have been undone. 
In addition to liminality, it also makes sense to speak of the encounter with 
God through mutual death as taking place in a theological non-place. Augé speaks of 
non-place as a place without history, relations, and identity.614 God’s self-giving 
finds its epitome in the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and it is here that a theological 
non-place emerges. In death, history comes to an end; progress ceases. For once the 
stream of time stops and the dead are able to step outside of time and place. In death, 
all relationships are severed. The dead are surrendered to the ultimate ‘others.’ In 
death, living identities dissolve and only remnants continue as memories among the 
living. Far from being a state of solidity, in this case death is actually a state of 
plasticity or liquidity because the solid structures of anthropological place melt away 
and give way to freedom to be recreated and redefined. Christ carves out a space, a 
non-place, for humanity in which humanity is liberated. God’s self-giving on the 
cross is an invitation to enter into this non-place and give oneself completely to God 
in correspondence. Through dying and rising with Christ, believers are freed from 
distortions in order to be able to take on and live out their new-found identity of 
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Mensch-zurück-zu-Gott. The deadly encounter with Gott-zum-Menschen-hin is thus 
an utterly liberating encounter that untangles humans from the net of arbitrarily 
constructed cultural, racial, nationalistic labels that seeks to pin down and subdue 
humans. Death in Christ is not something to be feared but something to be embraced 
because it mirrors the place we are originally from: i.e. the nowhere (non-place) of 
creation ex nihilo where originally humanity was completely dependent on God’s 
grace and completely free to identify in loving communion and harmony with God. 
Death as non-place is a place of grace. This view sees the liminality and marginality 
of the rejected saviour on the cross not as an encapsulated but a constructive event. 
In creation, humanity was created as Mensch-von-Gott-her by the God who 
revealed Godself to be Gott-zum-Menschen-hin. God was the God who bestows 
identity on God’s creation sola gratia. To be was to be from God. In redemption, 
humanity is invited back to a place of grace with an identity as ‘Mensch-zurück-zu 
Gott’. To be justified in our existence is to return to God. In both creation and 
redemption, God unchangingly reveals Godself to be the same Gott-zum-Menschen-
hin who graciously becomes the God who defines humanity. Gott-zum-Menschen-hin 
appears most distinctively in the self-giving of Jesus Christ who carves out a space 
through nothing less than self-sacrifice in order that humanity may follow suit and 
enter into this liminal redemptive space. The relation of personal correspondence 
suggests that Christ’s death, far from absolving humanity from death, invites 
humanity to be put to death correspondingly. Here God kills to make alive. 
 
‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’ and TCKs 
For the TCK, the cross of Christ is an empowering encounter with God which gives 
terminally unique ‘non-person’ unquestionable legitimacy as Mensch-zurück-zu-Gott 
grounded in nothing less than the unconditionally and total self-giving Gott-zum-
Menschen-hin. All other demands to identify are relativized by the only ultimate 
claim by God. Here TCKs can commit to relativism safely because of their ‘personal 
truth’ that they are persons of infinite value before God. Thus, a theological identity 
is death as well as life, emptiness as well as fullness, destruction of false claims of 
ultimacy that demand identification as well as construction of a legitimate ground of 
being that deserves absolute identification. Here there is “a non-contingent, over-
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arching, and spiritual locus of integrity”615 which is able to transcend the immediate 
calls for identification and serve as a foundation for core beliefs for higher order 
integration of the fragmented self. 
 
Conclusion 
In Brunner theological identity has two aspects: First, the personal correspondence of 
‘Gott-zum-Menschen-hin’ and ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’. God defines humanity and 
humanity finds its ground of being in God. Second, theological identity is infused 
with symbols of dying. Brunner’s method of locating identity in personal 
correspondence with God through the mutual dying and rising with Christ presents 
an alternative to a National Socialist identity and remains able to counter present day 
claims to defining humanity along political, racial, cultural, or even religious 
ideologies. To use Augé’s language, Brunner countered the Nazi identity grounded in 
anthropological place with a theological identity grounded in a theological non-place 
which transcends it. Human theological identity as Mensch-von-Gott-her provides a 
transcendental ground that can serve as an internal locus of integrity fitting for 
TCKs. 
Resembling Miyahira’s God-Christ-Believer-structure, Brunner incorporates 
three foundational components to answer the question of what and who human 
beings are. First, God is Gott-zum-Mensch-hin. God is the source of identity and 
bestows identity through nothing less than the total self-giving of Godself. This 
revealed Gott-zum-Menschen-hin stems from the eternal Trinitarian God-towards-
others, Miyahira’s Trinity of ‘three betweennesses’. Second, the pinnacle of the 
revelation of God as Gott-zum-Menschen-hin takes place in the dying and rising of 
Jesus Christ who through his dying creates a liminal non-place for purpose of 
mediating between Gott-zum-Menschen-hin and Mensch-zurück-zu-Gott. The Christ 
here is both the God who gives Godself to humanity and humanity which gives itself 
back to God in response. There is both asymmetry due to God’s sole initiative and 
correspondence due to the mirrored actions by God and humanity. Third, humanity is 
redeemed through participation in Christ’s death and live out their life in liminality 
as Mensch-von-Gott-her rather than a person rooted in the constructed identities of 
any anthropological place. Believers are reborn through dying with Christ and live 
                                                          
615 Schaetti, "Global Nomad Identity: Hypothesizing a Developmental Model," 58, 263-64. 
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out their calling as liminal people. These three building blocks identified above 
correspond with the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of Christology, and the 
doctrine of believer’s newfound identity. 
Brunner’s definition of God as Gott-zum-Menschen-hin adds an element of 
dynamic movement to Miyahira’s more static ‘divine betweenness’. Here Brunner’s 
divine ‘towardness’ in creation and incarnation corresponds to Miyahira’s 
‘betweenness’: a desire to reach out to others and be defined within that relation. 
Miyahira’s eternal Trinity of three ‘betweennesses’ constitutes the eternal ground of 
Brunner’s Gott-zum-Menschen-hin: Each divine person is a divine movement from 
one person toward another person, between two persons. Each divine person’s 
‘betweenness’ is a movement towards the other within the eternal Gott-zum-anderen-
hin (God-towards-an-other). Just as in Miyahira ‘betweenness’ defines each person 
in their relation between two other persons so the Father towards the Son and the 
Son towards the Father constitutes the Spirit’s betweenness; the Spirit moves 
between the Father and the Son. The Father towards the Spirit and vice versa 
constitutes the Son’s betweenness; the Son moves between the Spirit and the Father. 
The Spirit towards the Son and vice versa constitutes the Father’s betweenness; the 
Father moves between the Son and the Spirit. God eternally transcends Godself in 
God’s self-giving to seek a self-defining encounter with the other. Thus, ‘towardness’ 
adds a dynamic aspect to Miyahira’s divine ‘betweenness’ and Miyahira’s Trinity of 
‘betweenness’ anchors Brunner’s humanity oriented divine ‘towardness’ in the very 
being of God. 
Brunner’s self-giving of God in Christ’s death carves out a non-place between 
God and humanity, a place where an encounter with God becomes possible. 
Miyahira’s ‘betweenness’ between God and humanity expressed in the cross is thus 
not a threat to humanity which God graciously eliminates as Miyahira has argued but 
Christ’s constructive marginality in which humanity is invited to participate. The 
‘betweenness’ and contradiction between God and humanity which leads to the cross 
constitutes the very means by which the identity bestowing encounter with God is 
made possible: a non-place where humanity is stripped of idolatrous identities and 
only God’s grace upholds humanity. 
By participating in Christ’s death, believers identify with the liminal God of 
‘betweenness’ who acts towards others. Believers find themselves at home in non-
place, in Christ’s death, and are given an identity that transcends all other claims to 
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identity. This liberates believers to become in-between people, liminal people. 
Miyahira’s and Brunner’s insights together constitute a solid foundation upon 
which to construct a TCK theology. Miyahira lends a TCK theology a structure of 
three key theological areas which can be contextualized using liminality as the 
central concept. Utilizing the language of liminality serves to construct a theology 
that TCKs understand. Brunner, however, adds two important aspects to this 
structure. First, Brunner’s divine ‘towardness’ gives divine ‘betweenness’ and 
liminality a sense of purposeful dynamic movement. This divine movement serves to 
add an even more important second aspect. Through Brunner’s insight a TCK 
theology is able to take Miyahira’s God-Christ-believer structure and place it in the 
context of TCKs’ search for identity. A TCK theology tells the story of how God 
through Christ bestows a truly personal identity on believers. God is presented as the 
source of a transcending identity, a spiritual locus of integrity. A TCK theology 
presents a theological answer to TCKs’ question ‘Who am I?’ 
It now remains to flesh out this theological vision of an identity bestowing God 
towards humanity who through Christ, the God-Man betwixt and between, invites 
believers to be recreated in the image of a liminal God. This task will take up the 





Thomas Torrance: A Theology of Mediation 
 
Introduction 
Chapter twelve argued for ‘betweenness’ and liminality as a viable theological 
concept in a contextualized theology and introduced a ‘God-Christ-Believer’ 
structure for a TCK theology. Chapter thirteen recast this structure as a theological 
answer to TCKs’ question of identity and added a dimension of dynamic movement 
to ‘betweenness’ and liminality through divine ‘towardness.’ 
Both Nozomu Miyahira and Emil Brunner’s insights are of great benefit. 
However, it is time to flesh out this basic theological approach. What is needed is a 
theological ally with a proven track record to show more clearly how the concept of 
divine liminality plays out in the economy of salvation. This role falls to the 
theologian Thomas F. Torrance whose mature theology strongly features ‘mediation’. 
Mediation, central to both Christianity616 as well as TCKs617, constitutes the key to 
making the theology of Torrance applicable to TCKs. 
This chapter focuses on ‘mediation’ as a central theme in Thomas Torrance’s 
theology in order to adapt his robust Trinitarian theology and soteriology for a TCK 
theology. First, this chapter shows how Torrance’s unique upbringing as a missionary 
kid makes him a fitting dialogue partner and, second, makes the case for ‘mediation’ 
as a central concept underlying Torrance’s life and theology. By using Torrance’s 
theology of mediation to construct a TCK theology upon the foundation established 
in the previous two chapters, TCKs will be better able to recognize Christianity as a 
point of orientation. 
This chapter consists of four sections: First, it establishes why Torrance is of 
interest. Second, it explores Torrance’s unique biographical background as a quasi-
TCK. Third, it analyses the role that mediation plays in his theology. Finally, it lays 
out how Torrance’s theology takes a TCK theology beyond its foundation outlined in 
chapters twelve and thirteen. 
 
 
                                                          
616 See for example: Torrance, The Mediation of Christ. 
617 Bochner, The Mediating Person: Bridges between Cultures. 
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Why Thomas Torrance? 
Four reasons make Torrance a valuable resource. First, Torrance provides us with a 
robust Trinitarian framework needed to expand our earlier insights.618 Elmer Colyer 
describes Torrance as “one of the premier theologians in the second half of the 
twentieth century” and “a true theological heavy-weight.”619 Torrance’s Trinitarian 
theology ought to suffice as a rich enough resource to draw on. 
Second, Torrance’s work is appropriate for this project precisely because he is 
a missionary kid himself.620 Although Torrance would most likely not have self-
identified as a TCK as such a label did not exist when he grew up in the way it does 
today, he can still be considered an appropriate dialog partner. 
Third, themes of mediation, common to TCKs’ experience, can be discerned 
throughout his theology621 as well as his life as an ordained minister of the Church of 
Scotland engaging in ecumenical dialogue. 
Finally, Torrance understood his identity primarily in theological terms. His 
unique international upbringing clearly raised significant questions of cultural and 
personal identity which he answered theologically.622 For Torrance, it is God through 
Christ, the ‘personalising person’, who ultimately grants us, ‘personalised persons’, 
true personhood.623 It is therefore fitting to employ Torrance as a platform from 
which to proceed with a TCK theology. 
                                                          
618 Torrance’s three major works on the Trinity are: Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One 
Being Three Persons; Trinitarian Perspectives : Toward Doctrinal Agreement (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1994); The Trinitarian Faith : The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988). For a topically arranged guide to Torrance’s works see: Elmer M. 
Colyer, "An Introductory Reader's Guide to the Published Works of T. F. Torrance," Participatio 
Journal of the Thomas F. Torrance Theological Fellowship Supplemental Vol. 1 (2011). 
619 How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology (Downers 
Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 11. 
620 For works on the life of Torrance see: Alister E. McGrath, T.F. Torrance : An Intellectual 
Biography (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999); Jock Stein, "The Legacy of the Gospel," in A Passion for 
Christ : The Vision That Ignites Ministry, ed. Gerrit Dawson and Jock Stein (Edinburgh: Handsel 
Press, 1999); David W. Torrance, "Thomas Forsyth Torrance: Minister of the Gospel, Pastor, and 
Evangelical Theologian," in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology : Theologians in Dialogue with T.F. 
Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Elmer M. Colyer, 
"Torrance's Life & Achievement," in How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & 
Scientific Theology (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2001); Paul D. Molnar, "Introducing T. 
F. Torrance," in Thomas F. Torrance : Theologian of the Trinity (Farnham, England: Ashgate Pub. 
Ltd., 2009). 
621 See, for example: “Mutual Mediation” in Elmer M. Colyer, "Thomas F. Torrance on the Holy 
Spirit," Word & World 23, no. 2 (2003). Also: “Double Mediation” in Gary W. Deddo, "The Holy 
Spirit in the Theology of T. F. Torrance," in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in 
Dialogue with T.F. Torrance, ed. Elmer M. Colyer (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). 
622 Alister McGrath, personal communication (April 9, 2013). 
623 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 160-61. 
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The Making of a Mediator: Torrance as Quasi-TCK 
Before exploring the theme of mediation in the theology of Torrance, it is worth to 
mentioning some of his biographical details. Torrance exhibits some common TCK-
traits which go hand in hand with his mediation-featuring theology. This section is a 
re-appreciation of Torrance from a TCK-perspective and establishes Torrance as a 
quasi-TCK.624 
Torrance’s early years follow the pattern of cross-cultural moving and high 
mobility which have come to define today’s TCKs.625 He was born in August 1913 
in Chengdu, West China, to a Scottish father and an Anglican mother, who worked 
there as missionaries. Growing up as the second of six children, Torrance spent the 
first 14 years of his childhood in China before the mother and kids eventually 
repatriated to Scotland for good in Spring 1927.626 In Chengdu, Torrance attended a 
missionary kid school established by Canadian missionaries. This school, simply 
referred to as the ‘Canadian School’, was located on the campus of the West China 
Union University and was part of a bigger third culture community which included 
four major missionary groups: American Baptists, English Quakers, Canadian 
Methodists and Methodist Episcopalians. Alister McGrath notes that “[t]here was a 
degree of tension within the faculty of this university between liberal and 
conservative approaches to Christianity, reflecting similar tensions within western 
Protestantism as a whole.”627 Different cultural and linguistic aspects can be 
identified in Torrance’s life: Scottish, English, Canadian, U.S.American, and 
Chinese. Growing up within this third culture that emerged out of the complex 
interactions between these different cultural and religious groups working together, 
negotiating identities and positions must have been a daily occurrence in Torrance’s 
early life. 
It is usual for missionary families to return to their sending countries for a 
furlough from time to time in order to report to their churches and secure financial 
                                                          
624 Having been born before 1947, Torrance would fall into the category of “older ATCKs” (Adult 
Third Culture Kid) as opposed to “younger ATCKs. For how Torrance’s generation differs from post 
WWII TCKs, see: David C. Pollock and Ruth E. Van Reken, "Adult Third Culture Kids Survey 
Results," in Third Culture Kids : Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition (London: Nicholas 
Brealey Publishing, 2009). 
625 McGrath, T.F. Torrance : An Intellectual Biography, 3-85; Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture 
Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 39 - 84. 
626 Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance : Theologian of the Trinity (Farnham, England: Ashgate 
Pub., 2009), 3. 
627 McGrath, T.F. Torrance : An Intellectual Biography, 13-14. 
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support. The Torrance family’s first repatriation to Scotland occurred in 1920. This 
was the first time for Torrance to see for himself Scotland, his father’s country, and 
England, his mother’s country. In 1921, after approximately a year at the family’s 
home in Lanarkshire, the Torrances returned to Chengdu to resume their missionary 
work.628 Torrance’s second time to set foot on Scottish land came in 1927 when the 
family went on their second and final furlough. Increasing hostility towards 
missionaries and Christianity left several western missionaries injured or dead, 
mission buildings looted and damaged and shocked the expatriate community. All 
women and children were ordered to evacuate Chengdu for the coast. The Torrance 
family, minus the father, escaped to Shanghai where, after several weeks, Torrance 
senior joined them for their voyage to England to return to Scotland.629 
Several TCK themes emerge from these cycles of repatriation and expatriation. 
While the fact that Torrance would have to return to his father’s country at some 
point was a given, repatriation nevertheless must have been a strange experience to 
return so suddenly and among extreme uncertainty.630 First, in 1920 Torrance was 
temporarily transplanted into a whole new Scottish world essentially putting his life 
and identity on a hold until he was able to return to ‘normal’ life back ‘home’ in 
Chengdu. Then, in 1927 Torrance dramatically lost his familiar third culture world in 
Chengdu for good. Furthermore, this was followed by years of separation from his 
father who returned to China by himself in 1928 and stayed until his retirement in 
1934. According to Elmer Colyer, Torrance recalls this second repatriation as an 
extremely negative one, hinting at the possibility that Torrance transacted his 
repatriation as encapsulated.631 Colyer attributes this to the difficult economic 
situation in Scotland and also remarks how the fact that the Canadian school in 
Chengdu was not up to par with Scottish education forced Torrance to “[work] 
extremely hard to catch up on his studies.”632 Such adjustment difficulties during 
repatriation due to various reasons including needing to switch schooling systems are 
                                                          
628 Ibid., 16. 
629 Ibid., 18. 
630 Compare for example: Carolyn D. Smith, ed. Strangers at Home : Essays on the Effects of Living 
Overseas and Coming "Home" to a Strange Land (Bayside, New York: Aletheia Publications, 1996). 
631 Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology, 37. 
For encapsulating marginality see: Bennett, "Cultural Marginality: Identity Issues in Intercultural 
Training." 
632 Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology, 37. 
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common themes among TCKs.633 The long separation from his father and the 
adjustment to an unfamiliar Scottish environment must have made the experience 
difficult for the young Torrance who was still in his developmental years. It is thus 
understandable that from his early years Torrance wanted to become a missionary 
and continue his father’s missionary work in West China, which was more of a home 
to him than his father’s Scotland or mother’s England.634 Torrance’s instinct was to 
return to the familiar life he knew how to live. 
In 1931 Torrance started studying at University of Edinburgh where he 
eventually began the formal study of theology at New College in 1934. However, as 
can be expected from growing up a TCK, Torrance’s patterns of mobility continued 
even then.635 Having been awarded the Blackie Fellowship in 1936 due to his 
language skills, Torrance travelled for half a year through the Middle East visiting 
Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, as well as Turkey, Greece, and Italy.636 
Interestingly, he was asked to ‘shepherd’ a group of students who were visiting the 
Near East as part of their studies presumably due to Torrance’s remarkable 
international survival skills, a characteristic shared among many TCKs.637 He 
returned to Scotland in summer 1936 and graduated in 1937. Furthermore, after 
graduating from Edinburgh Torrance was awarded the Aitken Fellowship enabling 
him to continue postgraduate research at a place of his choice. This opened the door 
for Torrance to visit Germany, Berlin and Marburg, in order to study German before 
commencing his studies under the Swiss theologian Karl Barth in Basel, 
Switzerland, where he stayed for one year from 1937 to 1938.638 His dissertation yet 
to be completed, Torrance then was persuaded to move to upstate New York, U.S.A., 
where he taught at Auburn Theological Seminary from 1938 to 1939, instead of 
returning for a second year to Basel. 
Although having been offered an attractive job at Princeton University while in 
                                                          
633 For how educational differences can impact TCKs, see: Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture 
Kids: Growing up among Worlds. Revised Edition, 195 - 215. 
634 Torrance, "Thomas Forsyth Torrance: Minister of the Gospel, Pastor, and Evangelical 
Theologian," 5. 
635 See e.g. ‘Migratory Instinct’: Cottrell and Useem, "ATCKs Maintain Global Dimensions 
Throughout Their Lives."; Pollock and Van Reken, Third Culture Kids: Growing up among Worlds. 
Revised Edition, 126-29. 
636 Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology, 38; 
McGrath, T.F. Torrance : An Intellectual Biography, 39-42. 
637 T.F. Torrance : An Intellectual Biography, 39. 
638 Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance : Theologian of the Trinity, 6. 
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the States, the deteriorating political situation in Europe made him decline the 
opportunity. McGrath writes about a conversation Torrance had with Emil Brunner 
in June 1939 about whether to return to Europe or not which ended with the two of 
them agreeing that it would be best to return before German submarines would make 
the voyage too risky.639 While it was a difficult decision to leave such an attractive 
offer behind and return to an uncertain situation in Europe, McGrath interestingly 
comments that nevertheless “[Torrance] believed it to have been right and inevitable. 
His place was in Scotland, to which he would return. War was looming; but Scotland 
was where he belonged.”640 Curiously, Torrance’s brother, David W. Torrance, also 
remarks that Torrance’s decision to return “proved to be far reaching. His future, 
after the war, was to be in his own country of Scotland.”641 Thus, in the crisis of the 
rumours of another war, a coming to terms of Torrance with his Scottish heritage can 
be witnessed. While his missionary upbringing in China shaped his life 
tremendously, the impact that Scotland had on Torrance and the contribution 
Torrance would make to Scotland cannot be ignored.642 Until then, Torrance’s 
eagerness to chase opportunities abroad seems to suggest that he wanted to live the 
life of a global nomad, avoiding Scotland. His decision to commit to remaining in 
Scotland however does not necessarily mean he stopped being a quasi-TCK. Instead, 
it shows how Torrance transacted his marginality more and more constructively by 
choosing a place where he would make a lasting contribution and finding a field 
where he could excel. Torrance, after a period of extremely high mobility from his 
early to late 20s, came to terms with his transcultural identity. Thus he repatriated 
once again to the U.K. and enrolled at University of Oxford from 1939 to 1940 to 
work on his dissertation. 
A final period of high mobility and transculturality followed. In 1940, Torrance 
was ordained a minister of the Church of Scotland and in 1943 took a position as 
chief of Church of Scotland’s Huts and Canteens. The job entailed providing pastoral 
and practical support to Scottish soldiers overseas and Torrance accepted in hope it 
                                                          
639 McGrath, T.F. Torrance : An Intellectual Biography, 58. 
640 Ibid.(Emphasis mine) 
641 Torrance, "Thomas Forsyth Torrance: Minister of the Gospel, Pastor, and Evangelical 
Theologian," 11.(Emphasis mine) 
642 David Fergusson, "Torrance as a Scottish Theologian," Participatio Journal of the Thomas F. 
Torrance Theological Fellowship Vol. 2 (2010). Fergusson argues that while Torrance was deeply 
suspicious of Scottish nationalism and would have strongly disapproved of a partisan national 
identity, we nevertheless cannot overlook the strong connections Torrance maintained with Scotland. 
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would take him back to Palestine. Based in Cairo, he served soldiers in Tobruk and 
Tripoli, North Africa, in preparation for the invasion of Italy and later also provided 
food and spiritual guidance to soldiers at the front in Italy, at times even at the risk of 
his own life.643 After the war ended, Torrance repatriated to Scotland. 
This brief survey of Torrance’s patterns of high mobility and culture-crossing, 
the central two marks of a TCK, concludes here. If anything, his life shows that the 
context of extreme mobility and cross cultural experience in which he developed his 
sense of self cannot be neglected when looking at his life’s work and theology. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Torrance was aware of the implications of growing 
up as a TCK between worlds. When invited to succeed Barth in Basel in 1961, 
Torrance sadly declined the offer. McGrath comments that Torrance hesitated 
because he would have had to lecture extensively in German and his kids would have 
had to enrol in a German speaking school.644 According to Colyer, this decision to 
turn down the offer was partly influenced by Torrance not wanting to “subject his 
children (two sons and a daughter) to the disruptive change in culture and language 
in a move from Edinburgh to Basel.”645 In other words, Torrance chose not to raise 
his own children as TCKs. This shows that while Torrance definitely succeeded in 
transacting his own international experience constructively, he did understand the 
potentially encapsulating marginalization his children might have faced, indicating 
that the difficult initial repatriation to Scotland when he was a teenager, the painful 
adjustment to a new educational system, and years of separation from his father must 
have left a lasting and defining mark on Torrance. The bold step to reject the offer of 
a lifetime shows his awareness of the impact of cultural marginality and the mixed 
feelings about the urge to move abroad involving his non-TCK family. It also reflects 
his satisfaction of having been able to find his place at the University of Edinburgh 
after the more turbulent first half of his life. 
As we can see, Torrance’s highly internationally mobile life, starting with his 
birth in China and first transcontinental move when he was 7 or 8 years old and 
continuing until his early thirties, led Torrance to travel, live, study, and work on four 
continents (Asia, Europe, North America, Africa) and was marked by high mobility 
and intercultural contact especially in his twenties. Torrance thus qualifies as a full-
                                                          
643 Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance : Theologian of the Trinity, 11-12. 
644 McGrath, T.F. Torrance : An Intellectual Biography, 102 -03. 
645 Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology, 44. 
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fledged TCK in terms of mobility and cross-culture experience. Furthermore, Paul 
Molnar writes that “Torrance retained some Arabic throughout his life” and 
“remained fluent in Chinese, Greek, Latin, German, and French”646 and Colyer also 
remarks that “Torrance’s mastery of other languages is impressive. He has published 
scholarly articles in Greek, Latin, French and German.”647 The exhibition of an 
eagerness to continue his international involvement even after repatriation648 and 
advanced language skills649 both match the TCK profile. For Torrance, the 
negotiation and mediation between places, languages, cultures, and beliefs flow 
naturally from his TCK heritage. Thus, as this short biography of the first half of 
Torrance’s life indicates and TCK studies predict, it is only natural that Torrance 
through his experience of liminality would identify with a mediator role in his life. 
Furthermore, as a missionary kid he thoroughly understood the need to mediate (i.e. 
contextualize) the Christian message to its audience meaningfully through language 
and culture. The idea of mediation in Torrance’s mind is thus connected with the idea 
of revelation, of making the obscure familiar and of reconciliation, of restoring peace 
between God and humanity in its particular context. 
 
The Ecumenical Torrance: Mediation at Work 
His inclination to mediate can be seen in his ecumenical engagement in the second 
half of his life. After the foundation of the World Council of Churches in 1948, 
Torrance attended the Faith and Order Conference in 1952 and also served on the 
Faith and Order Commission from 1952 to 1962.650 Furthermore, he represented the 
Church of Scotland in their dialog with the Church of England from 1949 to 1951.651 
Torrance also engaged Roman Catholicism, as can be seen in his involvement 
in the Reformed-Roman Catholic Study Commission on the Eucharist in 1974 in the 
Netherlands and in the colloquy in 1975 in Switzerland on Karl Rahner’s work on 
the Trinity. His identification as mediator shows in the optimism Paul Molnar 
                                                          
646 Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance : Theologian of the Trinity, 6. 
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observes652 as Torrance truly believed Rahner’s work offered “the possibility of 
some real ecumenical convergence between East and West, Catholic and Evangelical 
Christians.”653 
Finally, as mediator Torrance is probably best known for his role as a 
negotiator between the Word Alliance of Reformed Churches and the Greek 
Orthodox Churches on the doctrine of the Trinity. Torrance initiated the dialogue in 
1977, which culminated in the “historic agreement” in 1991.654 
Thus, looking at Torrance from the perspective of the TCK profile reveals 
more than just a theologian who happened to grow up as a missionary kid. While the 
theological heritage of his upbringing as missionary kid is obvious and often 
remarked on, perhaps it is only after ‘TCK’ became an established category through 
which to view people and understand their behaviour that the fact that mediation 
features so dominantly in his life, his work as a cleric, and in his theology can fully 
be appreciated. This connection between Torrance and TCKs seems to have eluded 
previous biographers and students of his theology but the recent scholarship on 
TCKs should add an additional layer of depth to the understanding of this 
remarkable individual. This is not to claim that a TCK-perspective exclusively 
reveals Torrance’s identity but to suggest that TCK research is helpful in 
understanding Torrance, especially in terms of the theme of mediation in his life and 
work. Not only is viewing Torrance as a TCK warranted, the use of his theology to 
construct a TCK theology is suitable. Having established Torrance as a quasi-TCK 
deeply familiar with mediation in his upbringing and life, attention is now turned to 
mediation as featured in his theology. 
 
Mapping ‘Mediation’ in Torrance’s Mature Theology 
It is important to note that this section and the subsequent chapters are not a 
comprehensive and extensive treatment of Torrance’s theology but rather an 
appreciation of his Trinitarian ideas with the specific agenda of highlighting the 
theme of mediation within God and in the economy of salvation to construct a TCK 
theology. The theme of mediation features prominently in Torrance’s writing, 
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especially in his final major work on the Trinity.655 ‘Mediate’ and other forms related 
to the verb occur a total of 77 times throughout The Christian Doctrine of God.656 
Torrance never defines the word but rather takes its meaning for granted. 
Furthermore, he applies mediation in a variety of differing contexts, from mediation 
among the divine persons in the economy, to mediation in the apostolic tradition or 
believers’ fundamental evangelical experience. The frequent occurrences of 
mediation in Torrance’s later writings point to its high saliency in his mature 
thought. The diverse contexts in which he uses ‘mediation’ show what a rich concept 
mediation must have been in his mind for him to bring these various aspects of 
mediation under one umbrella term. 
‘Mediation’, stemming from the Latin mediatus meaning ‘placed in the 
middle,’ most commonly refers to the act of intervening between conflicting parties 
in order to achieve reconciliation. Furthermore, mediation is also used to refer to the 
act of transferring something through a medium. Mediation thus describes a third 
thing or agent that stands between two others in order to bring about a resolution 
and/or make access possible between the two. 
Torrance’s use of mediation can be divided into two areas. First, in the context 
of creation and culture, he uses mediation to describe how creation/creatures are the 
medium that make God’s revelation accessible and meaningful. Second, in the 
context of God, he ascribes mediation to Godself, including Christ’s assumed 
humanity. Each area of mediation is treated in turn. 
 
Mediation in Culture, Creation, and Canons 
Within the context of creation and culture, mediation is employed as follows. First, 
the apostolic tradition mediated the gospel to the church in the Mediterranean 
world.657 Mediation here refers to the contextualisation of the gospel in Hellenism. 
Second, creation is described as the concrete medium God designed for God’s self-
revelation and self-communication.658 Creation is thus the stage through which God 
reveals Godself. Third, the shared evangelical experience of believers mediates 
                                                          
655 The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons. 
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God’s revelation to believers.659 Fourth, the New Testament (including life of Christ, 
gospels, epistles) mediates God’s triune revelation to believers.660 The gospels and 
epistles are the medium through which God reveals God’s self-communication to the 
readers. Fifth, the Old Testament mediates God’s revelation.661 Torrance here 
emphasises the continuity of God’s revelation through God’s Word and Spirit in the 
New Testament with God’s revelation to the people of Israel in the Old Testament.662 
Sixth, Holy Scripture in general mediates God’s revelation to believers.663 Seventh, 
Israel as well as God’s covenanted relations with Israel are the medium through 
which God reveals Godself and through which God establishes the proper context of 
God’s self-revelation in Word and Spirit.664 Torrance stresses the importance of the 
concrete history of Israel through which believers can understand God’s self-
revelation. Eighth, the history of salvation, meaning our concrete experience of God, 
mediates God’s self-revelation.665 
Writings, history, experience, tradition, people, and covenants are examples of 
the media through which God’s self-revelation is actualised in a form that can be 
appreciated by people within their contexts. This mediation is a type of 
contextualisation of revelation that gives meaning within culture to God’s revelation 
and it is only natural to find these themes in Torrance who, due to his upbringing as a 
missionary kid in China, always had a “missionary sensibility.”666 In Torrance’s 
mind, the question of how missionaries can make Christ known to others in their 
respective situation is connected with the question of how God made Godself known 
to the world. God’s revelation always comes and is made meaningful through a 
medium that gives it a tangible expression. Nature, history, experience, culture, 
language (written and spoken), etc. are ‘a third’ positioned in the middle, between 
God and humanity, through which the reconciling revelation of God is made 
possible. Mediation in creation, in the Old Testament, and in Israel and her 
covenantal relationship established by God play an important role in Torrance’s 
thought as this mediation points to its proper fulfilment in ‘the mediation of 
                                                          
659 Ibid., 91. 
660 Ibid., 18, 22, 35, 38, 49, 60, 168. 
661 Ibid., 39, 68, 67, 69. 
662 The Mediation of Christ, 7-9. 
663 The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 12, 44, 50. 
664 Ibid., 14, 67, 68, 70. 
665 Ibid., 87. 
666 Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology, 51. 
180 
 
revelation’ and ‘the mediation of reconciliation’ in the incarnate Christ at the fullness 
of time.667 These mediations are, in a sense, reflections of the mediation between 
God and humanity in the historical missions of the Son and Spirit to be discussed 
next. 
 
God’s Mediating Missions 
It is in this rich context of mediation that Torrance’s God emerges as a self-
mediating God. Applied to God, Torrance uses mediation in the following ways. First 
and foremost, Torrance describes Christ as mediator in a threefold way: (A) mediator 
between God and humanity, (B) the historic medium of God’s self-revelation, and 
(C) the mediator of the Spirit to us. Second, Torrance applies mediation to the work 
of the Spirit. Third, mediation describes God’s self-mediation. 
(A) Christ as sole mediator between God and humanity668 is a well-established 
theological concept and Torrance uses mediator as the primary category through 
which to understand the person and work of Christ.669 The more unique feature of 
Christ’s mediatorial activity in Torrance’s theology is the two-fold movement from 
God to humanity as well as from humanity to God.670 Both authentic divine 
revelation and proper human reception coincide in the one person of Christ. 
Mediation through Christ is thus a two-way street between God and humanity in 
which Christ is active on both ends. 
(B) Through Christ’s incarnation, God’s revelation embeds itself within 
creation with Christ living out divine revelation in humanly recognizable form. As 
such, Christ is the absolute centre of revelation: the “objective personal self-
revelation of God,” “the exclusive language of God,” the “content” of revelation.671 
Furthermore, Christ is the exclusive “historic medium”672 who mediates God the 
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Father,673 God’s Word in human speech,674 God’s revelation,675 the triune God,676 
God’s redeeming love,677 and God’s nature and divine Life.678 Christ’s mediation 
anchors God’s revelation in time and place. 
(C) Christ mediates the Spirit to us.679 In the incarnation, Christ anoints the 
assumed human nature with his Spirit thereby mediating the Spirit from himself 
through his incarnate self to humanity.680 This is also a two-fold movement by Christ 
who both gives the Spirit as his own Spirit and faithfully receives the Spirit on behalf 
of humanity in his mediatorial role between God and humanity.681 
This mediation in Christ encompasses not only revelation but also divine 
reconciliation in that the incarnate Christ both extends God’s reconciliation to 
humanity and at the same time properly accepts God’s self-revelation and displays 
perfect obedience to God as one on the receiving end of revelation and 
reconciliation. The ‘mediation of revelation’ and the ‘mediation of reconciliation’ are 
inseparable.682 The reconciliation unveils the revelation of God and the revelatory 
self-giving of God constitutes the reconciliation with humanity.683 
Second, Torrance applies mediation to the Spirit: The Spirit mediates the Son 
(God’s revelation, knowledge of God) to humanity.684 While the Spirit does not add 
any further content to the revelation of the Son, the Spirit is the mediator who 
actualises the revelation of God through the Son within us.685 It is in the Spirit that 
believers recognise the self-revelation that Christ incarnate is. The Spirit is thus not a 
substitute mediator for an absent Christ, but the mediatorial activity of the Spirit 
unites believers to Christ the mediator.686 It is not the work of the Spirit to draw 
attention to himself but to illuminate the Son and the Father for believers. The 
Spirit’s mediatorial activity remains hidden.687 Importantly, similarly to Christ’s two-
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fold movement, there is also a “two-fold movement of the Holy Spirit from above 
and from below, along with the two-fold movement of the incarnate Son in receiving 
the Holy Spirit and giving him to us.”688 The Holy Spirit is the “creative Agent in 
mediating knowledge of God to us in himself and the creative Agent in our reception 
and understanding of that revelation.”689 The Spirit both reveals the Son to us and 
receives the Son within us, from above and from below.690 In the case of both the 
Son and the Spirit, there is a dynamic two-way mediation between God and 
humanity through the Spirit/Son. Furthermore, there is a dynamic two way mediation 
by the Son and the Spirit of each other. 
Combining the mediation of the Son and the mediation of the Spirit, Torrance 
speaks of both the Son and the Spirit mediating the revelation of God the Father691 as 
well as the Son and Spirit mediating the eternal Trinity to us.692 Torrance’s unique 
mediation of the Spirit by the Son and of the Son by the Spirit who together mediate 
the Trinity has come to be known as “mutual mediation”693 or “double mediation.”694 
In the economy, each of the two divine persons mutually give and receive each other 
in a two-fold movement to the effect that the believer can, in the Holy Spirit and 
through the incarnate Son, participate in the communion of the Trinity. Interestingly, 
Torrance occasionally also describes the Son and the Spirit as constituting a single 
two-fold movement of self-mediation: the Son from above or without and the Spirit 
from below or within.695 According to Paul Molnar, the Spirit and the Son’s 
mediation are not to be separated since both persons are consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος ) 
with the Father.696 The Holy Spirit is always the Spirit of the Father and the Son and 
must not be confused with the spirit of the church or the spirit of humanity.697 Thus, 
Christ’s mediatorial work takes place in the power of the Spirit and the Spirit’s 
mediatorial movement takes place through the Son’s incarnation: There is only one 
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mediating operation by the triune God taking place from the Father, through/in the 
Son, in/through the Spirit. 
Third, Torrance can thus naturally apply mediation to Godself. Not only is God 
the subject who mediates revelation and knowledge of God to humanity698 but God 
is the one who mediates Godself in “self-mediation (…) as the Father, the Son and 
the Holy Spirit.”699 In other words, together with the two-fold movement of 
mediation by the Son and the Spirit, God appears in three roles in the mediation: As 
the one who is mediated (Father), the one through whom God is mediated 
(Son/Spirit), and the one to whom God is mediated (Son/Spirit). The Son and Spirit 
appear in both roles due to the mutual mediation. 
As shown, Torrance sees creation itself as the medium of God’s revelation to 
humanity but more importantly sees God’s self-mediation in continuity with this 
activity of mediation. While ‘medium’ can invoke images of mediacy as opposed to 
immediacy, far from seeing the Son and the Spirit as Arian intermediaries, Torrance 
sees Christ as Godself united to creation and the Spirit as Godself imparted to the 
believer.700 In this mediation by Spirit and Son, God is immediately and really 
present. Torrance’s Trinitarian theology is a “realist theology”701 in which something 
of God in God’s very being can truly be known through the mediating movement of 
Son and Spirit in the economy of salvation. The content and the method are identical 
or, in other words, what God does in God’s self-mediation is in synch with who God 
is in Godself. In the economy, God revealed Godself to be the triune self-mediator. 
It is worth reiterating that for Torrance the mediation of God usually involves a 
two-fold movement of representing both sides that are brought together in mediation. 
While the initiative of mediating between God and humanity lies solely with God in 
the incarnation of the Son and the pouring out of the Spirit, God both gives Godself 
through Godself to humanity as much as God receives Godself in Godself on 
humanity’s behalf and for the benefit of humanity. God’s self-mediation is founded 
on the sovereign freedom of God to reveal Godself and not on some quality found 
within humanity itself. In this self-mediation God provides God’s own ground of 
revelation as the possibility of theology. Molnar comments: 
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[W]e know God only because of the grace that God has shown us by becoming 
incarnate in Jesus Christ and uniting us to Christ in faith through the Holy Spirit so 
that we may actually think from a center in God provided by God himself in the 
incarnation and the pouring out of the Holy Spirit.702 
In God’s self-mediation, God establishes within creation a divinely appointed point 
of contact as opposed to a point of contact within humans from which to think 
theologically about God without mythological projection. 
Mediation in Torrance’s mind is thus a rich concept ranging in meaning from 
contextualization to divine revelation and also personal Trinitarian relations. It arises 
naturally from Torrance’s background as quasi-TCK, and finds expression in his 
theology. Theologically, it adds further depth and breadth to ‘betweenness’ and 
‘towardness’ explored earlier. 
 
Torrance’s Mediation, Miyahira’s ‘Betweenness’, and Brunner’s ‘Towardness’ 
Torrance’s mediation helps build on Miyahira’s and Brunner’s insights. First of all, 
all three are engaged in theological contextualisation. Miyahira contextualises 
theology through the reinterpretation of the triune formula using ‘betweenness’ as his 
guide. He seeks to make sense of the traditional theological formula by finding 
points of contact in his particular Japanese context. Brunner recasts theology as the 
story of God-towards-humanity bestowing a new identity on humanity in the context 
of National Socialism’s construction of German identity. Torrance also engages in a 
contextualisation of sorts in that he describes the divine missions in terms of 
‘mediations’ and also sees mediation at work in the context of scripture, history, 
experience, the apostles’ work. He formulates theology in terms that are native to his 
context as quasi-TCK. He is making sense of his own experience growing up 
witnessing his parents mediate the gospel to the people of China and during his adult 
life teaching and preaching theology as well as engaging in constructive talks with 
other Christian traditions. In ‘mediation’, Torrance has found a unifying metaphor 
which lets him see his life and work in the light of God’s mediation. Mediation 
constitutes the overarching theme which connects his upbringing as missionary kid, 
the general presence of God among humanity, and the specific salvific actions of the 
triune God. He seeks to uncover a principle or logic which permeates his experience 
and theology. 
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Two features unique to Torrance’s theology of mediation stand out in contrast 
to Miyahira and Brunner. First, while the latter mostly focus on the Son in his work 
of bringing about concord between God and sinful humanity and restoring 
humanity’s identity, Torrance’s theology paints a much more detailed picture of the 
work of both the Son and the Spirit, who together bring about the mediation of 
revelation and reconciliation between God and humanity and the renewal of the 
believer. Miyahira does describe the Spirit as being between the Father and the Son 
but leaves the question of the ‘betweenness’ of the Spirit in the economy of salvation 
unanswered. In contrast, through his ‘mutual mediation’, Torrance displays a much 
better grasp of how the mediatorial work of the Spirit fits together with the 
mediatorial work of the Son. In a sense, Torrance’s two-way mediation of the Son 
and the Spirit much better describes ‘betweenness’ and ‘towardness’ in the economy 
than Miyahira or Brunner does. The Son mediates between his two natures: on the 
one hand, he gives the Holy Spirit and, on the other hand, he receives the Holy 
Spirit, making possible the pouring out of the Spirit to all other people. The Spirit 
thus mediated through the reconciling work of the Son also mediates between Christ 
and the believer: on the one hand, he reveals Christ from God’s side and, on the 
other hand, he accepts Christ within the believer enabling each individual to identify 
with Christ and become a child of God. 
Furthermore, Torrance’s two-way mediation by the Son and Spirit give 
Brunner’s ‘towardness’ an even more dynamic spin. God not only moves toward 
humanity but in God humanity is moved toward God. Through the two-way mutual 
mediation of Son and Spirit believers are known by God and know God (knowing, 
revelation), believers are accepted by God and accept God (trusting, reconciliation), 
and, believers are honoured by God as God’s children and honour God as their 
heavenly Father (honouring). All three aspects of Miyahira’s concord thus fit nicely 
into the Torrance’s mediation. 
Finally, Torrance adds an important element to Miyahira and Brunner: The 
connection between who God is and what God does. Miyahira applies ‘betweenness’ 
primarily to God’s being in Godself: God is eternally ‘three betweennesses, one 
concord’. The work of the triune God of ‘betweenness’ in redemption is of secondary 
concern to him. This does not reflect a weakness in Miyahira’s work per se but 
merely reflects the agenda of this particular work of his. Brunner does not touch on 
the question of who God is in Godself in terms of ‘towardness’ but focuses 
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exclusively on ‘towardness’ in God’s redemptive actions. Torrance applies mediation 
to the missions of the Son and the Spirit. Curiously he refrains from doing so when it 
comes to the Trinitarian God in Godself. However, Torrance understands who God is 
eternally in terms of what God does in the revelatory and reconciliatory mediations 
of the Son and Spirit. By speaking of a self-mediation of God and a divinely 
appointed point of contact in the mutual mediation of the Son and Spirit, Torrance 
opens the way to making the connection between what God does with who God is. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed Torrance’s use of ‘mediation’ in The Christian Doctrine of 
God and has shown how central the concept of mediation is to Torrance and how 
generous Torrance is in its use. While being more or less implicit, mediation is far 
from arbitrary in Torrance’s theology given his background as a quasi-TCK. Though 
Torrance might never have realised how unique this one aspect of his theology is,703 
in hindsight mediation and its two-fold representative movement follow naturally 
from how he grew up in a mediating third culture environment and how he lived his 
life mediating between the different Church traditions. Mediation serves as a rich 
theological concept to add to Miyahira’s ‘betweenness’ and Brunner’s ‘towardness’ 
in order to construct a doctrine of the Trinity, a doctrine of Christ, and a doctrine of 
the restored identity of believers in terms that TCKs strongly identify with. 
It also raises an important question. Torrance only speaks of mediation in the 
context of creation and the economy of salvation. Can ‘mediation’ be used as a 
concept to describe the eternal relations of the Trinity as Miyahira does with 
‘betweenness’ or is it confined to the economic activities of the Son and Spirit? Can 
‘mediation’ be read back from God in the economy of salvation to the ontological 
constitution of God? Is mediation only an activity of each person or does it constitute 
the person in a similar way to how Miyahira argues ‘betweenness’ constitutes the 
person? If ‘mediation’ is a rich enough concept to apply to both the redeeming 
activity of God and the constitutive personal relations of the Trinity this would 
establish a link between what God does (Brunner’s ‘towardness’) and who God is 
(Miyahira’s ‘betweenness’). This will not only help apply the insights of Miyahira 
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more thoroughly to the missions of the Son and the Spirit but also help apply the 
insights of Torrance and Brunner to the picture Miyahira paints of the eternal God. 
Combining the insight of these theologians will allow a TCK theology to apply the 
metaphors of ‘betweenness’, ‘towardness’, and ‘mediation’ as a unifying theme for a 
coherent vision of Christianity that covers who God is, what God does in Christ and 








Chapter fourteen concluded with the question of how to fit together ‘betweenness’, 
‘towardness’, and ‘mediation’ for a unified theme able to permeate a doctrine of 
God, of Christ, and of the believer’s identity in order to construct a TCK theology 
with liminality at its heart. While Nozomu Miyahira’s divine ‘betweenness’704 
focuses more on who God is in Godself, Thomas Torrance mediation705 and Emil 
Brunner towardness706 deal exclusively with God’s acts in redemption. In order to 
bring these two closer together this chapter explores the relation between the 
economic Trinity (God in the economy of salvation) and the immanent Trinity (God 
in Godself) in the theology of Torrance. By looking at how Torrance skilfully places 
the economic Trinity into the context of the ontological Trinity, subsequent chapters 
will be able to more persuasively argue for the intrinsic continuity of ‘betweenness’ 
and ‘mediation’ as well as ‘towardness’. 
This chapter consists of three sections: First, it looks at how Torrance sees the 
relation between what God does in Jesus Christ and who God is in Godself and 
introduces ‘Torrance’s Theorem’ as the key to clarifying this relation. Second, it 
analyses the crucial role that ὁμοούσιος (homoousios) plays for ‘Torrance’s 
Theorem’. Third, it brings the findings into conversation with Miyahira and 
Brunner’s insights. The goal of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for speaking of 
God’s Trinitarian relations in terms of mediation without arbitrarily projecting 
convenient human notions onto God. 
 
The ‘Evangelical’ and the ‘Ontological’ Trinity: Two Trinities? 
In order to understand Thomas Torrance’s theology of the Trinity it is crucial to 
realize the importance of the question of the relation between the economic or 
evangelical Trinity (God revealed, God for us) and the immanent or ontological 
Trinity (God in Godself, God’s eternal being) for Torrance. An encounter with a 
distressed soldier during Torrance’s time in Italy serves to illustrate this. When 
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serving as a stretcher bearer in 1940, Torrance was asked by the badly wounded 
soldier if God really was like Jesus.707 The soldier in fear of death probably knew the 
stories of Jesus of Nazareth but God and Jesus Christ had somehow become 
dislodged in his mind. As a result, “it left the impression that there was a God 
‘behind the back’ of Jesus himself”708 or, more technically, the ontological Trinity 
was unlike the evangelical Trinity. How sure can we be, the soldier might have 
wondered, that the God we will inevitably meet in the next world is similar to the 
incarnate God we encounter in this world? For Torrance, this uncertainty constitutes 
a problem since salvation itself rests on the identity between who God is for us in the 
economy and who God eternally is.709 We truly know God only through the 
incarnation of the Son and the pouring out of the Spirit in which the eternal God is 
really present and we are truly reconciled through God’s real self-giving and 
presence in the world in Word and Spirit. 
Paul Molnar explains that Torrance here follows Athanasus’ methodological 
axiom: “It would be more godly and true to signify God from the Son and call him 
Father, than to name God from his works alone and call him Unoriginate.”710 In 
other words, knowledge of God springs from knowledge of the Son and the Spirit 
rather than from speculation based on other sources found in creation. Therefore, 
‘God the Father’ much more accurately describes God than ‘God the creator’. The 
essential relation between the Father and the Son is a much more reliable way to 
know God than the causal relation between creator and creation. 
For Torrance, the Christian doctrine of God is found in the revelation of God 
through the incarnate Christ in the outpouring of the Spirit. Torrance writes: 
[I]t is only in Christ in whom God’s self-revelation is identical with himself that we 
may rightly apprehend [God’s self-revelation] and really know God as he is in himself, 
in the oneness and differentiation of God within his own eternal Being as Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit, for what God is toward us in his historical self-manifestation to us in 
the Gospel as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, he is revealed to be inherently and eternally 
in himself. It is thus in and through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit that the 
distinctively Christian doctrine of God in his transcendent triunity is mediated to 
us.”711 
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Here, Torrance sets out at the very beginning of his most mature work on the 
doctrine of God that the mediation of the Son and the Spirit faithfully reveal who 
God eternally is as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The relation between the economic 
Trinity, God revealed to us through God’s saving acts, and the ontological Trinity, 
God apart from God’s relation to creation, is a very specific one in Torrance’s 
theology and is marked both by an inseparability and distinction, not plain 
identity.712 
The picture that emerges can be aptly summarized in one of Torrance’s quote: 
“What God is toward us in the Gospel as Father, Son and Holy Spirit he is 
antecedently, inherently and eternally in himself.”713 Similar versions of the above 
statement appear so often in Torrance that for our purpose we will refer to this 
guiding principle as ‘Torrance’s Theorem’.714 Who God is in the evangelical Trinity, 
God is antecedently, inherently, and eternally in the ontological Trinity. 
‘Antecedently’ makes the relation between the economic Trinity and the ontological 
Trinity irreversible and clearly establishes the ontological Trinity as the necessary 
ground of any revelation. ‘Inherently’ declares God’s revelation in the mediation of 
the Son and the Spirit as authentic and accurate. The Son and the Spirit are not 
accidentally but essentially God among us. ‘Eternally’ emphasises that the 
faithfulness God displays in the economy of salvation has its ground in the 
unchanging faithfulness in God’s triune being and that revelation is not vulnerable to 
revisions. Torrance’s Theorem is based on his understanding of ὁμοούσιος 
(homoousios, ‘of one substance with’), referring to the consubstantiality of the Son 
and Spirit with the Father and the identity between God’s being (Who God is) and 
God’s act (What God does).715 Molnar writes that “[e]verything, including the 
knowledge of God as well as salvation and redemption, (…) hinges on the oneness in 
being and agency between God and his self-revelation in Christ.”716 There is only 
one approach to God: in faith through the Son by the Holy Spirit towards the Father. 
This approach depends on the oneness of what God is toward us and what God is in 
Godself. 
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Torrance’s Theorem is based on Torrance’s realist theology: 
[T]hrough his Word and Spirit who are of one and the same being with himself God 
has really communicated himself to us in his own eternal and indivisible Reality as 
God the Father Almighty (…) what God is toward us in Jesus Christ, the Word made 
flesh, he is in himself, antecedently and eternally in himself; and (…) what he imparts 
to us through the Spirit who sheds the love of God into our hears, he is in himself, 
antecedently and eternally in himself.717 
Both the Son and the Spirit are ‘really’ God because they are of one and the same 
being with God. The eternal God is thus truly mediated to us through the incarnation 
of the Son and the pouring out of the Holy Spirit. In the Son, God gives nothing less 
than Godself to us and in the Spirit God imparts nothing less than Godself to us so 
that through the Son’s and Spirit’s mediation creatures truly know who God is and 
can truly participate in the divine communion of the life of the Trinity.718 Ultimately, 
Torrance’s Theorem states that God’s self-revelation as Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
really is also a self-revelation of the eternal Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
However, Torrance’s Theorem must also be understood in the light of God’s 
transcendent freedom which rules out any logically necessary relationship between 
the economic and the ontological Trinity.719 Molnar stresses the point that “God’s 
eternal being as Father, Son and Spirit is not in any way constituted or determined by 
his relations to others.”720 While what God is toward us he is inherently and eternally 
in Godself, he is also antecedently in Godself. The irreversible relation between the 
ontological Trinity and the economic Trinity clearly introduces a distinction between 
the two which establishes the former as the ground of the latter and the latter as 
following the former. Torrance writes: 
We cannot think of the ontological Trinity as if it were constituted by or dependent on 
the economic Trinity, but must rather think of the economic Trinity as the freely 
predetermined manifestation in the history of salvation of the eternal Trinity (…). 
Hence when we rightly speak of the oneness between the ontological Trinity and the 
economic Trinity, we may not speak of that oneness without distinguishing and 
delimiting it from the ontological Trinity—there are in any case (…) elements in the 
incarnate economy such as the time pattern of human life in this world which we may 
not read back into the eternal Life of God. On the other hand, the fact that the 
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ontological Trinity has ontological priority over the economic Trinity, does not 
preclude us from saying that the ontological Trinity is essentially and intrinsically 
evangelical, for it is precisely the ontological Trinity that God has made known to us 
in his self-giving and self-revealing as Father, Son and Holy Spirit (…).721 
Thus while in faith the economic Trinity comes epistemologically before the 
ontological Trinity, the ontological Trinity always has ontological priority over the 
economic Trinity and constitutes its ontological ground. The evangelical Trinity does 
not follow necessarily but only freely from the ontological Trinity and God’s relation 
to the world does not constitute who God is in God’s very being. This, however, 
does not mean that the two are separate entities. Neither the evangelical Trinity nor 
the ontological Trinity can be collapsed into each other and the two “must be clearly 
distinguished” but simultaneously “are not to be separated.”722 
Collapsing the evangelical Trinity into the ontological Trinity results in the 
divinization of acts of creation and incarnation making these necessary eternal 
properties of God. Similarly, collapsing the ontological Trinity into the evangelical 
Trinity results in the temporalization of the eternal God only enabling God to 
become God through creation and incarnation.723 While acknowledging that God is 
essentially and inherently evangelical as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, Torrance 
avoids the two errors of simplistic identity by making the ontological Trinity prior to 
the evangelical Trinity and by insisting that God’s revelation is based on God’s 
freedom, not necessity. For him, God’s self-mediation can neither be logically 
necessary nor completely arbitrary but is free and nevertheless reflects who God 
eternally and inherently is. God loves in freedom and “[i]f he were not Love in his 
innermost Being, his love toward us in Christ and the Holy Spirit would be 
ontologically groundless.”724 The external relations of God truly reflect and reveal 
who God is in God’s internal relations, but do not dictate what God ought to be in 
the economy. 
What, then, about creation, incarnation, and Pentecost? According to Torrance, 
these are all “new events” even for God.725 For example, while God has always been 
Father, God has not always been creator. In creation God has done something new, 
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but not in disconnection with whom God is.726 Furthermore, while God is eternally 
Son, God was not always incarnate and so the incarnation was an absolutely new 
event in the life of God.727 The same must be said of the outpouring of the Spirit. 
Importantly, however, Torrance emphasises that even in these new events “God did 
not change but remained and continues to remain ever one and the same, (…) for 
God revealed himself as completely free to bring new ideas and realities into 
existence without contradicting himself.”728 Thus Torrance’s Theorem remains true 
despite the distinction between the economy and the ontological Trinity: What God 
is for us in the ecomony, God is antecedently, inherently and eternally in Godself 
even when God performs completely new actions. While incarnation and Pentecost 
are not eternal events, the incarnation of the Son and the pouring out of the Spirit 
then, far from obscuring God through novel, arbitrary acts, faithfully reveal who God 
eternally is. 
For Torrance, this primarily refers to God’s love as he writes that “[God] loves 
us with the very Love which he is.”729 The nature of God’s being is love and 
Torrance’s Theorem describes how God has committed his very being to humanity in 
unconditional love. Therefore, Torrance can reformulate his theorem to state that 
“[w]hat God is toward us in his immense love and infinite kindness (…) he is 
[antecedently,] inherently and always was in himself.”730 Nothing can separate 
creation from the love of God because God has given nothing less than God’s own 
being in the economy. 
Torrance’s Theorem shows his strong emphasises on the continuity and close 
proximity between who God is for us in God’s revelation as Father, Son and Spirit 
and who God eternally is without slipping into crude identifications. Any attempt to 
argue that God’s revelation is less than a self-mediation in which God is personally 
and really present threatens Torrance’s soteriology which takes place through union 
with the Son and in the Spirit. Importantly, Torrance’s Theorem makes possible the 
argument that, while maintaining a distinction between the economic and ontological 
Trinity, there is continuity and coherence in the way God presents Godself in the 
mutual mediation of Son and Spirit. This is thus a first step in establishing mediation 
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as a concept belonging antecedently, inherently and eternally to God’s being. 
 
‘Homoousios’: Linchpin of Torrance’s Theology 
One of the unique aspects of Torrance’s theology is his creative use of the concept of 
ὁμοούσιος (homoousios, ‘of one substance with’) which played such a crucial role in 
the development of the Nicene Creed in the 4th century.731 Homoousios for Torrance 
signifies the “oneness in being and act of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.”732 It is a 
hermeneutical principle with far-reaching soteriological consequences. Torrance’s 
Theorem rests on the premise that the Son and the Spirit are of one being with God 
the Father and that they can therefore really reveal who God inherently and eternally 
is in Godself. Torrance famously declared that homoousios is “the ontological and 
epistemological lynchpin of Christian theology”733 without which various aspects of 
Christian theology would fall apart, especially Torrance’s Theorem. 
Torrance applies ὁμοούσιος to hold together five different theological aspects: 
1. The Son and the Father; 2. The Spirit and the Father; 3. The economic Trinity and 
the ontological Trinity; 4. The one common being of the eternal Father, Son and 
Spirit; 5. The act and being of God. This section looks at these aspects in turn. It is 
important to keep in mind that homoousios here does not mean a simple identity but 
a nuanced distinction as well as identity.734 
First, homoousios applies to the relation between the Father and the Son to 
safeguard the unqualified, underived deity of the Son. It gives expression to “the 
unbroken oneness in Being and Act between Jesus Christ (…) and God the 
Father.”735 It follows that what Christ says and does, in effect who Christ is, truly 
reveals God.736 Additionally, Christ is also of one nature (homoousios) with 
humanity and thus the incarnate Son constitutes a bridge737 firmly anchored in both 
the eternal God as well as created humanity. Christ presents an uninterrupted 
continuity between the human expression of God in the incarnation and the very 
being of God in eternity. 
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In Christ, due to homoousios, the revealer and the revealed are one and the 
same.738 The mediator Son then while mediating between God and creatures is not a 
created intermediate being or some sort of demi-god.739 In other words, there is a 
unity and continuity in being, knowledge, and love740 between the Father and the 
Son.741 Through unity of being, believers know that in Christ God is truly among us; 
Through unity of knowledge believers know that Christ truly reveals the intentions 
of God the Father; Through unity of love believers know that the Father’s 
unconditional love for the incarnate Son can be humanity’s through Christ. The 
eternal love of the Father and Son is extended through Christ to creation. 
Torrance’s Theorem as it applies to the Son can be restated as follows: ‘What 
God is towards us in Christ, God is antecedently, inherently and eternal in Godself.’ 
In the incarnation, there is present nothing less but the very being of God. In the 
mediation of the Son, believers get a glimpse of who God really is. 
Second, homoousios applies to the Spirit: The Spirit is of one and the same 
being with God the Father742 and thus what God imparts to believers in the Spirit is 
nothing less than God’s true self.743 Just as in the Son the revealer and the revealed 
coincide, so in the Spirit the gift is the giver and the giver is the gift.744 The Spirit, 
God within us, is not a created intermediary but very God of very God. In the unique 
mediation of the Spirit nothing less but the very being of God is the mediator and the 
mediated. 
Homoousios in the case of the Spirit, like that of the Son, is necessary for 
salvation. Unless the Spirit was of one being with the Father and the Son, the 
revelation of God through the Son would not be actualised and fulfilled within the 
believer. However, Torrance argues that homoousios applies to the Spirit 
differently.745 The Spirit did not become incarnate and is not consubstantial with 
humanity. We do not know the Spirit in his own distinctive person as we know the 
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incarnate Son. The Son remains the only epistemological centre concerning 
knowledge of God. However, the Spirit is “the immediate presence and power of 
God’s revelation to us”746 and thus it is in the Spirit that we have access to God the 
Father through the Son. For Torrance, through the Spirit believers commune with 
God because the Spirit unites us to the Christ who is the very Son of the Father. 
Homoousios applied to the Spirit is of great significance. While the Son’s 
mediatorship is intrinsically connected with the incarnation and thus necessarily 
raises the question of whether God takes on a mediatorial role only in the economy 
of salvation (meaning that similar to the act of creation, the act of mediation is new 
even to God) or whether this points to an eternal mediatorial dimension freely 
expressed historically in the incarnation of the Son. For Torrance, it is crucial that 
homoousios in relation to the Son is placed alongside homoousios applied to the 
Spirit because homoousios in the context of the Spirit prevents the reading back into 
God of creaturely and material aspects.747 The Spirit’s homoousios keeps rampant 
speculations based on Christ’s incarnation in check.748 The Spirit, who is 
“imageless”749 and yet also very God of very God, prevents any mythical projection 
onto God of human characteristics. The naïve reading back into God of ‘mediation’ 
through the incarnation of the Son is kept in check through the Spirit’s 
homoousios.750 Mediation cannot be reduced to simply what God does in the 
incarnation if the Spirit must also be understood as performing a mediatorial role. 
When stripped of material and creaturely aspects of the incarnate mediation of 
Christ, we are still left with a solid theme of mediation in the Spirit and this presents 
a strong case for reading mediation back into God as something that God truly is and 
does in the eternal Trinitarian movements of love. 
Concerning the homoousios applied to the Spirit, Torrance’s theorem can be 
restated as follows: ‘What God is toward us in the Spirit, God is antecedently, 
inherently and eternally in Godself.’ The communion of the Spirit which makes 
present and imparts into us nothing less but the very being of God is the very same 
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communion between the Father and the Son that the Spirit eternally is.751 
Additionally, the mediator that God is toward us in the Spirit has an eternal 
dimension. 
Third, Torrance applies homoousios to the evangelical and ontological 
Trinity.752 Applying the homoousios to the whole Trinity is a stretch but nevertheless 
follows from the above two points. The incarnate Son is of one and the same being 
as the eternal God the Father and the poured out Spirit is of one and the same being 
as the eternal God the Father. Thus the tripersonal God of Father, Son, and Spirit (the 
evangelical Trinity) revealed in that Spirit through that Son cannot be anything less 
but the very tripersonal God of Father, Son, and Spirit that God is eternally (the 
ontological Trinity).753 Torrance writes that “[w]hat the ὁμοούσιος did was to give 
decisive expression to the truth that God’s revelation of himself as Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit in the incarnate economy of salvation was grounded in and derived from 
God as he is in [his] own eternal Being and Nature” and enables believers to know 
Godself, “in some real measure, as he is in the inner relations of his eternal Being as 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit.”754 For Torrance what counts is that something about 
God that is inherently and eternally true can be known through the Son and Spirit. 
This means that not only the content of what God reveals corresponds to whom God 
is (namely God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), but also the manner in which God 
reveals Godself (namely by way of mediation from the Father through the Son and 
the Spirit) expresses something about who God antecedently, inherently, and 
eternally is. In this sense, who God is as God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the 
economy of salvation, God is antecedently, inherently, and eternally as Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit. 
Fourth, Torrance applies homoousios to the eternal tripersonal being of God 
and the internal personal relations. Here homoousios describes both the eternal 
distinctions between the Father, Son, and Spirit and also the mutual interpenetration 
of one another in the one numerically (not specifically) identical being of the 
Trinity.755 Two aspects are significant in Torrance’s treatment of God’s tripersonal 
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being: First, God’s being (ousia) must be understood in the light of the person-
constituting relations (‘onto-relations’756): God’s one being is intensely personal, 
dynamic, and relational.757 Second, each of the three persons, who are always 
defined in their relation to the other two persons, must be understood in the light of 
this one being of God as inherently altruistic: they share “being for others” and are 
“for one another.”758 For Torrance, the three persons are “inseparably interrelated in 
being and act through a mutual indwelling and a mutual movement toward one 
another in the homoousial Communion of the Holy Trinity which they constitute.”759 
Homoousios here describes the unique divine communion the three persons have due 
to their sharing of the one being of God. While being distinct as persons, the three 
are identical in being. 
Since the three persons share the numerically identical being of God, their 
distinctiveness emerges out of the interrelations between them. Torrance calls this 
“the onto-relational concept of the divine Persons.”760 These ontic relations between 
the persons belong to what the persons are (substantive relations).761 Each person is 
who the persons is only as the third among and for two other persons: “Each person 
is intrinsically who he is for the other two.”762 Molnar observes that these ontic 
relations constitute the indivisible unity of the Trinity meaning that the Godhead is 
complete not in the Father alone but also in the Son and the Spirit.763 As such, the 
being of God is a Being-in-Communion and what God does is communion-
constituting.764 
Homoousios in the context of the Godhead then lets us speak of the divine 
persons in terms of their identity with each other (each person absolutely considered 
is identical with both the other persons) and their distinctiveness (each person 
relatively considered is neither of the other two persons). In other words, each person 
is both this and that person as well as neither this nor that person. 
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Finally, for Torrance homoousios is related to the oneness of God’s being and 
act.765 Referencing Karl Barth, Torrance argues that God’s being is “his being-in-his-
act” and his act is “his act-in-being”766 holding who God is closely together with 
what God does. Molnar even suggests that the concept of homoousios boils down to 
“the oneness in being and act of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.”767 Reflecting this 
identity, Torrance’s Theorem can be restated as follows: ‘What God does for us God 
is antecedently, inherently, and eternally.’768 
The ‘act of God’ must be understood as the outgoing mediating salvific 
movement of God in the Son and the Spirit which invites believers into the 
communion that God is in Godself.769 However, if God’s being (ousia) is the 
personal, dynamic, relational being770 that Torrance argues for then there must be a 
second aspect besides the immanent act of God in history, namely that of the eternal 
act of the three persons in the above mentioned “mutual movement toward and for 
one another.”771 God’s act has two dimensions. On the one hand, it refers to the 
mediating movements of God in salvation history. God’s act is an outgoing 
movement in which, through Son and in Spirit, God gives Godself to creation. This 
is a movement toward and for another, echoing Brunner’s God-toward-humanity. On 
the other hand, to this outgoing movement there corresponds an eternal act of God: a 
“movement of love”772 of the three persons which constitute the one personal, 
dynamic, and relational being of God. So, who God is in God’s mediating 
movements in the Son and the Spirit toward and for us, God antecedently, inherently, 
and eternally is in God’s movements of love. Indeed, Torrance argues: 
The inherent unity of Being and Act in God forces upon us an understanding of God 
in which movement belongs to his eternal Being. If God is how he is in his activity 
to us through the Son and in the Spirit, then it belongs to the essential Nature of his 
eternal Being to move and energise and act.773 
The mediatorial act belongs to the eternal moving act of God’s being. In fact, 
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Torrance goes as far as to say that God’s being is an eternal movement.774This 
correspondence between historical mediating movement and eternal movement 
merits further analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
Out of this analysis of how Torrance understands the connection between the 
mediation of the Son and the Spirit in the economy and who God is in Godself four 
important elements emerge. 
First, Torrance insists that in the mediation of the Son and the Spirit nothing 
less than Godself is present. God determined to be discerned in God’s revelation 
through the Son and in the Spirit who are both of one and the same substance as God 
the Father. Similarly, Brunner writes “God is the God-towards-humanity because and 
only because he wills to be discerned in his Word”775 and names this divine 
towardness a “Selbstmitteilung”.776 God gives Godself. 
Second, Torrance argues that the divine movement toward and for others in 
creation can be found antecedently, eternally, and inherently in the Trinitarian 
movements of love toward and for the other persons of the Trinity. Brunner’s God-
toward-humanity thus springs from the eternal towardness of the Trinity and the 
‘betweenness’ of the incarnate Christ between God and humanity similarly has its 
ground in the divine ‘betweenness’ of the Son between the Father and the Spirit. 
Third, the numerically identical being of God of the homoousial Father, Son, 
and the Spirit is differentiated through ‘onto-relations’. The relations between the 
persons constitute the very person.777 This corresponds to Miyahira’s argument that 
‘persons’ are in fact divine ‘betweennesses’ who are constituted by their relation to 
the other two.778 For Torrance, the personal, dynamic, and relational being of God 
gives rise to the three persons as much as the movement of love of the three persons 
gives rise to the personal dynamic, and relational being of God. Viewed through the 
implications of Torrance’s Theorem, the onto-relational understanding of persons 
links the constitutive relations of the persons with the eternal tripersonal movement 
of love of the being of God. 
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Finally, in connection with this movement of love by God, Torrance speaks of 
a mirrored movement of love by humanity. Torrance writes that “the movement of 
Love eternally hidden in God has been revealed to us, and a corresponding 
movement of love has been generated in us toward the Father through the Son and in 
the Holy Spirit.”779 God revealed Godself to be the God-toward-humanity and 
evokes a response within humanity of a movement of discovery wherein humanity 
finds itself as ‘Humanity-from-God’ in a movement in the Spirit, through the Son, 
back to the Father. The movement of redemption is humanity-back-to-God. 
Thus in looking at how Torrance understands the relation between the 
evangelical Trinity and the ontological Trinity a significant connection arises among, 
first, the movement of mutual mediation of Son and Spirit who reveal and reconcile 
believers to God, second, the eternal movement of love which cannot be anything 
else but the onto-relations of the three divine persons in their movement towards and 
for one another, and, third, the corresponding redemptive movement from humanity 
back to God in which humanity can reclaim its true identity as creatures.780 However, 
while using ‘mediation’ so frequently to speak of the salvific movement of God in 
history, Torrance remains silent when it comes to any references of a corresponding 
‘mediation’ that can be found antecedently, inherently, and eternally within God as 
Torrance’s Theorem would suggest. Taking seriously Torrance Theorem, the 
question thus emerges: Can we speak of the Father, Son and Spirit in terms of eternal 
communion constituting self-mediators who are each unique in their ‘betweenness’ 
(à la Miyahira) and have a dynamic ‘towards and for other’-ness (à la Torrance) that 
serves as the ground for the identity-bestowing God-toward-humanity (à la 
Brunner)? 
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Toward a Liminal Trinity 
 
Introduction  
Chapters fourteen and fifteen looked at the contours of Torrance’s Trinitarian 
theology rooted in the mutual mediation of the Son and Spirit and his close 
association of what God does and who God is. This chapter weaves the various 
theological building blocks together towards a doctrine of the Trinity from the 
perspective of TCKs. Using Thomas Torrance’s ‘mediation’ and Nozomu Miyahira’s 
‘betweenness’ as key concepts this chapter seeks to formulate a doctrine of the 
Trinity expressed in terms of liminality, non-place, and liquidity. 
Even though Torrance remains silent concerning mediation in the eternal life of 
the Trinity, mediation plays an undeniable role in the economy of salvation. 
However, Torrance’s realist theology holds together closely the evangelical Trinity 
(and with it the economic mediation of the Son and the Spirit) and the corresponding 
eternal Trinitarian life of God (which Torrance names the eternal movement of love). 
This chapter makes the case that mediation lies at the centre of the eternal movement 
of love within God, and shows that the doctrine of the Trinity can be conceived with 
mediation at its very heart. Three points are of importance in Torrance’s mutual 
mediation: First, in light of homoousios, God personally mediates reconciliation and 
revelation between divine things and creaturely things in the Son and the Spirit. The 
mediators are not intermediary beings but ‘very God of very God,’ ‘of one being 
with the Father.’781 The medium is thus divine and personal. Second, a central 
characteristic of Torrance’s mediation is the dynamic two-way movement executed 
by the mediating person who stands and negotiates between two parties, i.e. God and 
creation.782 Mediation is a dynamic ‘betweenness’. Third, the mediating two-way 
movement of the Son and of the Spirit are inseparable due to the one coactivity of 
the triune God.783 All divine operations are from the Father, through the Son, and in 
the Spirit. The mediatorial work of the Son is not independent of the mediation of the 
Spirit. In short, “Calvary and Pentecost (…) may not be separated from one 
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another.”784 This mutuality opens the way to argue for mediation not only in the 
economy but between the divine persons themselves. 
With the above points in mind, the first half of this chapter looks at mediation 
in three contexts: First, in terms of the salvific work of the Son and Spirit in 
reconciliation and revelation; Second, in terms of the historical mission of the Son 
and the Spirit from the Father; Third, in terms of the eternal generations of the Son 
and the Spirit from the Father. The second half of this chapter then proceeds to 
formulate a doctrine of the mediating Trinity and, finally, presents a TCK doctrine of 
the Trinity with liminality at its centre. 
 
Mutual Mediation in Reconciliation and Revelation 
Elmer Colyer summarizes Torrance’s mutual mediation in the following two 
statements: on the one hand, “[t]he coming of the Spirit at Pentecost is mediated by 
Jesus Christ,” on the other hand, “[t]he coming of the Holy Spirit mediates Jesus 
Christ to us.”785 Torrance describes Christ’s mediation in terms of the mediation of 
revelation and the mediation of reconciliation. In both cases Christ plays the dual 
role of faithfully speaking and faithfully hearing.786 The mediation of the Spirit by 
the Son belongs inseparably to the mediation of revelation and reconciliation: In the 
incarnation and ascension, the Son mediates the pouring out of the Spirit through the 
assumed humanity reconciled to God. In fact, the gracious pouring out of the Spirit 
at Pentecost only participates in the natural reception of the Spirit in the incarnation 
of the Son to whom the Spirit eternally belongs. In the incarnate mediating person of 
Christ, the Son plays the dual role of both natural giving what is his own and faithful 
receiving the Spirit in the assumed humanity in order to make possible the 
unconditional pouring out of the Spirit to all creatures and with it the pouring out of 
God’s love into our hearts.787 
The second part of Colyer’s summary describes how the Spirit steps in 
between the incarnate Christ and believers to play the dual mediating role of 
revealing Christ as the Son of God to the believer on the one hand and uniting the 
                                                          
784 Ibid., 196. 
785 Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology, 221, 
24. 
786 Ibid., 65-69; Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 17, 41. 
787 The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 148. Colyer, How to Read T. F. 
Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology, 223-24. 
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believer to the incarnate Son on the other hand. The Spirit mediates between God 
and humanity, faithfully showing what God has accomplished in Christ and enabling 
believers to faithfully recognize that reality.788 
On the surface, the mediation of the Spirit seems to be a secondary step which 
merely completes the mediation of the Son and ties up loose ends after Christ’s 
ascension. However, Torrance’s mutual mediation of Son and Spirit argues for a 
more intricate relation between Son and Spirit in the economy. The mediation of the 
Son itself is mediated by the Spirit. Just as the pouring out of the Spirit (and thus the 
historical mission of the Spirit) results from the mediation of the Son, so the birth, 
life, death, and resurrection (and thus the historical mission of the Son) occurs 
through the mediation of the Spirit. The Son is conceived in time by the Spirit, is 
baptised with the Spirit, lives anointed with the Spirit, offers himself to the Father in 
atoning sacrifice through the Spirit, and rises again by the power of the Spirit.789 In 
other words, due to the mutuality of the two mediations, Torrance hints at the 
possibility of speaking not only of the salvific work of the Son and Spirit in terms of 
mediation but also of the historical missions of the Son and the Spirit themselves as 
mutually mediated by the Son and the Spirit: God’s outward movement of Love can 
be described in terms of mediation. 
 
Mutual Mediation in the Historical Missions 
Aspects that Torrance’s concept of mutual mediation leaves unsaid can now be 
developed in order to formulate a unique take on the doctrine of the Trinity. If the 
historical missions of the Son and the Spirit themselves reflect mediation then the 
persons themselves can be spoken of as being inherently, antecedently, and eternally 
mediators. Missions and mediation would go beyond the idea of the persons merely 
performing mediatorial roles in the economy of salvation as an ad hoc response to a 
fallen world. This argument constitutes the next step towards making the case for 
eternal mediations between the persons in the Trinity. 
The New Testament suggests790 and the Nicene Creed of A.D. 381 affirms791 
the notion that the generation of the Son in time involves the mediation of the Spirit. 
                                                          
788 How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology, 224-33. 
789 Ibid., 224; Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 62. 
790 Matthew 1.20; Luke 1.35. 
791 ‘(…) was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary.’ 
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Applying Torrance’s language of personal mediation, in the incarnation of the Son 
the Spirit mediates between the Father who sends the Son and the Son who is sent 
from the Father in the Spirit. There is thus a Father-toward-Son movement of self-
giving taking place in the Spirit who mediates the being of the Father to the Son. 
Correspondingly, there is a Son-toward-Father movement of trust and dependence in 
the Spirit’s mediation.792 Part of the Spirit’s role is the two-fold mediating movement 
not only of reconciliation or revelation but of self-giving and self-offering where, on 
the one hand, the Father through the Spirit gives himself to the Son and exalts the 
Son, and, on the other hand, the Son through the Spirit gives himself to the Father 
and glorifies the Father. 
The historical mission of the Son can be meaningfully stated using Torrance’s 
language of the personal two-way mediation of the Spirit. The incarnation takes 
place through the mediatorial work of the Spirit through whom the Father gives the 
Son and in whom the Son glorifies the Father. In fact, Torrance’s recurring 
statements about the communion of the Spirit being the very communion between 
the Father and the Son almost necessarily imply a mediatorial Spirit-person between 
the Father and the Son.793 Torrance writes that “the Holy Spirit himself is to be 
thought of as the ever-living two-way Communion between the Father and the 
Son.”794 There is thus an inherent connection between the mediation of the Spirit and 
Torrance’s concept of the communion of the Spirit. The Spirit mediates between 
Father and Son in the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Christ. 
Naturally, a similar case for the mediation of the Spirit by the Son in the 
historical pouring out of the Spirit can be made. For example, the Son sends the 
Spirit who proceeds from the Father795 and the Spirit is poured out generously from 
God the Father through Christ the saviour.796 As per Torrance’s two way movement 
of mediation, on the one hand, the Spirit is poured out from the Father through the 
mediation of the Son, and, on the other hand, the Spirit bears silent witness through 
the Son of the Father. In Torrance’s words, the “[the Spirit] lights up for us the Face 
of God in the Face of Jesus Christ.”797 The two-fold movement of Father-toward-
                                                          
792 Heb. 9.14. 
793 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 59-70, 125-28. 
794 Ibid., 126. 
795 John 15.26. 
796 Titus 3.6. 
797 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 151. 
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Spirit and Spirit-toward-Father takes place through the mediation of the Son. 
Through Christ, God Father gives himself in the Spirit to believers and, 
correspondingly, in the Spirit believers have access through Christ to the Father. 
While Torrance does not speak of ‘the communion of the Son’ between the Father 
and the Spirit, this dimension of the mediation by the Son finds its expression in the 
outgoing movement of God to creation “from the Father, through the Son and in the 
Holy Spirit”798 and the corresponding returning movement of believer “by the Spirit 
through the Son to the Father.”799 The Son mediates between the Father and the 
Spirit in the outgoing movement of love and self-giving as well as in the 
corresponding movement in which the Spirit through the Son takes believers back to 
their Father. There is thus a ‘communion of the Son’ not unlike the ‘communion of 
the Spirit’ through which the Father’s out pouring movement and the Spirit’s 
returning and movement flows. 
This formulation of the missions of the Son and Spirit in terms of the mutual 
mediation reflects a significant shift of the argument from the divine mediation 
between God and creation (the end result of the mutual mediation of Son and Spirit) 
to mediation between divine persons (which constitute the underlying ground and 
grammar of God’s salvific work of inviting creation back into communion with its 
Creator). Both the outgoing movements of God in the historical missions can be 
stated in terms of personal, mutual, two-way mediation by the Son and the Spirit. 
Torrance’s unique ‘mutuality’ of the Son’s and Spirit’s mediation adds a further layer 
of implicit mediation in the economy between divine persons themselves to the 
already explicit mediation of reconciliation and revelation between God and 
creation. 
In the context of the realist theology of Torrance, where God really and truly 
gives nothing less than Godself, this does not come as a surprise. While taking place 
in time and space and being open to the inclusion of humanity, redemption as an 
outgoing two-way movement of God’s love does not rest on a fragile and tentative 
God-human relation dependent on the unlikely obedient acceptance of God by sinful 
humanity. Instead the mediation of revelation and reconciliation is anchored securely 
and validated unconditionally in the self-giving movement and corresponding 
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returning movement through the mediation between the divine persons themselves. 
By expanding Torrance’s concept of mediation to include the generation of the Son 
in time from the Father through the Spirit (and the corresponding mediating 
movement of the self-giving of the Son through the Spirit to the Father) and the 
pouring out of the Spirit in creation from the Father through the Son (and the 
corresponding mediating movement of glorification of the Father through the Son by 
the Spirit) the salvific mediatorial work of the Son and the Spirit between God and 
humanity is grounded in the unfailing mutual mediation of the Son between the 
Father and the Spirit on the one hand and of the Spirit between the Father and the 
Son on the other hand. The mediation offered to humanity in the Son and the Spirit is 
a participation in the very mediation that exists between the divine persons. 
 
Mediation in the Divine Movement of Love 
Having established mediation as a valid concept between the divine persons in the 
historical missions themselves, the next step involves reading back mediation into 
the very life of God. This establishes mediation as a key concept when speaking of 
who God is not only for us but antecedently, eternally, and inherently as per 
Torrance’s Theorem. Torrance’s concept of divine movement serves to make the case 
that the historical missions reflect the eternal onto-relations that constitute the 
persons. 
Torrance conceives of God’s being as a dynamic “being-in-movement.”800 
Movement in God here has two aspects. First, Torrance speaks of God’s movement 
in terms of God’s mediating movement of self-revelation and self-giving.801 This 
constitutes God’s ‘outgoing movement.’ Secondly, Torrance speaks of God’s 
movement in God’s very being.802 This constitutes God’s ‘eternal movement of love’ 
and to Torrance this means the same as God’s fellowship of love803 or God’s 
communion of love.804 
The Son’s and Spirit’s two-fold mediating movements characterize God’s 
outward movement.805 Torrance also emphasizes that these two movements are in 
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fact one divine outgoing movement of overflowing love, reemphasising the unity of 
God’s operations and the inseparability of the Son and the Spirit.806 The outgoing 
movement of God’s redemption corresponds to and truly reveals “the movement of 
Love eternally hidden in God.”807 The outgoing movement and the eternal movement 
reflect the close relation between economic Trinity and the ontological Trinity in 
Torrance’s Theorem: The outgoing movement is grounded in the eternal movement 
of God’s being and both movements really are one and the same authentic movement 
of God.808 If we understand the outgoing movement of God, to which there is a 
corresponding eternal movement of love within God, to mean the mutual mediation 
of the Son and the Spirit in the economy, then there must be a corresponding eternal 
mutual mediation of Son and Spirit within the eternal being of God. This eternal 
mediation finds expression in the fellowship and communion of love that God is. 
Torrance strongly argues against any separation between an unknowable 
transcendent God (the eternal movement of love) and God’s uncreated energies of 
self-revelation (the outgoing movement of love) since this would obstruct any real 
access to knowing God in Godself and in God’s internal relations.809 Instead, relying 
on his concept of homoousios, Torrance argues for the possibility of “read[ing] back 
the interrelations between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit in the economy of 
salvation unto the eternal relations immanent in the one Being of God.”810 The 
historical missions (outgoing movement) give us access to knowing something 
meaningful about the eternal processions (eternal movement). While we cannot 
know what the ineffable relations such as ‘generation’ and ‘procession’ mean when 
applied to God, Torrance’s realist theology nevertheless insists that we can know 
something valid about them, e.g. through the incarnation, Jesus’s teachings about the 
Father and the Spirit, the breathing out of the Spirit on the disciples, and the pouring 
out of the Spirit upon the church after the ascension.811 And thus Torrance writes in 
the context of the procession of the Spirit that “it is on the oneness of the historical 
mission of the Spirit from the incarnate Son with the eternal outgoing of the Spirit 
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from the Father that the truth of the Gospel is ultimately grounded.”812 The same 
should apply to the oneness of the generation in time and the eternal generation of 
the Son as Torrance remarks that the incarnation of the Son tells us something about 
who the Son really is.813 
Based on the oneness of the historical missions (outgoing movement) and the 
eternal relations (eternal movement), the eternal divine interpersonal onto-relations 
can thus be described in terms of personal, two-way mutual mediations. The Son is 
eternally begotten from the Father through the mediation of the Spirit and the Spirit 
is eternally breathed out and poured out through the mediation of the Son. These two 
eternal movements of mutual mediation are inseparable. Correspondingly, there is an 
eternal returning movement of love from the Spirit to the Father through the Son and 
an eternal movement of love from the Son to the Father through the Spirit. Otherness 
in God is conceived through the personal mediation that distinguishes as well as 
unites in moving between the two others. It makes sense to speak of mediation 
within God if, as Torrance argues, God is truly ‘being-for-others’ not only towards 
creation but antecedently, inherently, and eternally within Godself. 
 
The Father as Mediator 
Having made the case for an eternal movement of mediation by the Son and the 
Spirit, a similar case for the eternal mediation of the Father needs to be made in 
order to truly make mediation a central characteristic of who God is. Through their 
historical missions of mutual mediation the Son and the Spirit can easily be imagined 
as eternal mediators. The case for a mediator Father is less clear. 
Torrance has been criticised for downplaying the significance of the Father in 
the monarchy of the Trinity thereby portraying a less fatherly Father.814 Indeed, 
Torrance ascribes the monarchy, the one concrete being of God, not to the person of 
the Father but to the whole Trinity.815 However, Torrance also retains the idea that 
there is an order in the distinctions of the persons which gives priority to the 
Father.816 Furthermore, while for Torrance the Father could never be the deifier of 
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the Son and the Spirit since this would introduce a damaging qualitative distinction 
between underived and derived deity within the Godhead, Torrance nevertheless 
maintains that the Father must be thought of as the principle of deity simply because 
the Father is the uniquely unoriginate one from whom the Son is born and from 
whom the Spirit proceeds.817 Torrance expresses this by arguing that the Son is from 
the being of the Father (instead of the person of the Father).818 
From the above the case can be made that the mutual mediation by and of Son 
and Spirit rests on there being an unoriginate Father amongst the two from whom the 
two eternally proceed. The principle of mediation is found in none other than the 
Father who as the principle of deity gives rise to the other two persons (and defines 
the other two as much as he is defined by the Son of the Father and the Spirit of the 
Father). The homoousial unity between the Son who sends the Spirit from the Father 
and the Spirit through whom the Son is born rests on none other than the being of the 
Father. 
As both the Son and the Spirit proceed from the Father, the Father stands 
uniquely between the Son and the Spirit as the principle of distinction and 
communion. In this sense, the Father can be conceptualized as the unoriginate 
mediator who eternally mediates between the Son and the Spirit from whom both 
proceed. Through the one being of the Father from whom both Son and Spirit are, 
the Spirit and the Son share in each other completely and inhere in each other. In the 
processions, the Father mediates between Son and Spirit as the arch-mediator. The 
Father constitutes the creative ground that lets the others be who they are. In other 
words, the Father is the personal medium in which the Son and Spirit are. 
Following Torrance’s two-way movement of mediation, the following relations 
can be described: the Spirit loves the Son through the Father, and the Son loves the 
Spirit through the Father. This is possible precisely because both the Son and the 
Spirit share the one numerical divine being through their relations of origin and 
distinction in the Father between them. 
The mediation of the Father plays a crucial role within the economy of the 
mutual mediation of the Son and Spirit. The Son can share the Spirit with humanity 
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only through the Father through whom both are homoousios and the Spirit can give 
witness to the Son only through the Father through whom both are homoousios. In 
fact, the case can be made that through the mediation of the Son and the Spirit the 
mediator Father is revealed as the ground on which their mutual mediation stands. 
By being united with Christ in the Spirit believers witness the eternal Father who is 
between them and whom the Son and Spirit have in common. 
The being of the mediator Father is God’s communion-constituting being819 
and, eternally, this finds expression in the Father’s eternal self-giving mediation 
between the Son and the Spirit to create an everlasting perfect communion and again 
in the historical economy where the Father creates communion with God’s people 
through the mediating missions of the Son and the Spirit. 
 
Communion of the Spirit and Trinitarian Mediation 
There is thus an inherent connection between communion, which Torrance argues 
God’s being essentially is, and mediation, which describes the persons’ movements 
for and towards others. This comes to the foreground in Torrance’s repeated 
discussions of the ‘Communion of the Spirit.’820 
The communion of the Spirit seems to occupy a unique place in Torrance’s 
theology since Torrance at times comes close to equating the Spirit with the 
communion-constituting being of God thus potentially giving the impression that the 
Spirit is the quasi-principle of unity of the Trinity. 821 Borrowing from Athanasius of 
Alexandria, Torrance describes “the Communion of the Holy Spirit [as] belong[ing] 
to the mutual relation between the Father and the Son;”822 Referring to Epiphanius of 
Salamis, he writes that “the Spirit is to be understood in his oneness in being and 
coequality with the Father and the Son as being in himself the homoousial 
Communion of the Father and the Son with one another.”823 Referencing Basil the 
Great, Torrance remarks that “the Holy Spirit is to be thought of as the ever-living 
two-way Communion between the Father and the Son”824 It is not by coincidence 
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that Torrance concludes his discussion of the eternal indwelling of the Father, the 
Son and the Spirit with an explicit reference to the centrality of the communion of 
the Spirit, giving the impression that the Spirit constitutes this indwelling union of 
persons.825 For Torrance, the Spirit is forever the principle of communion between 
the Father and the Son and therefore is also the person associated with the principle 
of union between God and the communion within the church. 
This explicit reference to the Spirit as the homoousial bond between the Father 
and the Spirit of course relates to the mediation of the Spirit between the Father and 
the Son. Divine mediation means divine communion-constitution. However, does 
‘communion’ exclusively belong to the Spirit? Given that for Torrance God’s being 
is communion, by ascribing communion exclusively to the Spirit would that not 
reduce the Spirit to the homoousial nature of a binity consisting of the two persons of 
Father and Son and thus to a sub-personal essential quality?826 What does Torrance 
mean when he writes that “the Holy Spirit is in himself the enhypostatic Love and 
the Communion of Love in the perichoretic relations between the Father and the 
Son”?827 
Here Torrance’s idea of looking at each person relatively as well as absolutely 
will help to clarify the issue of the communion of the Spirit. Each of the three 
persons exhibit two dimensions. The Father, relatively, is the Father in relation to the 
Son and the Spirit. The Father, absolutely, is also the one God, the one “eternal self-
grounded personal Being who is the Source and Lord of all that was, is and ever will 
be.”828 Similarly, the Son, relatively, is the Son in relation to the Father and the 
Spirit. The Son, absolutely, is also the fullness of the Trinitarian Godhead, 
unconditionally God and thus in the incarnation unconditionally ‘God with us.’829 
Finally, the Spirit, relatively, is the Spirit-person distinct from the Father and the 
Son. The Spirit, absolutely, is the one Spirit of God.830 Absolutely considered Father, 
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Son, or Spirit are the one living God, the full being of God. Relatively considered, 
the Father, Son, and Spirit constitute the personal otherness within God in their 
distinctive onto-relations. 
This distinction between absolute and relative aspects proves helpful in the 
case of the communion of the Spirit. Relatively considered, there is only one 
communion of the Spirit due to the unique personal properties of the Spirit in his 
two-way mediation between the Father and the Son. However, absolutely considered 
the communion of the Spirit is the one being-in-communion of God common to all 
three persons and reflects the unconditional consubstantiality of the Spirit with the 
Father and the Son. When Torrance thus speaks of the communion of the Spirit, his 
emphasis is on homoousios, the underived divinity of the Spirit. 
If divine communion is the Spirit considered absolutely it makes no sense to 
restrict communion to the person of the Spirit only since, as homoousios established, 
all three share the one numerically identical concrete being-in-communion of God. 
We must also be able to speak of the communion of the Son and the communion of 
the Father together with the communion of the Spirit if homoousios is to be taken 
seriously. It does not reduce the Spirit to the non-personal being of God because 
relatively considered the Spirit is clearly other than Father and Son. Torrance’s 
distinction between ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ lets us speak of the communion of the 
Spirit as the very communion of God’s being. In light of homoousios applied to all 
three persons, the absoluteness of the communion of the Spirit lets us expand 
communion equally and unconditionally to the Father and the Son also. Just as there 
is the communion of the Spirit between the Father and the Son, there is the 
communion of the Son between the Father and the Spirit and the communion of the 
Father between the Son and the Spirit making their mutual mediation possible in the 
first place. Relatively considered each person is distinguished in their particular 
relation between two others but absolutely considered there is but one divine 
Trinitarian communion of Father, Son, and Spirit. 
Relatively considered, the communion, and thus the mediation, which the 
Spirit is between the Father and the Son is unique to the breathed-out Spirit in that 
only the Spirit is between the Father and the Son. The Spirit here is neither the 
Father nor the Son but a third among two others. Absolutely considered, the 
communion, and thus the mediation which the Spirit is, is the very being of the 
triune God and is the one mediating movement of love that the Father, the Son, and 
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the Spirit have unconditionally and absolutely in common. The Spirit absolutely here 
is both Father and Son. This pattern occurs threefold in the Trinity. 
Relatively considered, the mediation of the Son is the unique two-way 
communion of the only-begotten Son between the Father and his Spirit. The Son is 
neither Father nor Spirit but the third who distinguishes and upholds the two others. 
Absolutely considered, the mediation of the Son is the unconditional divinity of the 
Son that the Father and Spirit have in common and is the very being of God. The Son 
in this regard is both Father and Spirit. 
Relatively considered, the mediation of the Father is the unique unbegotten 
two-way communion between the Son and the Spirit who on account of the Father’s 
mediation can mutually mediate each other. The Father is neither the Son nor the 
Spirit. Absolutely considered, the mediation of the Father is the very same 
communion of the Spirit and the Son. The Father is the very being of God, both Son 
and Spirit. 
Mediation relatively considered distinguishes between the three persons by 
establishing three distinct unique two-way mediations between two real others. 
These are the onto-relations that constitute the persons. Mediation absolutely 
considered is a unifying concept, the personal, dynamic, relational being of God. In 
God, there is one absolute eternal movement of mediation forever taking place in 
three relative personal two-way communion-constituting mediators. Mediation 
belongs to all of the persons as it belongs to each of the persons and works as both 
distinguishing and unifying principle in the Trinity. 
Thus ‘mediation’ as a concept to describe God can be traced from the 
economic salvific activity of God in creation, through the historical missions and 
corresponding eternal processions of Son and Spirit, to the eternal communion of 
love which is God’s very being-for-others. 
 
Towards a Doctrine of a Liminal Trinity 
So far, the case for a doctrine of the Trinity with ‘mediation’ at its centre has been 
made. While chapter twelve addressed the possibility of speaking of God in terms of 
‘liminality’ through Miyahira’s theology of ‘betweenness’831 and chapter thirteen 
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discussed Christ’s death on the cross in Brunner’s work832 as an instance of ‘non-
place’, the task remains to more explicitly link this doctrine of the Trinity in terms of 
mediation based on Torrance’s theology833 with TCKs’ experience of living in 
liminality834 explored in part two. The concept of being both ‘a part of’ and ‘apart 
from’835 as well as ‘at home everywhere and nowhere’836 was explored through 
Victor Turner’s ‘liminality’837, Marc Augé’s ‘non-place’838, Zygmunt Bauman’s 
‘liquid modernity’839, and Janet Bennett’s ‘constructive marginality’840. A doctrine of 
the Trinity in terms of liminality based on mediation would be a theological example 
of constructive marginality at the very core of Christianity and would present the 
doctrine of the Trinity through concepts that truly resonate with TCKs. 
To speak of liminality and mediation within God can be misunderstood. A 
doctrine of the Trinity in terms of liminality, non-place, liquidity, marginalization 
and mediation does not argue that God is a victim of marginalization, that God is 
going through a process of transformation towards perfection or that there exists 
discord within God which needs to be overcome by reconciling mediation. Instead, it 
makes the case that there is genuine otherness and self-transcendence within the life 
of the Trinity. A doctrine of the Trinity in terms of liminality agrees with Torrance’s 
view that God’s being is a ‘being for others’.841 Liminality, non-place, liquidity, 
constructive marginality are now each applied to the Trinity. 
 
Liminality in the Trinity 
Miyahira described each Trinitarian person as ‘divine betweenness’842 which 
differentiates between the two other persons. Building on Torrance’s insights, this 
chapter has gone further to argue that based on the mutual mediations of the Son and 
the Spirit in the economy, all three divine persons can be seen as eternal mediators 
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moving in between the two other divine persons in a two-way mediating movement 
of love. Furthermore, each person can display an absolute as well as a relative 
dimension. This view of divine persons as in between mediators can now be 
described in terms of liminality, a concept central to TCKs’ identity who are said to 
live in perpetual liminality843: Each divine person exists ‘between and betwixt’ the 
other two in a position of neither/nor (relative) and both/and (absolute). Liminality 
here acts as a temporal metaphor for otherness within the Trinity which imagines a 
‘before’ and ‘after’ and a liminal period in between which is balanced on the 
threshold, informed by both yet also different from both. 
Liminality can be applied to the person of the Son as follows. The liminal Son 
is both Father and Spirit in the sense that he is the homoousial communion between 
the two (the Son absolutely considered). In the movement of love from Father to the 
Spirit, the Son represents the Father to the Spirit, and in the echoing movement of 
love from the Spirit to the Father, the Son represents the Spirit to the Father. In 
another sense, however, the Son is neither the Father nor the Spirit but a third in 
between who distinguishes between the Father and the Spirit (the Son relatively 
considered). The Son’s uniqueness rests in his distinctive mediation on the threshold 
between the Father and his Spirit in the Spirit’s procession. The Son both mediates 
the Father’s breathing out of the Spirit and the Spirit’s procession from the Father. 
The Son also maintains genuine otherness between the Father and the Spirit by 
establishing a threshold between the two. Thus intimately bound to the procession of 
the Spirit, the liminal Son plays the dual role of both distinguishing and uniting the 
Father and the Spirit. 
Turner argues that persons in liminality are invisible, metaphorically ‘dead’, 
without rights, but that they also transcend the categories of the before and after.844 
Similarly, the Son in his liminality becomes structurally invisible as he mediates 
selflessly between the Father and the Spirit. The Son can be said to have ‘died’ to the 
other two persons in his liminality, giving himself completely to the communion of 
the Father and the Spirit. Establishing the Father as Father and the Spirit as Spirit 
through his mediation, the Son becomes a no-one and forsakes all rights to an 
                                                          
843 Schaetti and Ramsey, "The Global Nomad Experience: Living in Liminality," par. 17; Gilbert, 
"Loss and Grief between and among Cultures: The Experience of Third Culture Kids," 94. 
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independent existence apart from the communion of the other two in the Spirit’s 
procession from the Father. However, the Son’s liminality also constitutes a ‘sacred 
poverty’ which lets him transcend the categories of either Father or Son within the 
Trinity and lets him exist on the threshold as that which is neither the Father nor the 
Spirit. 
Liminality thus serves as a metaphor to imagine the Son’s mediation in the 
Father’s breathing out of the Spirit and the Spirit’s procession from the Father. The 
Son holds the other two apart as the third person who is neither Father nor Spirit and 
also holds the two together as the personal homoousial bond who is both Father and 
Spirit. 
The same case can be made for the liminality of the Spirit and the liminality of 
the Father. On the one hand, the liminal Spirit (absolutely considered) in his 
mediation between the Father and the Son is both Father and Son as their 
homoousial bond that unites the two in the Father’s generation of the Son. The 
Father and Son love each other through the bond of the Spirit. On the other hand, the 
Spirit (relatively considered) is neither Father nor Son but constitutes a third in 
between the Father and the Son. The Son is begotten from the Father and stands as a 
genuine other apart from the Father through the liminality of the Spirit who 
establishes a threshold between the two in the generation of the Son. The Spirit’s 
liminality is thus found in his mediation of the generation of the Son from the Father. 
Correspondingly, as the person from whom both Son and Spirit proceed, the 
Father (absolutely considered) is both Son and Spirit. The Son and the Spirit exist in 
communion only through the liminal Father they both have in common. However, as 
the one standing in between the two, the liminal Father, being neither Son nor Spirit, 
also distinguishes the two and guarantees their otherness. Thus the Father’s 
liminality is the eternal ground of being for both the Son and the Spirit in their 
relative uniqueness. 
Each of the three persons gives themselves complete for the sake of the other 
two and can be said to ‘die’ in their liminality. As neither this person nor that person 
in between, however, each divine person also maintains genuine liminal otherness in 
the Trinitarian life of God. It is through the liminality of the Son that the Father sees 
the Spirit as truly another apart from him and vice versa. It is through the liminality 
of the Spirit that the Father sees the Son as truly another person and vice versa. And 
it is through the liminality of the Father that the Son and the Spirit are truly different 
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and can love each other in a non-narcissistic way. 
 
Trinitarian Non-Place  
Liminality in the Trinity as applied above fits neatly with the idea that each person 
constitutes a sacred, liminal ‘space’ in between the other persons. In this space, 
genuine interactions become possible. Thus, applied theologically, Augé’s non-place 
is a spatial metaphor for the Trinitarian liminality of each person. Augé distinguished 
between anthropological place with identity, history, relation and non-place without 
identity, history, and relation.845 Non-place, far from being a place of insignificance, 
is a linking space, a neutral place where others from different anthropological places 
can enter into communion. Theologically speaking, each liminal divine person can 
be imagined to constitute such a non-place in between the other two persons. 
The Son in his liminality constitutes the non-place in between, on the one 
hand, the Father in his ‘identity’, ‘history’, and ‘relation’ as Father of the Son and 
breather of the Spirit and, on the other hand, the Spirit in his ‘identity’, ‘history’, and 
‘relations’ as the person proceeding from the Father and/through the Son. ‘Identity’, 
‘history’, and ‘relations’ here stand metaphorically for each person’s relative 
distinctiveness in the Trinity. The Father and the Spirit in this case are imagined to 
constitute anthropological places which are linked through the non-place of the 
liminal Son. In his mediation, the Son opens up a neutral space for the Father and the 
Spirit to step into without the other dominating the other, without destroying their 
balanced onto-relation. Each person can remain themselves through the selfless 
sacrifice of the Son who, as non-place in between the Father and Spirit, guarantees 
their distinctiveness while allowing their communion. The Son carves out within the 
being of God a selfless non-space for others to be in order for God to be more than 
tyrannically mono-personal or narcissistically bi-personal. The non-place of the 
person of the Son represents the principle of self-transcendence, of God’s ability to 
overcome a single ‘identity’, ‘history’, and ‘relation’ to include otherness in the 
Trinitarian life of God. 
Similarly, the liminal Spirit constitutes the non-place between the 
anthropological places of the ingenerate begetting Father and the eternally begotten 
Son. The liminal Spirit creates the empty space in God’s being from which 
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distinctions can arise between the Father and the Son. The non-space of the Spirit 
constitutes the background in which the loving communion the Father and Son takes 
place. In the non-place of the Spirit, there exists an eternal space in God where the 
Father and the Son encounter, love, and glorify each other. 
Finally, the liminal Father constitutes the non-place between the 
anthropological places of the breathed out Spirit and the begotten Son. The Father in 
his liminality carves out a space in God’s being for the genuine otherness and 
communion of the Son and the Spirit. The Father’s non-place establishes the Son and 
Spirit’s ground of being. In this sense, the Father can be seen as the primordial ‘tohu 
wa-bohu’846 place which makes possible the two distinct processions of the Son and 
Spirit. 
Thus liminality and non-place, which play such significant roles in TCKs’ 
experience, can become temporal and spatial metaphors to describe the betweenness 
and mediation of God’s Trinitarian relations. Liminality and non-place describe each 
person as taking on two separate roles: that of the mediating liminal person in non-
place and that of the mediated person on each end who is distinguished and brought 
into communion. While TCKs mostly see themselves as the ones in liminality 
between the host and first contexts, for liminality to be a reality within God there 
also has to be the non-liminal. Yet it is always the non-liminal being invited to enter 
into liminality by the person in between. Furthermore, while being non-liminal in 
one sense (e.g. the Father in relation to the Spirit through the liminality of the Son) 
each person is always also simultaneously liminal in another sense (e.g. the Father in 
his liminality in between the Son and the Spirit). The Trinity thus perfectly balances 
‘being oneself’ with ‘letting others be themselves’. 
 
Liquid Trinity 
This brings the discussion of a liminal Trinity to Bauman’s dual concepts of liquidity 
and solidity.847 As explored in chapter ten, Bauman has criticised the trend to remain 
exclusively liquid so as not to commit oneself or tie oneself down.848 Liquids 
without gaps to fill and forms to take the shape of risk becoming irrelevant puddles. 
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TCKs without a purposeful engagement in contexts such as their host or home 
cultures risk experiencing their marginality as encapsulating. The Trinity can be seen 
as an interplay of solid and liquid states which safeguards liquidity from becoming 
pointless aloofness and demonstrates for TCKs a purposeful commitment at the heart 
of the Trinity. 
A liquid Trinity imagines the mediating divine person freely shifting shapes 
like a liquid in the interplay of the other two mediated persons in that instance 
solidify. The liminal Son in between the Father and the Spirit becomes a 
shapeshifting liquid, filling the space between the persons thereby becoming a 
seamless medium between them. The image of engine lubricant reducing wear on 
moving parts in an internal combustion engine might serve as an illustration. The 
liquid Son takes on the shape of the Father towards the Spirit and the shape of the 
Spirit towards the Father and thus brings the two into contact without the Father 
losing his fatherly quality and the Spirit losing his spiritual quality. The liquid Son in 
between the Father and the Spirit maintains harmony even amidst genuine 
difference. It is the unbound freedom of liminality that lets the Son exhibit such 
plasticity in his liquid mediation. The Son’s fluidity does not result in his 
disassociation from the Father and the Spirit but in his unique mediatorial 
engagement in between the two as the one through whom the Spirit proceeds from 
the Father and the one through whom the Spirit pays homage to the Father. Thus, in 
the Son’s mediation between the Father and the Spirit, the Son is in a liquid state but 
the Father and the Spirit are in solid states. 
Similarly, the Spirit in his liminality between the Father and the Son takes on 
the role of the liquid medium in between the two. The liquid Spirit fills the void in 
between the Father and the Son maintaining their eternal relation as well as their 
distinctiveness as Father of the Son and Son of the Father. The fluid Spirit takes on 
the shape of the Father towards the Son and the Son towards the Father in his 
freedom. The liquidity of the Spirit allows the existence of fatherly and filial solids 
within the Trinity without dissonance. 
Correspondingly, the Father in his liminality in between the Son and the Spirit 
fills the empty space with his liquid presence completely engulfing the surface area 
of the solid Son or solid Spirit. The Father takes on the shape of the Son towards the 
Spirit and the shape of the Spirit towards the Son freely shifting shapes in his 
fluidity. The liminal Father thus freely loves the Son and the Spirit in his liminality. 
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The metaphor of liquidity thus imagines the Trinitarian persons to melt as well 
as solidify in their roles as mediators and the mediated, freely shifting forms and 
function but maintaining one purpose, namely, that of performing effective 
mediation for the benefit of others in loving communion. The divine persons put 
their freedom rooted in liminality to work in mediation between different others. 
Because each person betwixt and between the others is both neither/nor and both/and 
they can take on the shape of two others. 
 
Constructive Marginality in the Trinity 
As this presentation of a liminal Trinity has already hinted at, Trinitarian liminality 
as described above exhibits constructive marginality which can overcome 
dichotomies and exert purposeful commitment without fear.849 A constructive 
marginal construct contexts intentionally, experiences authenticity, and shifts 
smoothly between identification with others (both/and; ‘being a part of’) as well 
differing from others (neither/nor; ‘being apart from’). 
The divine persons in their liminality display this commitment to mediation in 
their liminality and thus own their in-betweenness wholeheartedly. The Trinitarian 
persons in their liminality can thus be described as the perfect embodiment of 
constructive marginality. As Muneo Yoshikawa’s double swing model describes, the 
divine persons find themselves in a dynamic in-between able to overcome the 
dichotomy of either/or between two divine persons.850 
Furthermore, as Bochner et al. suggest the divine mediating persons are able to 
relate perfectly to their two counterparts while also transcending the other two.851 In 
the words of Ronald Taft, in their mediation the divine persons have “two skills in 
one skull”.852 The Son has intimate knowledge of the Father as well as of the Spirit 
in his mediation between them; the Spirit of the Father and the Son; and the Father 
of the Son and Spirit. This is possible as all three persons have one numerically 
identical being. 
However, even in their relative difference in their onto-relations, each person 
standing in between the other two is able to relate intimately to the persons at both 
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ends of the relation. The Son is intimately engaged in the procession of the Spirit 
from the Father and the Spirit’s glorification of the Father. The Spirit is intimately 
engaged in the generation of the Son from the Father and the Son’s obedience to the 
Father. The Father is intimately engaged in the two processions emanating from his 
being and in the mutual mediation between the Spirit and the Son. 
As mediators, metaphorically speaking each person can thus be said to be 
‘bilingual’: the Son is able to translate the Father spiritually towards the Spirit and 
the Spirit fatherly towards the Father in his mediation between the two; the Spirit 
translates the Father filially towards the Son and the Son fatherly towards the Father 
in his mediation between the two; and the Father translate the Son spiritually towards 
the Spirit and the Spirit filially towards the Son as mediator in between the two. 
In fact, it can be argued that the bilingual mediation of the Son in between the 
Father and Spirit constitutes who the Son is eternally, inherently, and antecedently to 
his faithful mediation between God and humanity and in the pouring out of the Spirit 
onto creation. The bilingual mediation of the Spirit between the Father and the Son 
constitutes who the Spirit is eternally, inherently, and antecedently to his faithful 
mediation between the Father and the Son in his birth, life, death, and resurrection 
and in the actualization of the mediation of the Son within each believer. The 
bilingual mediation of the Father between the Son and the Spirit is who the Father is 
eternally, inherently, and antecedently to the sending out of the Spirit and the Son in 
their mutual mediation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that mediation proves to be a rich enough concept to speak 
of the various aspects of the Trinitarian self-revelation of God and, while not an 
exclusive language to describe the ineffable Holy Trinity, nevertheless is a valid 
language to speak of God. Mediation succeeds in describing the salvific work of the 
Spirit and the Son, the onto-relational dynamics that constitute the persons, and the 
one absolute communion-constituting being of the Trinity expressed relatively and 
uniquely in each person. 
Based on this doctrine of the Trinity in terms of mediation implicit in 
Torrance’s mature theology, the theological application of the key TCK concept 
identified in part two becomes possible. This chapter thus presented a doctrine of the 
Trinity in terms of liminality, non-place, liquidity, and constructive marginality. 
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Speaking of the Trinity in such terms constitutes a step forward towards a TCK 
theology able to resonate with TCKs in their lived experience of liminality. By 
highlighting the aspect of mediatorial liminality within the dynamics of the Trinity, 
TCKs can find a spark of divinity in their everyday lives as cultural mediators. 
Having fleshed out the doctrine of the Trinity in terms familiar to TCKs, next a 
closer look is given to the incarnation of the Son and his liminality as a two-natured 





Towards a Liminal Christology 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to build on the previous argument for a liminal Trinity 
and draw conclusions of what it means for the incarnation of the Son. If liminality 
and mediation are at the heart of the Trinity, then we ought to be able to give an 
account of the life and death of Jesus Christ in accordance with these. The guiding 
themes continue to be first and foremost liminality853, together with non-place854, 
liquidity855, and mediation856. This chapter will rely on Thomas Torrance’s dynamic 
two-nature Christology which sees Christ as mediator amidst enmity between God 
and humanity and argues for Christ as the proto-Third Culture Kid being both 
translator between God and humanity (mediation of revelation) and mediator 
between two parties at odds (mediation of reconciliation). The divine nature 
symbolizes Christ’s ‘home culture’ and the human nature symbolises Christ’s ‘host 
culture’.  
Theological works emphasizing the marginality of Christ’s assumed human 
nature as a first century Galilean Jew already exist. For example, the Korean 
American theologian Sang Hyn Lee writes from the perspective of the 
marginalization of Korean immigrants in the United States describing how their 
encapsulating marginality can be creatively transformed through the encounter with 
a Christ who is himself liminal.857 Lee makes the case for the geographical, cultural, 
and religious liminality of Christ’s assumed Galilean humanity in solidarity with the 
marginalized.858 
While such exploration of Christ’s liminality in his humanity certainly has its 
place, this chapter seeks to describe Christ’s theological liminality as the Son of God 
who is “send into the far country” 859 in order to mediate between “the things of God 
                                                          
853 Turner, "Liminality and Community." Schaetti and Ramsey, "The Global Nomad Experience: 
Living in Liminality." 
854 Augé, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity.  
855 Bauman, Liquid Modernity. 
856 Bochner, The Mediating Person: Bridges between Cultures. 
857 Sang Hyun Lee, From a Liminal Place : An Asian American Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2010). 
858 Ibid., 43-44. 
859 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1, 157-210. 
225 
 
and the things of humanity.”860 We will thus argue that Christ’s liminality can most 
clearly be seen in his two-natured person, betwixt and between God and humanity 
who are at odds with each other. Furthermore, while Nozomu Miyahira sees this 
‘betweenness’ as a sinful obstacle to overcome,861 we will argue that Christ in his 
personal liminality opens up a reconciling space between God and humanity. This 
‘betweenness’ is thus a positive outcome of Christ’s work as mediator and makes 
possible the identity bestowing encounter with Emil Brunner’s ‘Gott-zum-Menschen-
hin.’862 
This chapter, first, briefly reviews the traditional two-nature Christology of the 
Chalcedonian settlement, second, analyses Torrance’s criticism of Chalcedon, third, 
outlines Torrance’s alternative dynamic doctrine of Christ, and finally constructs a 
liminal doctrine of Christ fitting for a TCK-Theology. 
 
The Two-natured Christology of the Chalcedonian Settlement 
A brief review of the traditional two-nature Christology will help set our subsequent 
discussion of the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures on a firm 
theological foundation. After the outbreak of the Nestorian and the Monophysite 
controversies, the fourth ecumenical council at Chalcedon in AD 451 officially 
settled the question of the unity of the person of Christ and the distinction of the 
divine and human natures.863 Two parties, Cyril of Alexandria (c. 376-444) and his 
various supporters based in Alexandria and the Antioch educated bishop of 
Constantinople Nestorius (c. 386-450) with the support of the Syrian bishops, had 
alternative understandings of the unity and distinction of the divinity and humanity 
of Christ. 
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The question of the unqualified divinity of the Word of God was affirmed 
against Arianism at the Council of Nicaea in 325864 and the complete humanity of 
Christ was affirmed against Apollinarianism at the Council of Constantinople in 
381.865 The discussion now shifted to how these two could be united in Jesus Christ. 
Cyril of Alexandria emphasised the unity of the one incarnate Christ over the 
God/human distinction but thereby endangered the authenticity of Christ’s 
humanity.866 Insisting on a hypostatic union, Cyril wanted to safeguard, first, the real 
presence of God in Jesus Christ,867 and second, the exchange of properties between 
the natures868. The whole point of the incarnation was that the impassible God truly 
became involved in human affairs and that humanity was transformed by God.869 
Nestorius argued that this hypostatic union made God passible and divinizes 
humanity thereby destroying any resemblance of an authentic humanity.870 In his 
sharp distinction between divinity and humanity, Nestorius, first, insisted on 
maintaining the unqualified impassibility of the Word, and second, argued for the 
genuine human life of growth and development in Jesus if he was to the be the 
second Adam of redemption.871 Cyril accused Nestorius of splitting the one incarnate 
Word into two loosely related independent persons.872 
J. N. D. Kelly comments that “[e]ach had its strong points, but also its counter-
balancing defects, and it must have been obvious that, if a solution was to be found, 
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they would both have to make their contributions.”873 The first step towards 
agreement came in the form of the Formula of Union of AD 433.874 It affirmed the 
duality of natures but also the Word as the subject of the Man-God. Further progress 
was made through the introduction of insights from the Latin tradition through Pope 
Leo’s Tome.875 Leo initially supported Cyril but, as the Monophysite controversy 
erupted, adopted a more Antiochian stance emphasizing the assumption of a concrete 
human being with moral and psychological autonomy.876 The Tome, first, identifies 
the person of the incarnate God-man with the Word, second, argues that nevertheless 
each nature retains their unique properties, third, maintains that each nature, while 
always acting in harmony, has their own principle of operation, and finally, suggests 
that due to the unity of the person and the duality of the natures it is possible to 
predicate properties from both natures to the one numerically identical person of 
Christ without destroying the integrity of the natures.877 
Finally, the fourth ecumenical council held in Chalcedon in 451 officially 
settled the question of how to describe the unity and the duality in the incarnate 
Christ. It produced a Definition of Faith including a formal confession. 878 The 
confession draws on Cyril’s letters, the Formula of Union, Leo’s Tome, and 
Flavian’s Confession of Faith879. The Confession rejects the duality of sons, the 
passibility of the Word, the mixture of the natures, a single nature after the union, 
and an alien human nature of Christ.880 
The following points are stressed in the Confession. First, the Confession 
repeatedly mentions that Christ is ‘the very same Son’ in his humanity as well as 
divinity. It treats ‘prosopon’ and ‘hypostasis’ synonymously reserving them to refer 
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Oecumenicorum, Tome II, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 114. 
880 Norris, The Christological Controversy, 158. 
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to the unity of Christ. The two natures do not divide Christ into ‘two prosopa’. The 
divine Word is thus the one unique subject of the incarnate. Second, it affirms 
Christ’s consubstantiality with us. Christ’s humanity is the very same humanity as 
ours, complete with soul and body, except for sin. Third, Mary is named ‘theotokos’, 
as the Son was born of her according to his humanity, thereby affirming the 
communication of properties in the Son. Fourthly, the Son is acknowledged ‘in two 
natures’ as opposed to ‘from/of two natures’ as it could be misunderstood to refer to 
the dual natures prior to the union only.881 
The confession reserves physis (nature) to refer to the duality in Christ and 
clearly distinguished it from prosopon / hypostasis. The two natures are ‘inconfuse, 
immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter’ (without confusion, without change, without 
division, without separation). The former two words are meant to explicitly reject 
Eutychianism’s fusion of two natures into one God-human nature resulting in the 
destruction of the integrity of the respective natures. The latter two words are meant 
to exclude Nestorianism’s excessive separation of the two natures at the expense of 
the integrity of the unity of the one person of Christ. Thus, each nature’s integrity 
(the impassibility of the Godhead and the specific identity of Christ’s humanity to 
ours) is preserved. Each nature operates distinctively but comes together in the one 
person of Christ.882 
This review of the traditional two-nature Christology shows the soteriological 
concerns behind the discussion. The unity of Christ in one person must be affirmed if 
Jesus is to truly reveal and reconcile us to God. Along with the hypostatic union 
some form of exchange of properties between the natures must also be maintained in 
order for Jesus’ actions to be attributed to God and hence to be able to argue that the 
assumed humanity was redeemed (and thus transformed from corrupted to healed) 
through the Son. However, at the same time each nature’s reality must be protected. 
The humanity of Christ, while relying for its existence on the hypostasis of the Son 
(and thus being unlike our humanity), must be granted its own space to grow and 
suffer if it is to have any kind of resemblance to our adamic experience of what it 
means to be human. Correspondingly, while attributing the birth, life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus to the second person of the Trinity, God must be said to 
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faithfully remain God in the incarnation. There emerges a tension between the need 
for Christ’s humanity to be a genuine human nature like ours existing under the 
impact of a fallen world while also being a unique faithful human nature completely 
unlike ours. Similarly, ungodly human attributes such as suffering, death, and even 
sin are attributed to the divine person of the Son while the Son cannot be thought of 
as ceasing to be God. These tensions while woven into the text of the confession are 
largely left for others to wrestle with. 
Thus Chalcedon arrived at a description of the status of the incarnate Christ, 
two natures in one person. The hypostatic union of divine and human nature in the 
one and only second person of the Trinity has this agreement as its basis and it is this 
Chalcedonian framework which will serve as our foundation for constructing an 
account of the incarnate Christ as our liminal mediator who due to his personal unity 
is able to achieve the reconciliation between God and humanity, both representing 
God to humanity and humanity to God. Because of the communication of attributes, 
we can speak of God truly speaking and acting as human and our humanity truly 
being resurrected and present at the right hand of the Father. 
 
Thomas Torrance on Chalcedon’s Christology 
At this point our discussion of the two natures in one person will benefit greatly from 
the insights of Torrance. While the Chalcedonian settlement was a monumental 
accomplishment, its Christology falls short on several accounts.883 The Christ of 
Chalcedon was a mostly static figure meant to ward off erroneous conceptions of 
what Christ is. We, however, are more interested in a dynamic account of the person 
of Christ as mediator in the tradition of Athanasius: Christ who in his person and 
work ministers of the things of humanity to God and of the things of God to 
humanity.884 We are looking for ways to describe a metaphorical ‘bilingual Christ’ 
who mediates revelation and a metaphorical ‘bicultural Christ’ who mediates 
reconciliation not just at his birth but throughout his life, death, and resurrection. 
Torrance argues against the static description of Christ at Chalcedon for a more 
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dynamic account which sees the hypostatic union as something that Christ achieves 
in his birth, life, death, and resurrection.  
 
Torrance’s Three Points of Criticism 
The hypostatic union plays a significant role in Torrance’s doctrine of atonement885 
and while he acknowledges Chalcedon’s contribution he also expresses his 
dissatisfaction with it:  
There can be no doubt that the Chalcedonian formulation of the [hypostatic] Union 
in Christ was one of the greatest and most important in the whole field of theology, 
and yet it was formulated in almost entire abstraction from the historical life and work 
of Jesus Christ from His birth to His resurrection. It is one of the most pressing needs 
of theology to have the hypostatic union restated much more in terms of the mission 
of Christ, much more from the perspective of the cross and resurrection.886 
Torrance has three issues with this abstract account of the hypostatic union: first, the 
lack of connection to atonement; second, the ambiguous nature of Christ’s ‘neutral’ 
humanity; third, the so-called ‘Latin Heresy”. 
 
(a) Incarnation and Atonement 
Torrance argues that the early Church failed to relate the incarnation to Christ’s 
atoning work.887 He writes that “we have to see that reconciliation is the hypostatic 
union at work in expiation and atonement, and therefore that [the] hypostatic union 
cannot be expounded aright except in terms of Christ’s active ministry within our 
(…) estrangement.”888 Chalcedon does not go far enough and leaves the impression 
that atonement is something added to the hypostatic union.889 In Torrance, the 
incarnation and atonement are intrinsically linked to one another instead.890 Gunther 
Pratz comments that for Torrance “the incarnation has to be seen as essentially 
redemptive, and the redemption has to be seen as inherently incarnational or 
                                                          
885 Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance : Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology, 81-
84.  
886 Thomas F. Torrance, "The Atonement and the Oneness of the Church," Scottish Journal of 
Theology 7, no. 03 (1954): 246. 
887 Incarnation : The Person and Life of Christ, 183. 
888 Ibid., 184. 
889 "The Atonement and the Oneness of the Church," 247. 
890 Gunther Pratz, "The Relationship between Incarnation and Atonement in the Theology of Thomas 
F. Torrance," Journal for Christian Theological Research 3, no. 2 (1998). (This article uses paragraph 
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ontological.”891 The two cannot be dealt with in isolation because the incarnation, far 
from being a one-time event, is a continuing movement of identification with 
humanity in Christ’s life. Similarly, the atonement is not merely about the cross but 
Christ began to pay the price of our redemption from conception and continued to do 
so until his vicarious death.892 This means that the hypostatic union constitutes a 
‘continuous union’ in the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Christ.893 The cross is 
the culmination of an intensifying enmity between the judge (God incarnate) and the 
judged (God incarnate) as a result of Christ’s increasing solidarity with sinners and 
growing interpenetration of our alienation from God.894 Thus, the crucial issue is not 
the mere acknowledgment of the two natures in one person, but the working out of 
that union in the life of Christ for the purpose of our salvation in terms of Christ’s 
growing identification with sinful humanity and simultaneous living out of the 
obedience of the faithful Son of God. 
 
(b) The nature of Christ’s assumed humanity  
Torrance’s stress on Christ’s identification with sinners brings us to the second 
point: What is the nature of the assumed humanity of Christ? Was it a neutral 
humanity or ‘our adamic fallen human nature’895? Chalcedon stresses the complete 
consubstantiality of Christ with us but Torrance points out that “the Chalcedonian 
statement does not say that this human nature of Christ was human nature ‘under the 
servitude of sin’ as Athanasius insisted.”896 He detects a growing shyness post-
Nicaea of speaking of the assumption of ‘our flesh of sin’ in fear that it might 
damage the perfection of humanity in Christ.897 The same tendency can be seen in 
Cyril who stressed that the life-giving ‘holy flesh’ of Christ is unlike our corrupted 
humanity.898 Limiting the assumption to a neutral (unfallen) humanity goes against 
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the soteriological principle that ‘the unassumed is the unhealed’899 (non-assumptus), 
a crucial principle in Torrance’s theology.900 For Torrance, Christ penetrated our 
sinful humanity in order to sanctify it and bring it back into communion with God 
within himself.901 He therefore describes it as a sinless assumption of our sinful 
adamic human nature in which Christ is both like us and unlike us.902 Christ both 
identifies with our fallen nature and also sanctifies it within himself. Therefore, 
Torrance argues that “if we think of Christ as assuming neutral and perfect humanity, 
then the doctrine of the hypostatic union may well be stated statically. But if it is our 
fallen humanity that he sinlessly assumed, in order to heal and sanctify it, not only 
through the act of assumption, but through a life of perfect obedience and a death in 
sacrifice, then we cannot state the doctrine of the hypostatic union statically but must 
state it dynamically.”903 A neutral humanity in Christ in a static union would merely 
be instrumental and atonement would become an act of God done externally to 
humanity rather than a truly incarnate divine act from within humanity. 
 
 (c) The Latin Heresy 
Finally, Torrance criticises what he calls ‘Latin Heresy.’904 The Latin Heresy is an 
umbrella term for Torrance which includes all aspects of a dualistic, external relation 
between God and the world. Of interest is how this pertains to the incarnation and 
atonement. Torrance traces back the origins of the Latin Heresy to Leo’s Tome in 
which a dualist outlook separated the divine and the human in the person and work 
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of Christ and as a result started a trend that impoverished the doctrine of the 
atonement in the Latin Church.905 Torrance writes: 
[I]f we operate only with an external relation between the Son and the Father, we 
are unable to give any saving significance to the human life and activity of Christ in 
the form of a servant, for it rules out of account any direct personal intervention by 
God himself in our lost and damned human condition.906 
Instead, we must see the hypostatic union as an atoning union of the Holy One and 
our sinful humanity in which atonement is accomplished internally, not as an 
external transaction between God and humanity. Viewing atonement apart from the 
hypostatic union of God and humanity in Christ depicts the cross mainly as an 
external transference of penalty between sinners and God.907 Christ’s humanity 
would have accomplished atonement by being a moral example of inspiration in self-
giving on the cross or by being put to death as a scape goat for our sins granting us 
an alien forensic righteousness. How Christ lived out his life as the obedient Son of 
the Father, how the Father raised the Son from the dead to then ascend to his right 
hand would, strictly speaking, have no bearing on such a cross-centred atonement 
theory. Instead, Torrance sees Christ’s atoning death as the outcome of the 
hypostatic union in which Christ is internally related to (i.e. homoousios) both God 
and sinful humanity. The cross then is the result of the Son, very God of very God, 
descending into our alienation from God, not the rejection by God of a perfect 
instrumental human nature upon whom humanity’s sin is somehow transferred. For 
Torrance, the whole of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection is a matter of restorative 
justice where the very corruption in the depth of our adamic human nature is undone 
within Christ in order to restore humanity. 
 
Torrance’s Dynamic Hypostatic Union 
Viewing the hypostatic union as an atoning mediation in which the Son sinlessly 
assumes our fallen adamic human nature in order to restore it from within through 
his birth, life, death, and resurrection requires a dynamic perspective of the 
hypostatic union that views the penetration of our alienated condition by the divine 
                                                          
905 Torrance, "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," 477.  
906 Ibid., 473. 
907 Ibid., 476. 
234 
 
Son as an increasingly intensifying movement. Torrance therefore names it a 
‘continuous union.’908 
Why is such a dynamic account of importance to us? First, a dynamic account 
of God moving into time is consistent with the dynamic account of the eternal triune 
mediating movements of love. Torrance writes that “the hypostatic union is 
grounded in the eternal communion of Father, Son and Holy Spirit within the Holy 
Trinity.”909 The dynamic hypostatic union stands in continuity with our account of 
the Trinity as Torrance’s Theorem910 suggests. Treatment of the hypostatic union 
merits a description in terms of the language we have already applied to the 
Trinitarian relations. There is an eternal and essential relation between the hypostatic 
union of God and humanity in Christ and the tripersonal unity of the Trinity.911  
Second, a dynamic account of the hypostatic union brings together the 
incarnation and the crucifixion. Instead of seeing the incarnation and atonement on 
the cross as two loosely related events, the hypostatic union and Christ’s self-
sacrifice belong to one and the same atoning divine movement in which the Son 
descends into our human condition and we ascend in union with him to communion 
with God. Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection are the quintessential example of 
encapsulating and constructive marginality. If the death and resurrection of Christ is 
the incarnation at work in atonement, then this lets us describe the hypostatic union 
in light of Christ’s liminality on the cross. This dynamic account of Christ’s two 
natures in one person is fitting to a TCK-theology as the increasingly intensifying 
contradiction experienced by the Son in the continuous union drives our account of 
his liminality betwixt and between God and humanity who are at odds and in need of 
mediation. 
What exactly does a ‘dynamic’ account of the hypostatic union entail? 
Torrance sees Christ as exercising a two-fold ministry.912 Andrew Purves describes 
this as “a humanward and a Godward direction, in which Christ mediates God to us 
and us to God in the unity of his incarnate person.”913 In other words, there is a 
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human-directed movement and a God-directed movement in the life of Christ both of 
which need to be seen as taking place in the undivided unity of the person and the 
unconfused duality of natures.914 We need to see the life of Christ as the work of the 
faithful and obedient Son of the Father as well as the work of the Servant who 
increasingly identifies with and remains faithful to the sinful humanity he assumed. 
Each of these movements, however, has a counter-movement of rejection: the fallen 
humanity Christ assumed has rejected God and God incarnate comes also to judge 
this fallen humanity. Both Godward and humanward movements thus need to be 
seen as incorporating the duality of Christ’s fallen human and righteous divine 
natures. With the assumption of sinful human nature, each of the movements of 
Christ has the dual aspect of acceptance and rejection to it. We will look at each 
movement in turn.  
 
The God-ward movement 
Since the Son is homoousios with the Father and thus is in unbroken relation with 
him even in his incarnation, the Son lives in perfect faithful obedience to his own 
Father from birth to death and resurrection.915 For Torrance, this entails Christ’s 
complete dependence on the Father in prayer916, Christ’s absolute obedience to the 
Father917, and Christ’s perfect reflection of the divine glory.918 The goal of this 
Godward movement of faithfulness in Christ is to restore from within our 
estrangement from God the image of God in which humanity was created. The 
human response to God’s word is actualised and secured in Christ’s filial 
faithfulness to the Father. Unlike us in our estranged humanity, Christ lives out “the 
true life of man created after God and actualised in real righteousness and 
holiness.”919 In this sense Christ is unlike us. 
This faithfulness of the Son to the Father needs to be seen in the light of both 
Christ’s sinless assumption as well as Christ’s assumption of sinful humanity. On the 
one hand, Christ vicariously lives out the perfect life God had envisioned for 
humanity in union with God. On the other hand, Christ appropriates and represents 
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before God our sinful humanity under God’s judgment and accepts this judgment 
obediently. Torrance thus speaks of Christ’s active and passive righteousness.920 
Christ’s active obedience/righteousness corresponds to the above described positive 
fulfilment of Father’s will in Christ’s life. The passive obedience/righteousness 
means Christ’s submission to the judgment of the Father. Christ assumed our fallen 
adamic humanity and willingly brings it before the Father to be judged and 
destroyed. The active obedience highlights the embodied living out of true sonship 
before the Father (perfect incarnation of the Son). The passive obedience highlights 
the divine act of bringing fallen humanity into God’s holy presence (assumption of 
our sinful humanity). Both the incarnation and the crucifixion need to be seen as 
Christ being actively and passively obedient to the Father, living faithfully as the 
Son of the Father yet doing so within our cursed existence. Both the active and 
passive righteousness of Christ are dynamic in that they take place throughout the 
Son’s mission but the passive obedience is most visible in the crucifixion. 
In this sense of both representing humanity to God on our behalf as well as 
substituting for us in accepting judgment, Torrance, rather than speaking of a mere 
atoning vicarious death, speaks of the atoning “vicarious humanity of Jesus”.921 
Christ from the beginning of the incarnation in birth to the ascension lives on behalf 
of humanity in active and passive obedience securing humanity’s salvation. 
 
The Human-ward Movement 
Torrance describes the second movement in Christ of God’s faithfulness to humanity 
in terms of Christ as shepherd and king.922 Christ the shepherd represents the 
compassion Christ has for his lost sheep, especially the marginalized people of his 
time.923 Torrance describes Christ’s compassion not as a feeling but an act, namely 
the act of taking on the suffering of others. Every act of healing or forgiveness thus 
cost Christ something and was performed in agony.924 The assumption of our broken 
humanity was thus truly an act of making our brokenness his own and paying for our 
restoration. Christ lived his life increasingly appropriating our brokenness as an 
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atoning sacrifice until he was ‘made perfect’ by bearing the worst humanity has to 
offer on the cross.925 In this sense, Christ the shepherd is truly one of us. 
As king, Christ brought the sovereign kingdom of God to bear on humanity. 
Torrance writes that “[Christ] was perfectly free to be what he was and to do what he 
had come to do. (…) He was not bound by man, by any power of nature or history, 
by any of the fetters and shackles which all other men and women know only too 
well.”926 While in compassion Christ was increasingly encapsulated by our 
brokenness, as king he was free and his kingdom violently imposed itself on our 
estranged humanity exposing humanity’s vain attempts to establish itself 
independently through religious, political, or social power. God’s faithfulness 
towards humanity thus also involved the dethroning of humanity’s false gods which 
corrupted humanity’s true identity as God’s creatures created ex nihilo. Torrance 
describes the arrival of God’s kingdom in Christ as follows: “It meant the time had 
been fulfilled, and the time was at hand, had even now overtaken the world, when 
the kingdom of God was present, threating to uproot every earthly dominion, every 
human power, and all their entrenched authorities and sanctions. Final judgment had 
begun (…).”927 Christ’s faithfulness towards humans thus also involves the judgment 
of our fallenness. This judgment is done on our behalf: “Jesus (…) gathers into the 
sovereign grace of the kingdom all the very worst that man can do, in order thus to 
break the power of guilt and set people free from being the rebels that they had 
become.”928 Christ’s judgment as king liberates us from our own constructed 
demeaning schemes that marginalize people. 
Christ’s human-directed movement of faithfulness has a double outcome: On 
the one hand, Christ in compassion submits to the earthly corrupt powers and 
ailments. He lets himself be victimized and eventually be killed in complete 
solidarity with our alienation and marginalization. Christ is ‘dehumanized’ in his 
faithfulness towards humanity. On the other hand, Christ’s sovereignty exposes the 
very dehumanization he takes on. Paradoxically, from birth to death Christ displays 
both submission to our condition and judgment of our condition. 
Unity of Christ’s Double Movement 
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The dynamic account of Torrance’s atoning hypostatic union thus has several 
dimensions which all need to be seen within Christ’s unity of the person and duality 
of natures. It is the undivided Christ who both makes our sinful humanity his own as 
well as embodies God for us. Torrance writes that as Jesus 
involved himself more and more, intertwined himself more and more completely with 
sinners, until in the fullest sense and most personal sense he was the representative of 
the divine judge to us, condemning by his truth our sin in the flesh, and was also our 
representative, representing us the judged as he wore our humanity. Because he was 
God’s Son become man he could both incarnate God for us, and represent us before 
God, this one man on behalf of all men and women.929 
Christ in his two natures was thus a double representative, representing God to 
humanity and humanity to God. The uncompromised integrity of the natures in the 
incarnation signifies the complete nature of Christ’s double representation. Christ 
faithfully represents us sinners before the Father as the one and only Son of the 
Father and faithfully represents God the Father as the Father’s consubstantial Son in 
true human form. 
As we have seen above, however, this unity of representation had within itself 
a dissonance due to our sin. The growing closeness between God and humanity leads 
to an intensifying contradiction and enmity between God and humanity. The Son’s 
filial faithfulness leads to him being judged by the Father and the Son’s 
compassionate taking on of our brokenness goes hand in hand with the Son’s 
cataclysmic exposure of our condition. The cross is both the Son’s exposure of our 
condition and the taking on of that very condition. In Christ, God is both just to 
sinners and justifier of sinners. These two are held together by the dual faithfulness 
of the one person of Christ.930 The hypostatic union, dynamically understood as 
Christ’s mediating movements between God and humanity throughout his life, 
cannot lead anywhere but the crucifixion where Christ endured the full contradiction 
of his perfected unity and through which Christ’s true liminality becomes apparent. 
 
Towards a Doctrine of a Liminal Christ 
Following the steps towards a doctrine of a liminal Trinity in the previous chapter, 
the remainder of this chapter is devoted to the application of our conceptual tools, 
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liminality,931 non-place,932 liquidity,933 and constructive marginality,934 to 
Christology. The goal is to describe the person and work of Christ in categories that 
TCKs who themselves live life in liminality935 can appreciate. While liminality in the 
life of the Trinity focused on maintaining otherness among the three Trinitarian 
persons in their relations, the liminality of Christ takes place under the impact of sin 
and the focus thus shifts to establishing harmony between two parties at odds. The 
liminality of Christ, nevertheless, reflects the eternal liminality of the Trinity.  
 
Liminality in Christ 
As we have seen so far, the Godward movement and humanward movement in 
Christ each have two aspects: In this vicarious humanity we see Christ living out the 
life of the perfect Son representing humanity and also accepting God’s judgment of 
fallen humanity as a substitute (Godward movement). Through the incarnation of the 
divine person of the Son, we also see God identifying with sinners as well as the 
divine exposure of human corruption (Humanward movement). The simultaneous 
identification with sinners who reject God and rejection of sinners by God leads to 
the incarnate Son’s intensifying liminality betwixt and between God and humanity. 
Christ’s liminality is driven by contradiction. 
Torrance writes that “there are, then, three factors to be taken into account, 
God and mankind, or God and his people, the two parties of the covenant 
partnership, but within that polarity, the all-important middle factor, the vicarious 
humanity of Jesus.”936 The incarnate Son emerges as a third standing on the 
threshold between God and humanity, simultaneously representing both divinity and 
humanity: God in divine  judgment of sin on the one hand and the perfect humanity 
in the active obedience of Christ’s vicarious humanity on the other hand. Through 
his birth, life, death, and resurrection, Christ displays what true humanity in harmony 
with God looks like. The anhypostatic assumed humanity is brought fully to life 
                                                          
931 Turner, "Liminality and Community."; "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites De 
Passage." 
932 Augé, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. 
933 Bauman, Liquid Modernity. 
934 Bennett, "Cultural Marginality: Identity Issues in Intercultural Training."; Yoshikawa, "Cross-
Cultural Adaptation and Perceptual Development."; "The Double Swing Model of Intercultural 
Communication between the East and the West."; Bochner, The Mediating Person: Bridges between 
Cultures. 
935 Schaetti and Ramsey, "The Global Nomad Experience: Living in Liminality." 
936 Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, 77. 
240 
 
through being enhypostatic in the person of the perfect Son of the Father.937 The Son 
also brings the presence of a holy God into a fallen world thus exposing humanity’s 
corruption and judging it, establishing God on earth as sovereign creator. In this 
positive sense, the two-natured incarnate Son is thus both divine and human. 
However, there are also the other two aspects of the twofold God/humanward 
movements: God identifying with sinful humanity and taking on their ungodly 
corruption on the one hand and Christ’s passive acceptance of the godly destruction 
of our fallen humanity on the other hand. These two aspects begin with the birth of 
the incarnate Son but find their most visible climax in the crucifixion. Regarding the 
former, the life and death of Christ describes God’s descend into human 
godforsakenness. In forgiving and healing humanity, the Son takes on humanity’s sin 
and sickness. This finds its apex in Jesus’s quotation of Psalm 22:1 on the cross: ‘My 
God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’938 The Son’s identification with sinful 
humanity is brought to completion with the ‘death of God’ on the cross.939 
Interestingly, however, the Son’s descent into godforsakenness is paralleled by the 
Son’s increasing persecution by humanity who reject him. The Son, in passive 
obedience, advances towards the cross and willingly suffers the increasing 
dehumanization. God here uses the sinful rejection of the Son of God by humanity in 
order to put to death and destroy the fallen humanity Christ assumed. The Son’s 
bringing of God’s judgment to humanity thus finds its completion in the total 
destruction of the fallen human nature in Christ on the cross. In this negative sense, 
the two-natured Son must be said to also be neither God nor human but completely 
alien to both God and humanity in the crucifixion’s ‘de-divinization’ and 
dehumanization. This fits well with Victor Turner’s description of liminality as 
‘death’, the loss of rights, but also the transcendence of categories.940 The 
crucifixion, far from being an encapsulating defeat, reveals Christ’s ‘sacred poverty’. 
The deconstruction of God and humanity on the cross liberates Christ from the 
absolute categories God and humanity. 
                                                          
937 Incarnation : The Person and Life of Christ, 84, 227-33. 
938 The Mediation of Christ, 43. 
939 This death of God is of course repeated with every instance of complete godforsakenness in which 
the Son of God descends in solidarity. See for example the Eliezer’s answer to the question of where 
God is when a child was hung in Monowitz concentration camp: “Here he is—He is hanging here on 
this gallows.” Elie Wiesel, Night (New York; London: Bantam Books, 1960), 61-62. 
940 Turner, "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites De Passage." 
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The liminality of the Son of God in the incarnation consists thus of being both 
divine and human and neither divine nor human at the same time. It is of utmost 
importance however, that this liminality of the Son of God be recognized as the 
reflection of the Son’s eternal liminality in the Trinity. The subject of the liminal 
incarnate Son even in his role betwixt and between God and humanity, even in the 
godforsakenness and dehumanization on the cross, is not a demigod but the one and 
only person of the Son. God in God’s sovereign freedom remains God even in 
godforsakenness. 
The incarnate Son’s liminality exhibits the complex dynamic of the 
incarnation’s Godward and humanward movements and their contradicting dual 
aspects. The incarnate Christ through his birth, life, death, and resurrection can be 
described as being both divine and human and also neither divine nor human. 
 
Christ as Non-Place 
This liminality can be expanded by theologically utilizing the metaphor of liminal 
space: non-place.941 The hypostatic union beginning with the birth of Christ and 
finding its completion in the death and resurrection of Christ can be understood as 
the work of the Son to carve out a unique liminal space in between God and 
humanity. Through the complete ‘dedivinization’ and dehumanization on the cross, 
the Son establishes within himself a non-place where previously held identities, 
histories, relations are disregarded and a fresh start for a new encounter between God 
and humanity becomes possible. Christ in his person creates a space without 
judgment in which even the most marginalized are invited to participate and be 
liberated from the shackles of society’s labels. In this sacred non-place, Christ 
establishes the gracious presence of God. 
Christ, being both divine and human as well as neither divine nor human, 
through himself is able to represent a ‘God beyond judgment of humanity’ to 
humanity as well as a ‘humanity beyond fallenness’ to God. Through Christ’s non-
place, God’s judgment is left behind as God newly enters into relation with humanity 
as ‘Gott-zum-Menschen-hin.’942 God, in Christ’s non-place between God and 
humanity, steps out of Godself and reveals Godself to be pro nobis. Similarly, 
                                                          
941 Augé, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. 
942 Brunner, Wahrheit als Begegnung. 
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humanity can escape the god-hostile environment and through Christ can enter into 
the theological non-place between God and humanity to meet God in redeemed 
fashion, as children of God. The betweenness of the person of the incarnate Son far 
from being an obstacle to be overcome, through the liminality of the hypostatic 
union becomes the meeting place of God and humanity mediated through the 
intervention of the Son who not only completely identifies with us but also acts as 
our substitute on our behalf. 
The liminal Christ as non-place thus carves out a sacred space between God 
and humanity to make possible the encounter of a forgiving God and a repentant 
humanity. Through this neutral space in Christ, God can be God even in the face of a 
fallen humanity and morally bankrupt humanity can be humanity even before a holy 
God. Furthermore, just as Christ’s incarnation assured a space for God among fallen 
humanity, so Christ’s ascension assures a space for humanity at God’s right hand. 
 
Liquid Christ 
Bauman Zygmunt’s dual concepts of solid and liquid943 can also be applied 
theologically to the incarnate Christ’s liminality. Liquidity in Christ signifies 
Christ’s freedom to transcend the dualism of God versus humanity in his liminality. 
The contradiction of the presence of God’s judgment and human fallenness within 
Christ is overcome through Christ’s liquidity. Christ in his liminality as both divine 
and human as well as neither divine nor human is free to perform multiple 
conflicting roles within himself. Humanity’s sin and God’s judgment exist as 
incompatible solid obstacles preventing any amicable encounter between God and 
humanity. Christ in his flexible liquidity takes on different shapes to accommodate 
these solid structures and fill the gap between them. While having assumed the solid 
structure of a fallen humanity, Christ in his freedom can nevertheless live a faithful 
filial life in active obedience. While bringing God’s solid judgment to bear on 
creation, Christ in liminal freedom nevertheless can identify with a godforsaken 
humanity. 
Shifting shapes appropriately in Christ’s mediating movement, the Son 
presents to humanity a human-sympathetic God and presents to God a godly 
humanity. The Son’s shape shifting liquidity is thus able to fill the gaps between God 
                                                          
943 Bauman, Liquid Modernity. 
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and humanity and fulfil the demands of God as well as meet the needs of humanity. 
In his liminality, he shows his willingness to mediate and work towards 
reconciliation by actively using his liquidity not to remain aloof and above the 
messiness of the divine-human conflict, but to take on different roles shifting from 
liquid to solid and solid to liquid to represent both God and humanity within his 
person. This, of course, points to a constructive marginality in Christ able to act 
purposefully to accomplish the reconciliation of God and humanity. 
 
Constructive Marginality 
Throughout Christ’s life, Christ in his liminality shows the ability to construct 
contexts intentionally, remain authentic, and shift smoothly between different roles 
both representing God to humanity (in identifying with fallen humanity but also in 
judging human corruption) and humanity to God (in active and passive obedience). 
Christ thus displays a constructive marginality as opposed to an encapsulating 
marginality.944 Christ does so by overcoming the dichotomy of God versus humanity 
through his dynamic in-betweenness945 and through his mediation946 of revelation 
and reconciliation. 
Bochner et al. describe the ideal mediator as someone with “two skills in one 
skull.”947 A mediator must be able to both genuinely identify as well as freely 
transcend. The one person of Christ in two natures does exactly that. Christ’s 
constructive marginality can be described in terms of Christ’s bilinguality (mediation 
of revelation) and biculturality (mediation of reconciliation).  
Torrance often describes Christ’s mediation in terms of the translation of 
language.948 He writes that Christ “assumed human speech into himself as the Word 
of God in such a way as to address us precisely as human word, without ceasing to 
be the Word of God.”949 And furthermore, argues that “Jesus is also the real text of 
our address to God. We have no speech or language with which to address God but 
the speech and language called Jesus Christ. In him our humanity, our human 
                                                          
944 Bennett, "Cultural Marginality: Identity Issues in Intercultural Training." 
945 Yoshikawa, "The Double Swing Model of Intercultural Communication between the East and the 
West." 
946 Bochner, The Mediating Person: Bridges between Cultures. 
947 Ibid., 53. 
948 See for example: Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, 76-79; The Christian Doctrine of God: One 
Being Three Persons, 40-41. 
949 The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 41. 
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understanding, our human word are taken up, purified and sanctified, and addressed 
to God the Father for us as our very own—and that is the word with which God is 
well pleased.”950 Being two-natured thus means to be a bilingual native speaker of 
both God’s speech and human speech in one person. Jesus reveals God to humanity 
by faithfully translating God’s Word into human speech and form. Jesus being the 
divine speaker is also the faithful listener in his vicarious humanity, listening to the 
word of God in his active obedience on behalf of humanity. Reversely, Jesus 
guarantees that our human speech is translated into acceptable speech before God 
and given an audience. The human word of godforsakenness on the cross of Christ 
is, through Christ’s passive obedience, translated (‘purified and sanctified’) and 
heard loud and clear by God in Christ’s identification with sinful humanity. In his 
liminality, Christ then acts as the bilingual translator who is native to both God and 
humanity. As native speaker as well as faithful listener, Christ ensures that God’s 
Word to humanity and humanity’s word to God are not lost in translation. 
Christ’s two skills in one skull also extend to his mediation of reconciliation. 
The cause for the enmity between God and humanity is not merely a problem of 
miscommunication but a problem of disobedience. As bicultural mediator who 
understands both God’s point of view as well as humanity’s point of view, Christ 
steps between God and humanity to represent humanity’s ‘culture’ acceptably before 
God and God’s ‘culture’ acceptably before humanity. On the one hand, Christ brings 
with him the presence of God. This presence of God does not consist of arbitrary 
judgment of humanity but of the faithful establishment of the kingdom of God 
through the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. Christ presents God to humanity in 
a form that humanity can participate in through identifying with Christ. On the other 
hand, Christ presents to God a faithful humanity both willing to actively depend on 
the Father as well as passively agreeing to the undoing of our sinful human nature on 
the cross. Thus, even the crucifixion, which at first seems like an encapsulating 
event, is infused with intentionality and purpose so that for Christ it is part of his 
constructive marginality. 
As mediator between God and humanity, Christ then can be understood as a 
Third Culture Kid betwixt and between God and humanity who can speak both the 
native tongues of God and humanity and who is able to faithfully live out God’s way 
                                                          
950 The Mediation of Christ, 78-79. 
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of life as well as humanity’s way of life. This is possible through the unique 
liminality of Christ who is both divine and human but who also transcends these two 
categories by also being neither divine nor human. 
 
Conclusion 
We have so far traced liminality as a theological idea from the liminality of the 
divine persons in the Trinity to the liminality of the incarnate Son between God and 
humanity. In the person and work of Christ the mediator we have also been able to 
more explicitly portray Christ as a bilingual and bicultural proto-TCK. As proto-
TCK, Christ is a native of divinity and also humanity but is able to freely mediate 
between the two by transcending the dichotomy of God versus humanity by 
embodying an identity as the third who is neither divine nor human. 
Importantly, Christ as ‘the third’ between God and humanity who is able to 
transcend both God and humanity, far from being an alien other, is the very 
embodiment of a liminal God. This means that God in God’s liminality is a self-
transcending God and the Son’s liminality between God and humanity is a faithful 
working out within the economy of salvation the eternal liminality of the life of the 
Trinity. While the incarnation certainly is a new event for God, the mediation of 
Christ is nevertheless in accordance with whom God is. In the words of Torrance, the 
liminal Christ’s mediation “reveals that [God] loves us more than he loves himself—
the transcendent sovereignty of the eternal love of God.”951 
It remains now to spell out how the liminality of Christ plays out in the 
justification of believers and the construction of their identity as liminal children of 
God. 
  
                                                          




Towards a Liminal Christian Identity 
 
Introduction 
From Nozomu Miyahira we have adopted the ‘God-Christ-believer’ structure and 
this chapter constitutes the third act in our argument from a liminal doctrine of the 
Trinity, through a liminal doctrine of Christ in two natures, to a doctrine of a liminal 
Christian identity. Through Emil Brunner we have recast Christianity as the answer 
to the question of human identity. The ‘God-Christ-believer’ structure thus tells the 
story of how God bestows new identities unto God’s creatures. This chapter focuses 
on the question of how a liminal God and saviour impacts believers’ everyday lives 
on earth. We have fleshed out this structure using Thomas Torrance’s mediation-
themed theology and have constructed a theology fitting to TCKs with liminality as 
the underlying theme that connects everything. Sticking with the theme of liminality 
together with non-place, liquidity, and constructive marginality, this chapter makes 
the case for a liminal Christian identity. 
First, this chapter reviews how liminality has conventionally been understood 
in the experience of believers. Next, using Torrance’s insights, it makes the case for 
Christ as the person who bestows believers with their identity. Third, the chapter 
argues for the construction of a Christian liminal identity through justification in 
Christ, before concluding with a review of how a TCK theology impacts TCKs’ 
quest for an internal locus of integrity. 
 
Liminality and Faith 
Liminality as a spiritual theme permeates Christian faith. For example, believers 
experience liminality being simul iustus et peccator, in anticipation of the Kingdom 
of God already and not yet here, or as living both heavenly and earthy lives. More 
often than not, spiritual liminality involves a personal crisis of faith.952 St. John of 
the Cross’ 16th century treatise, Dark Night of the Soul, represents perhaps the most 
                                                          
952 Anne Franks and John Meteyard, "Liminality: The Transforming Grace of in-between Places," 
Journal of Pastoral Care & Counseling 61, no. 3 (2007); Michelle Trebilcock, "Living with Jesus in 
Liminality: An Invitation to ‘Be Dead with the Dead God.’," Crucible 4, no. 1 (2012). 
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famous case of such spiritual liminality.953 Michelle Trebilcock describes the 
experience of liminality among believers as “an apophatic experience of loss and 
deconstruction.”954 Anne Franks and John Meteyard describe liminality in terms of 
displacement: “that sense of being in no man’s land, where the landscape appears 
completely different, there is no discernible road map, and where the journeyer is 
jolted out of normalcy.”955 Liminality is here portrayed as a critical interruption of 
one’s faith journey which upon resolution ideally leads to an encounter with God on 
a deeper level. 
Franks and Meteyard outline three scriptural metaphors of liminality as points 
of orientation: the tomb of Christ; wilderness; exile.956 First, the tomb of Christ, 
between the death and resurrection of Christ, represents a powerful image for the 
spiritually liminal. Believers are invited to identify with Christ in his tomb awaiting 
resurrection.957 The tomb captures the pain of loss as one disidentifies with one’s old 
self. It represents the act of dying to oneself in order to move towards a more 
authentic self. In this sense, the liminality of the tomb leads to liberation from 
inauthentic constructed selves. 
Second, the wandering through the wilderness958 represents a common 
metaphor for spiritual liminality. The wilderness stands for the experience of 
emptiness and loss of security and ideally leads to discovering a sense of security in 
God. Spiritual pilgrims wandering the wilderness have the opportunity to break with 
their previous lives and construct new patterns of behaviour reflecting a newfound 
trust in and dependence on God. 
Third, exile959 exists as a rich biblical theme for believers in liminality. 
According to Franks and Meteyard, exiles are confronted with two tasks: the need to 
adapt in order to be able to live in integrity while not at home and the need to 
transcend themselves by finding ‘home’ in God, rather than a culture or nation.960 
                                                          
953 "Living with Jesus in Liminality: An Invitation to ‘Be Dead with the Dead God.’," 3. See also how 
Dark Night of the Soul relates to crisis of faith and depression: G. Durà-Vilà and S. Dein, "The Dark 
Night of the Soul: Spiritual Distress and Its Psychiatric Implications," Mental Health, Religion & 
Culture 12, no. 6 (2009). 
954 Trebilcock, "Living with Jesus in Liminality: An Invitation to ‘Be Dead with the Dead God.’," 2. 
955 Franks and Meteyard, "Liminality: The Transforming Grace of in-between Places," 216. 
956 Ibid., 218-20. 
957 Trebilcock, "Living with Jesus in Liminality: An Invitation to ‘Be Dead with the Dead God.’." 
958 E.g. Moses, the Exodus, David, John the Baptist, Jesus. 
959 E.g. Babylonian captivity, Jewish diaspora. 
960 Franks and Meteyard, "Liminality: The Transforming Grace of in-between Places," 219. 
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The hoped-for outcome of such exilic experience of liminality is the increased 
openness to “many different expressions of identity, culture, and community, 
without the nostalgically longing for the familiar.”961 
According to Trebilcock, such experiences of liminality are common and 
actually necessary in order to mature as a believer: “It is not that the whole of the 
religious life is lived in liminality, but rather that liminal moments and movements 
are an essential element to a constantly unfolding encounter with God.”962 This 
raises the important question of how TCKs are to understand their experience of 
liminality in light of this common framing of liminality in Christian experience in 
terms of a temporary crisis of faith. Trebilcock focuses on the metaphor of the tomb 
and suggests that believers going through a period of liminality ought to imagine 
themselves as experiencing Holy Saturday and ‘be dead with the dead God’ until 
such time that God deems them ready to experience a personal resurrection.963 
However, “there is nothing to do but wait”964 is hardly the appropriate Christian 
response to the TCK’s experience of living in perpetual liminality.965 
Instead of categorising the experience of liminality as a temporary crisis of 
faith which will eventually be resolved through an encounter with God, it is more 
fitting for TCKs to establishing the encounter with God itself as an event which 
ascribes new meaning to TCKs’ liminality in a constructive way. As we have already 
seen in our argument for a liminal doctrine of the Trinity and of Christ, liminality 
need not be encapsulating but can be constructive through purposeful action such as 
mediation. Thus, far from an encapsulating liminal experience, the encounter with 
God, as we have explored through Brunner in chapter 13, ought to enable TCKs to 
transact their liminality constructively by providing internalized spiritual values 
which can help TCKs achieve an integrated, higher order, ethnorelative self-
concept.966 The question is thus how we can construct an account of Christian 
liminality as a model for TCK which can resolve the encapsulating search for 
authenticity. 
                                                          
961 Ibid., 220. 
962 Trebilcock, "Living with Jesus in Liminality: An Invitation to ‘Be Dead with the Dead God.’," 10. 
963 Ibid. 
964 Ibid., 1. 
965 Schaetti and Ramsey, "The Global Nomad Experience: Living in Liminality." 
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Nevertheless, the theme of death plays a pivotal role in the construction of the 
believer’s liminal identity.967 Death also represents a key metaphor for the state of 
liminality in Victor Turner.968 Brunner argues that the identity-bestowing encounter 
with God involves the believer being ‘sucked into’ the death of Christ so that the 
death of Christ becomes a real death and Christ’s resurrection the real resurrection as 
‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’ of the believer.969 The believer’s identification with the 
liminal death and resurrection of Christ thus stands out as the crucial event through 
which God forms the believer’s permanent liminal Christian identity. In this sense, 
we will thus treat the invitation to ‘be dead with the dead God’ (i.e. to become 
liminal with the liminal God) as the key concept in understanding how God bestows 
believers with a God-given liminal identity. 
 
The Personalised Person and the Personalising Person 
Torrance’s 1988 article, The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian 
Tradition, outlines his vision of what true human existence should be in light of 
Christ’s redemptive mediation.970 Torrance argues that in the hypostatic union Christ 
assumes our fallen human nature and redeems it within his person in order to restore 
humanity to what it is destined to be: genuine personhood in inter-human relations 
reflecting, in a creaturely way, the uncreated personal relations within the Trinity.971 
God in God’s tripersonal being constitutes the fullness of personal being and the 
ideal humanity should reflect in their creaturely way.972 Torrance writes: 
[W]e may not understand what it means to speak of God as Person or as personal in 
terms of what human beings are in themselves and in their relations to one another, 
for human personhood is to be understood properly by relation to the creative 
Personhood of God. We must think of God, rather, as ‘personalising Person’, and of 
ourselves as ‘personalised persons’, people who are personal primarily through onto-
relations to him as the creative Source of our personal being, and secondarily through 
                                                          
967 For example: Gal. 2.20 “I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in 
me”; Gal. 4.16 “May I never boast except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the 
world has been crucified to me, and I to the world”; Col. 2.7 “I have been buried with him in 
baptism”; Col. 2:20 “Since you died with Christ to the basic principles of the world (…)”; Phil. 3.10 
“becoming like him in death”. 
968 Turner, "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites De Passage." 
969 Brunner, Wahrheit als Begegnung, 114-15. 
970 Thomas F. Torrance, "The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the Christian Tradition," Modern 
Theology 4, no. 4 (1988). 
971 Ibid., 311-12. 
972 The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons, 161. 
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onto-relations to one another within the subject-subject structures of our creaturely 
being as they have come from him.973 
For Torrance the imago dei lies in this human capacity to be fully personalised 
through our relation to God and in our relations to others.974 Similarly to Miyahira’s 
argument of human ‘betweenness’ and concord reflecting divine ‘betweenness’ and 
concord,975 Torrance argues that human persons ought to reflect the transcendent 
person-constituting onto-relations in God. The vertical onto-relation to our Creator 
and the horizontal onto-relation to other human beings constitute human 
personhood.976 
The Son and the Spirit reveal and activate God’s “personalising and 
humanising power.”977 “Jesus is the personalising activity of God”978 through whom 
we can become genuine persons. The incarnate Son is the one person who is 
properly in the image of God and also discloses and establishes humanity’s true 
image.979 Torrance argues that Christ is the ‘humanising man’ as he is both the 
source of humanity and humanity par excellence.980 Christ takes our corrupted 
humanity and humanises it in himself through his active and passive obedience to the 
Father. Believers take part in Christ’s true humanity by uniting themselves to Christ 
through the work of the Spirit. Thus, “[f]or us to be human, therefore, is to be in 
Christ.”981 
Furthermore, Torrance argues the Son is the ‘personalising person’ as in the 
incarnation human nature becomes fully real in the person of the Son. The Son is the 
personalising person and we who are united to Christ through the Spirit are the 
personalised persons who derive our personhood from the Son.982 Torrance’s 
definition of human person is founded on his understanding of the Trinitarian 
persons in their onto-relations. Humans, created in the image of God, are called to 
live in constitutive relations towards others mirroring the Trinitarian persons. Thus, 
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Torrance summarizes: “To be truly human is to be truly personal, and to be truly 
personal is to be truly human.”983 
Torrance explains this humanisation / personalisation in the Son through the 
two complementary concepts of ‘anhypostasis’ and ‘enhypostasis’.984 Anhypostasis 
asserts that in the assumption the human nature of Christ has no independent 
hypostasis or subsistence apart from the hypostatic union with the person of the Son. 
It stresses the general humanity of Jesus, the adamic fallen human nature the Son 
assumed.985 It also expresses Christ’s ontological solidarity with all of humanity.986 
Enhypostasis asserts that in the assumption the human nature was given a real 
concrete hypostasis or subsistence in the hypostatic union with the perfect person of 
the Son.987 It stresses the particular humanity of the man Jesus who is none other 
than the eternal person of the Son.988 In the continuous hypostatic union our 
anhypostatically assumed fallen nature is enhypostatically healed and restored 
through the personalising and humanising work of the personalised and humanised 
person of the Son.989 
In being ‘in Christ’, a believer is united with the Son through the mediation of 
the Spirit and thus can “trnascend [sic] his original creation [and] exist not just 
alongside the Creator, but in such a way that his human being is anchored in the very 
Being of God.”990 It is in the Spirit that the humanising and personalising work of 
the Son is actualised within believers.991 Thus the objective reconciliation in the 
hypostatic union of the Son goes hand in hand with the subjective actualisation of 
that reconciliation within us through the Spirit. For Torrance, not only Christ’s 
objective identification with our humanity but our subjective identification with 
Christ through the Spirit play an important role. 
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The humanisation and personalisation of Christ in the incarnation cannot be 
understood apart from the selfless love of God to go beyond Godself for the sake of 
humanity. Reflecting God’s eternal love for the other in the Trinity, God’s relation to 
creation reveals that “God actually loves us more than he loves himself.”992 Thus, 
Torrance argues that human ‘goodness and dignity’ also consists in selflessly loving 
others not for our own sake. Christ’s humanising and personalising power is 
actualised in our lives by us going beyond ourselves.993 Torrance writes: 
[T]he relations of Love between the Person of the Holy Trinity belong essentially to 
what the Divine Person are. (…) God has created human beings in such a way that 
their inter-human relations are meant to be inter-personal, and as such are meant to 
reflect on the level of the creature the inter-personal relations of God himself.994 
Human persons are called to transcend themselves and enter into the ‘betweenness’ 
of inter-human relations. Torrance envisions humans in their union with Christ 
through the Spirit to act as “a kind of midwife to creation” and “the priest of 
creation.”995 By this he means that in going beyond themselves to love others for 
their sake, believers bring the best out in creatures and contribute to the emergence 
of richer forms of life. As ‘priests of creation’ believers play a role in the redemption 
of creation. Believer’s selfless love for others gives life to harmonious creaturely 
diversity. Both ‘midwife to creation’ and ‘priest of creation’ are concepts pregnant 
with significance for TCKs in their liminality as they connote intercession and 
mediation for the sake of others. 
 
Towards a Liminal Christian Identity 
Now that we discussed Torrance’s theological anthropology, we can reinterpret the 
significance of Christ’s personalisation and humanisation in terms of liminality. So 
far we have portrayed the Trinitarian persons as liminal persons in between two 
others and Christ as the incarnate liminal person in between God and humanity. The 
goal is now to portray Torrance’s believers’ identity in Christ as ‘midwives to 
creation’ or ‘priests of creation’ within our framework of liminality. For TCKs, to be 
truly personal is to be constructively liminal reflecting the transcendent liminality of 
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the Trinity through the redemptive liminality of Christ. Thus, in the context of a 
TCK theology, God’s act of justifying sinners through the righteousness of Christ 
signifies God’s gracious bestowing of a new redeemed liminal identity onto 
believers through the personalising work of the liminal mediator Christ in whose 
death believers dwell. 
In union with Christ, Christ’s liminality has a double significance as the 
humanisation and personalisation of Christ’s assumed fallen humanity becomes the 
humanisation and personalisation of each believer’s human person. Christ’s 
vicarious humanity in Christ’s Godward movement of passive and active obedience 
becomes the believer’s passive and active obedience before God. This means that, on 
the one hand, Christ’s dehumanising movement that ends in the judgment and 
destruction of sinful humanity in the crucifixion also becomes the believer’s 
movement of deidentification with constructed identities which have idolatrously 
taken the place of humanity’s primary identity as ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her.’ 996  
Believers participate in the passion of Christ so that the death of Christ becomes the 
real death of the believer where previously held constructed identities are exposed as 
falling short of what God envisioned for humanity, judged, and destroyed. The cross 
shatters believer’s trust in human institutions and sense of security in the identities 
these institutions construct. The personalisation that occurs in Christ thus involves 
the deconstruction of our false notions of what it means to be human persons. In the 
words of the Lutheran theologian Robert Kolb, “God kills to make alive.”997 
On the other hand, in the personalisation in Christ a constructive development 
runs parallel to the above described deconstruction of our fallen humanity. In union 
with Christ, the active obedience of the Son, expressing itself in dependence and 
trust in the Father, become the believer’s expression of dependence and trust in the 
Father through Christ. Our fallen human nature is properly personalised and 
humanised in the person of the Son. In Christ and through the work of the Spirit our 
new identity as ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’ is constructed through identification with the 
birth, life, death, and resurrection of Christ. 
It is not enough to merely argue that God bestows new identities on believers 
through the liminal mediation of the Son. In participating in Christ’s liminality, 
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believers enter Christ’s liminality. In Christ’s non-place, people leave their loyalties 
behind in their anthropological places. In Christ’s liquidity, believer’s identities are 
dissolved. However, what kind of personhood takes the place of what is 
deconstructed for TCKs? Torrance speaks of midwives and priests who love beyond 
themselves but what does that mean for TCKs in their liminality? What is the 
content of ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’ in the context of a TCK theology? 
Torrance makes the case that human personhood reflects the divine persons of 
the Trinity. This means that for a TCK theology, the liminality of the Trinitarian 
persons finds an expression in the redeemed identities of believers. However, while 
believers participate in Christ’s liminality, their liminality differs from Christ’s. In 
his liminality, Christ mediates betwixt and between God and humanity, creating a 
neutral space for humanity and God to meet by being at once both divine and human 
and neither divine nor human through death and resurrection. Believers are the ones 
who are mediated and reconciled to God through the Son in the Spirit, not the ones 
who then subsequently mimic the mediating between the divine persons. Creaturely 
liminality, while mirroring divine liminality, must do so in a creaturely fitting way 
within a world full of groups at odds with each other. In what sense are believers 
‘both/and’ and ‘neither/nor’? 
 
Justification as Liminal Identity 
In order to more explicitly outline the liminality implied in the human identity as 
‘midwife to creation’ and ‘priest of creation’, we will turn to Robert Kolb’s creative 
modern reinterpretation of Luther’s concept of the two kinds of righteousness as two 
dimensions of human identity. 998 Kolb’s novel framework argues that the doctrine of 
justification is the answer to the question of what it means to be human. Luther’s two 
kinds of righteousness (passive, Christ’s righteousness; active, proper righteousness) 
signify the two relationships or dimensions (vertical in relation with God; horizontal 
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in relation to others) of our human existence and help make the case for believer’s 
liminal identity both ‘neither/nor’ and ‘both/and’.999 
First, the justification of sinners (or personalisation / humanisation of believers 
in Torrance’s words) restores believers’ relation with God. Christ’s righteousness 
thus constitutes believers’ core or primary identity before God. In Brunner’s words, 
justification regenerates human beings as ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her.’ Christ’s 
righteousness is seen in his trust toward the loving Father and this trusting, vertical 
relationship constitutes believers’ fundamental identity.1000 Believers are 
theologically defined by God through identification in faith with Christ’s death and 
resurrection.1001 
Second, this core identity is lived out and performed through the secondary 
righteousness in horizontal relationships to others.1002 Our love towards other 
creatures is a reflection of our core identity. The two must be held together as the 
one influences the other but must be distinguished as our theological identity 
bestowed on us by God through faith transcends our secondary social affiliations. 
The secondary, proper righteousness is fulfilled in our familiar, economic, political, 
and religious responsibilities to others but is done so under the impact of the primary 
core identity provided to us through Christ’s liminality.1003 
The two dimensions to human identity are also expressed in Luther’s 1520 
treatise On the Freedom of a Christian in terms of human freedom and 
responsibility: “A Christian is a free lord over all things and subject to no one. A 
Christian is a dutiful servant to all things and subject to all.”1004 On the one hand, a 
Christian is neither this nor that since believers undergo a real death and a real 
resurrection through their participation in Christ’s liminality. Previous identities are 
undone and left behind. Neither political nor cultural nor economic standings have a 
say in the believer’s encounter with God in Christ’s mediating liminality. On the 
other hand, Christians always express their primary identity as liberated ‘Mensch-
von-Gott-her’ through their secondary social responsibilities as gendered, political, 
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ethnic, economic beings to their neighbours but do so under the impact of the 
liberation from the constraints of these constructed national, political, ethnic, 
economic etc. identities. 
Torrance’s vision of human beings as midwives to creation and priests of 
creation thus needs to be seen in the light of the two dimensions of human existence: 
Christ’s righteousness which liberates believers to be neither this nor that and 
believers’ proper righteousness which enables them to freely identify in solidarity 
with others. The freedom that springs from Christ’s liminality thus frees believers to 
take on different representative roles within creation while transcending these.  
In this sense, the believer’s secondary righteousness which flows from the 
primary righteousness of the liminal Christ consists in ‘standing in the gap’ and 
mediating. A Christian is thus obligated, in objective love for the sake of the other, 
to take on the case of the neglected, the weak, the disadvantaged, the marginalized, 
or the victimized. In mediation, Christians naturally also have the obligation to stand 
in for and represent the accused. Liminal Christians thus find themselves in the 
‘unhappy middle’ betwixt and between groups at odds with each other. Believers in 
their liminal Christian identity thus on the one hand transcend the particularities of 
social identities and are freed from both the need to depend on them in order to ‘be 
someone’ as well as from the demands that such constructed identities might make. 
Believers’ speaking from within the liminality of Christ are thus free to speak out 
against injustice among their own and show solidarity even to the alien other. 
In accordance with our understanding of Turner’s liminality as being both 
‘neither/nor’ and ‘both/and’, liminal believers in union with the liminal Christ both 
belong to no one in particular while at the same time are free to identify with anyone. 
Christians are always both apart from the constructed identities in our society and a 
part of the diverse identities of creatures. Christians are always both not at home and 
always at home. Being ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’ in the context of a TCK theology thus 
means being liminal in a creaturely way as God is liminal in a transcendent way. 
 
Justification and Non-Place 
Believers in their liminality as ‘Mensch-von-Gott-her’ thus stand in between various 
groups as mediators, representing both sides yet belonging to neither. This redeemed 
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liminality can now be expanded on utilizing Marc Augé’s concept of non-place.1005 
In Christ, believers stand in and speak from within the non-place Christ created in 
his own liminality. Believers also function as creators of non-places within their own 
contexts. 
First, identifying with Christ, believers transcend the places they find 
themselves in. Through the justification by God through faith believers are 
graciously placed on new ground in Christ’s non-place where they are humanised 
and personalised. Believers stand in Christ’s non-place, always simultaneously 
leaving their anthropological places behind in repentance and renewing their 
belonging to Christ’s non-place in faith by the grace of God. 
Second, standing in Christ’s non-place, believers can now create a sacred space 
wherever they find themselves in. Christ’s righteousness which provides the space 
believers inhabit as citizens of heaven now flows over into believer’s proper 
righteousness as they open up non-places for others to enter into. Belonging to the 
non-place of Christ thus effects the transformation of the space believers find 
themselves in into non-places betwixt and between the constructed places in society. 
As midwives to creation and priest of creation liminal believers thus participate in 
God’s redeeming act of creating sacred places in creation that provide refuge and 
rest for others. Sacred non-places protect the integrity of diverse others while 
facilitating reconciliation between groups at odds. Under the impact of the liminal 
space carved out by Christ between God and humanity for the reconciliation of 
humanity to God and the regeneration of humanity, believers now carve out non-
places for others to enter and to find reconciliation. As midwives, believers help 
create a space for dialog and understanding between conflicting parties and as priests 
believers interceded for others. Justification thus leads to the creation of non-places 
where justice for the oppressed, the victimised, or marginalised can be realised. 
 
Justification and Liquidity 
As liminal believers belonging to the liminal non-place of Christ and carving out 
sacred non-places within creation, believers participate in the dissolution of their 
identities in Christ but also benefit from the liquidity that comes from Christ’s 
justifying liminality in situations they find themselves in. We can thus apply 
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Zygmunt Bauman’s metaphor of liquidity to liminal believers.1006 The justification 
of the believer in Christ’s death means the melting of solid structures that limit 
believers in their regeneration in relation to God but also in their mediation between 
their neighbours. 
However, just as liquidity in the Trinity and liquidity in Christ exists not for 
the sake of disassociating and emancipating oneself from commitment to others, so 
in the believer’s case the liminal liquidity does not imply a believer’s otherworldly 
aloofness. The newfound liberation believers find in their liquidity through their 
justification in Christ is meant to be put to work in the proper righteousness of the 
liminal believer’s everyday life. As already seen in the case of non-place, believers 
as midwives and priests are to reflect the liquidity of the Trinity and Christ in their 
mediation betwixt and between their neighbours. 
The ability to disassociate oneself from particular identities through identifying 
with Christ gives liminal believers the freedom to purposefully and intentionally 
shift and take shapes in service of their neighbours. In mediating as midwives and 
priests, believers are not stuck between blind loyalty to solid structures and cool 
liquid reservation to commitment but can smoothly shift from one shape to another. 
In this sense of being both liquid and solid, we can, for example, understand Paul’s 
proclamation that “there is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is 
there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus”1007 and Paul’s ability and 
willingness to “become all things to all people so that by all possible means I might 
save some.”1008 In Christ, human liquidity is put in the service of achieving 
reconciliation. Believers act as the liquid lubricant in order to make possible the 
peaceful and fruitful encounter between different groups, taking on the forms of 
various others in solidarity and as representatives while also remaining unbiased as 
liquid liminal persons in Christ. 
 
Justification and Constructive Marginality 
We have so far made the case for a Christian liminality which is different from that 
of a ‘dark night of the soul’ in need of consolation. The liminality of Christians 
through the work and person of the liminal Christ is an excellent example of a 
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constructive case of marginality.1009 The at times encapsulating experience of 
liminality in TCKs’ lives can be redeemed through a fitting presentation of 
Christianity which casts liminality in a highly positive light as a God-given gift to 
believers in order to live faithful lives as God’s liminal creatures. In justification in 
Christ, TCKs are given an internal locus of integrity which does not depend on 
external ever-shifting circumstances. The spiritual liminal identity, bestowed on 
believers by a liminal God through a liminal Christ by the power of a liminal Spirit, 
helps TCKs transact their liminality constructively. 
‘Midwives to creation’ and ‘priests of creation’ interpreted through the lens of 
liminality thus shows TCKs their imago dei in a familiar and relatable way, namely, 
as liminal mediators. TCKs’ multilingual and transcultural skills lend themselves 
perfectly in their role as global Christ-like liminal mediators. It gives TCKs a 
mandate to get involved rather than to withdraw, to commit rather than remain aloof, 
and to exercise their constructive liminality creatively for the glory of God and the 
good of their neighbours. Christian faith as a model for the constructive transaction 
of liminality helps TCKs make sense of their experience betwixt and between 
people. 
 
Bringing Part Three to a Close 
Part three has presented in broad strokes a Christian vision with the question of 
identity at its centre. Not only that, it has traced liminality as an underlying 
theological theme through three key theological areas: the doctrine of the Trinity, of 
Christ, and of a Christian liminal identity. Adapting Brunner’s concept of the 
identity bestowing God, we have made the argument that a liminal God through a 
liminal saviour bestows a liminal Christian identity on believers. Torrance’s 
mediation-focused theology has naturally lent itself to this end and has played a 
crucial role in fleshing out Miyahira’s ‘God-Christ-believer’ structure we have 
adapted from his theology of ‘betweenness.’ 
A TCK theology presents a viable candidate for TCKs as “a solid central core 
belief”1010 that lets TCKs integrate their unique experience more meaningfully. With 
Christianity as a resonating ‘personal truth’, TCKs can transact their repatriation as a 
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cosmopolite instead of as a homecomer or stranger. They can have a transnational 
national identity instead of an insular or merely international national identity. The 
experience of difference can be normalized instead of rejected or transacted as 
terminal uniqueness. And finally, the experience of plurality can be transacted within 
the framework of commitment within relativism instead of dividing dualism, 
confusing multiplicity, or mere relativism. 
A TCK theology provides TCKs with a spiritual dimension of belonging. A 
liminal identity in Christ functions as the crucial “non-contingent, overarching, and 
spiritual locus of integrity”1011 for TCKs. A TCK theology lets TCKs commitment to 
a “personal set of higher-order values”1012 based on a vision of Christianity that 
resonates with TCKs and affirms them in their experience of perpetual liminality. 
Thus, a TCK theology is a theology for TCKs. 
Applying the unique outlook of TCKs to Christianity in order to spell out in a 
new way concepts that have been overseen or neglected also benefits the wider 
Christian community. Liminality has turned out to be a fruitful framework through 
which to conceptualise the transcendent relations in the Trinity, the person and work 
of Christ, and believer’s Christian identity. For non-TCK believers, a TCK theology 
presents a fresh look at key theological areas fitting to a church in the 21st century 
faced with questions of identity amid mass migrations. A TCK theology is thus also a 
theology by TCKs for the benefit of the Church. 
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A Few Final Words 
 
Accomplishments 
Looking back at the argument for a TCK theology, we can now comment on what 
has been accomplished, the limitations of a TCK theology in its present form, and 
the potential for further exploration within the context of a TCK theology. 
This dissertation’s outline of a TCK theology presents a theological place for 
TCKs to belong to and to speak out from. We have shown that Christian faith can 
function as a spiritual home for TCKs. Moreover, Christian faith can function as a 
fitting liminal home which does not deny TCKs’ unique experience of liminality but 
affirms it in a constructive way. Christian faith also challenges TCKs to commit even 
within their relativistic outlook to putting their liminality to work in mediation. 
Furthermore, a TCK theology successfully argued for a constructive 
understanding of liminality. TCKs are not called to merely survive in their liminality 
but to thrive in their restlessness and rootlessness. Tracing the theme of liminality 
not just in the area of Christology but also in the doctrine of the Trinity and Christian 
calling paints liminality in an entirely different light. God is not just the fellow 
sufferer who understands the suffering TCK but the giver of the gift of constructive 
liminality to TCKs. 
Finally, a TCK theology has shown that the theme of liminality can give a 
constructive theology significant coherence. The doctrine of the Trinity, of Christ, 
and of the identity of believers could all be discussed using the one underlying theme 
of liminality. The three theological areas could be treated as naturally related to one 
another. The ‘God-Christ-Believer’ line of argument showed beautifully how 
liminality originates in God, works in the redemption of creation through Christ, and 
finds fulfilment in the identity and life of believers. 
 
Present Limitations 
Not surprisingly, a TCK theology in its current form has its limits. First of all, it is 
methodologically limited in that it is a contextualisation of theology for a particular 
group of people. No particular theology can claim to be universal or infallible. A 
TCK theology needs to be seen as one fallible model of God among many other such 
theological models. However, a TCK theology adds a crucial perspective to our 
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communal understanding of who God is and can thus only be of benefit to the study 
of theology if properly understood as just such a contribution. 
A TCK theology is also limited in that it will soon be out of date. I write this as 
a turbulent year 2015 comes to an end. Acts of terrorism rocked France fuelling 
xenophobia across Europe. Greece’s economic meltdown has cast doubt on the idea 
of a unified European Union. Great Britain is still not sure if it wants to belong to 
continental Europe but neither is Scotland sure if it wants to remain within the 
United Kingdom. Meanwhile, millions of desperate refugees continue to flow into 
Europe to find both enthusiastic acceptance and angry rejection. Great tension exists 
between protectionist national identities and more idealistic transnational human 
solidarity. Who is in and who is out? The question of identity in the face of otherness 
is thus a very current dilemma and a TCK theology comes as an opportune 
perspective for churches across Europe. However, sooner or later other questions 
will overrun us and will demand more fitting theological answers. 
However, perhaps the most significant weakness of a TCK theology is its 
focus on the individual. It treats the question of a Christian identity in a rather 
individualistic way and stands in contrast with other theologies with the Christian 
community at their centre. This is an unfortunate side effect of the individualistic 
nature of TCKs for whom being rooted in a local community proves rather difficult. 
However, the lack of a proper treatment of liminal Christians and the Christian 
community can be remedied. 
This brings us to the final limitation. A TCK theology so far only addresses 
three theological areas: the doctrine of God, of Christ, and of believers’ identity. 
While these three key areas together certainly lend a TCK theology a sense of 
coherence and structure, we cannot call a TCK theology in its current form complete. 
Other theological areas deserve their rightful attention.  
 
Future Potential 
Thus, this dissertation points to the potential for further exploration. The theme of 
liminality which proved so useful as an underlying unifying theological theme can 
easily be applied in other theological areas to add towards a more complete TCK 
theology. Three areas are worth mentioning. 
First, to counter the individualistic tendencies, a TCK theology can benefit 
from an ecclesiology. From the perspective of TCKs, the church represents God’s 
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liminal community which transcends nationalities, cultures, and ethnicities in service 
of creation. A liminal body of Christ balances both difference and harmony through 
liminality thus glorifying God through human diversity and co-operation. 
Second, the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist as symbolic rites of 
liminality lend themselves naturally to a TCK theology and provide fertile ground 
for further exploration. Sacraments, from the perspective of TCKs, are outward signs 
of the inward gift of liminality from God. They are thus crucial symbols that express 
a liminal church’s identity. 
Third, no theology would be complete without an eschatology. From the 
perspective of TCKs, present liminality can only lead to an ever increasing 
constructive marginality in the future. A TCK theology thus holds that liminality is 
not mean to be resolved in the end. Eternity with a liminal God necessarily involves 
creaturely liminality as well. A TCK theology would therefore benefit from a liminal 
eschatology. 
Thus, a TCK theology promises to also be fruitful in other areas in theology, 
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